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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I argue that physicalism should be understood to be the view that mental 
properties are realized by physical properties. In doing this, I explore what the realization 
relation might be. Since realization is the relation that should help us formulate 
physicalism, I suggest that the theoretical role of realization consists in explaining some of 
the things that physicalists wish to explain. These are: (i) How are mental properties 
metaphysically necessitated by physical properties? (ii) How are mental properties causally 
efficacious? A theory of realization should provide resources for answering these questions. 
Having identified the theoretical role of realization, I discuss several theories of realization, 
but then focus on the subset view of realization. According to the subset view, a property P 
realizes a property Q if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal 
powers of P. I argue that the realization relation as it is formulated by the subset view is a 
promising candidate to play the theoretical role that I want realization to play. I then 
investigate how this theoretical role is occupied. In doing so, I provide a general 
metaphysical framework that the defenders of the subset view can appeal to. This 
framework specifies in what ways properties are related to their causal powers. Discussing 
some problems that the subset view faces, I propose my own version of the subset view. I 
argue that a property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal powers of Q are a 
proper subset of the causal powers of P, and (ii) P is more fundamental than Q. Thanks to 
the requirement that a realized property is less fundamental than its realizers, two things 
that the original version of the subset view cannot explain are guaranteed: first, 
fundamental properties are not realized; second, arbitrary conjunctions of properties do not 
realize their conjuncts. By showing how a theory of realization can help us explain some of 
the things that physicalists typically wish to explain, I also show that a non-reductive 
variety of physicalism does not face the problems that it is commonly thought to face.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an exploration of the realization relation that is thought by physicalists to 
relate mental properties to physical properties. I argue for a modified version of what has 
come to be known as the subset view of realization, the defenders of which are Jessica 
Wilson (1999), Lenny Clapp (2001), and Sydney Shoemaker (2001; 2003; 2007; 2011; 
2013). In doing so, I systematically lay out and critically evaluate different views on 
realization and causal powers. The notion of causal powers is central to the subset view, as 
the core idea of the subset view is that realization is ultimately a relation between causal 
powers of properties. Evaluating several theories of realization with respect to their 
implications regarding the formulation of physicalism and the explanation of mental 
causation, I argue for the following four claims: 
1. Physicalism should be understood as the view that mental properties are realized by 
physical properties.  
Physicalism is often understood to be the view that the mental is nothing over and above 
the physical. If physicalism is true, then the mental is nothing over and above the physical 
because of the way mental properties and physical properties are related. For realists about 
relations, the predicate “is nothing over and above” should correspond to a relation to be 
specified. In Chapter 1, I argue that realization is a better candidate than identity and 
(varieties of) supervenience for being such a relation. Throughout the thesis, I do not take a 
stance on whether physicalism is true or false; I only claim that a realization-based 
formulation of physicalism is better than other formulations and that some of the problems 
that physicalism is said to face can be solved thanks to a regimentation of realization.  
In Chapter 2, I start exploring what the realization relation might be. For this, I identify its 
theoretical role. Given that realization is a relation in terms of which physicalism is to be 
formulated, a theory of realization should provide resources to explain some of the things 
that physicalists wish to explain. I argue that a theory of realization should provide the 
resources to explain how mental properties are metaphysically necessitated by physical 
properties, and how mental properties can be causally efficacious.  
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2. A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal powers of Q are a proper 
subset of the causal powers of P, and (ii) P is a more fundamental property than Q.  
This is the modified version of the subset view that I argue for in Chapter 6. In working 
towards this argument, in Chapter 3, I provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on 
realization–the only comprehensive survey that exists to date. I evaluate theories of 
realization other than the subset view. I also introduce the core idea of the subset view, and 
defend it against some objections. The core idea of the subset view simply takes realization 
to be the proper subset relation that is addressed in (i). However, unless (ii) is added, 
certain problems cannot be solved. In particular, without the addition of (ii), fundamental 
properties turn out to be realizable, and arbitrary conjunctions of properties turn out to 
realize their conjuncts. I demonstrate these issues in Chapter 6, and I argue that my version 
of the subset view solves these problems. 
3. If realization is to be explained in terms causal powers, then the relationship between 
properties and their causal powers must also be explained.  
Defenders of the subset view should provide an explanation of how properties and their 
causal powers are related. In Chapter 4, I provide a critical survey of the notion of causal 
powers. What makes this survey original is that it is structured around two theses that I 
argue in Chapter 5 to be relevant for the subset view. These two theses are:  
(C1) Properties are individuated by their causal powers;  
(C2) Properties have their causal powers essentially.  
What makes the survey critical is that I argue that none of the arguments for or against 
these two theses are persuasive enough. Then, in Chapter 5, I argue that (C1) and (C2) are 
highly relevant for the subset view. With the endorsement of these two theses, the 
defenders of the subset view have the resources to explain how mental properties are 
metaphysically necessitated by physical properties. 
4. The subset view’s solution to the exclusion problem is not a distinctive one. 
In Chapter 2, I argue that a theory of realization should provide the resources to explain 
mental causation. In Chapter 3, I argue that the subset view can do this. In Chapter 7, I 
critically examine how this is done. In particular, I focus on the exclusion problem. The 
exclusion problem is the alleged problem that any causal work that a mental property is 
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supposed to do is already carried out by the physical property that realizes it, in which case 
there is no room for mental causes. The subset view and other theories of realization are 
designed to solve this problem.  
The subset view‟s solution to the exclusion problem is as follows: (i) because of the proper 
subset relationship between the causal powers of a mental property and its physical realizer, 
a mental property instance is a proper part of its realizer instance; (ii) parts and wholes do 
not causally compete; (iii) therefore, mental properties are not causally excluded by their 
realizers. In Chapter 7, I argue that although the exclusion problem can be solved, the 
endorsement of (i) is redundant and possibly problematic. I argue that the exclusion 
problem can be solved thanks to the observation that mental properties and their realizers 
are metaphysically non-distinct. Although it is true that parts and wholes are 
metaphysically non-distinct, this does not mean that mental property instances are parts of 
their realizers. Moreover, in order to show that mental property instances are parts of their 
realizer instances, the defenders of the subset view may have to make implausible 
metaphysical commitments. The reason that the subset view‟s solution to the exclusion 
problem is not unique is that many varieties of physicalism can and do recognise that 
mental properties and their realizers are metaphysically non-distinct. 
The conclusion of the thesis is that if physicalism is true, then the causal powers of mental 
properties are a proper subset of the causal powers of physical properties, and physical 
properties are more fundamental than mental properties. With the endorsement of (C1) and 
(C2), a physicalist of this sort can easily explain how mental properties are metaphysically 
necessitated by physical properties. Given the explanation of metaphysical necessitation, 
physicalists can take mental properties and their realizers to be metaphysically non-distinct. 
Since metaphysically non-distinct properties do not causally compete, the exclusion 
problem is not a problem for physicalism of this sort.  
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CHAPTER 1: FORMULATING PHYSICALISM 
1.0 Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to find a viable formulation of physicalism. In Section 1.1, I 
introduce physicalism as the view that mental properties are “nothing over and above” 
physical properties. I suggest that if physicalism is true, then that the mental is nothing 
over and above is true because of the way the mental and the physical are related. For 
realists about relations, then, the predicate “is nothing over and above” should denote some 
relation to be specified. For each such relation that may correspond to the predicate “is 
nothing over and above”, there will be a distinctive formulation of physicalism. In Section 
1.2, I discuss the proposal that supervenience is such a relation, and then list two 
supervenience-based formulations of physicalism. One conclusion to take from this section 
that will be important in the rest of this thesis is that, regardless of whether a 
supervenience-based formulation of physicalism is good enough or not, physicalism should 
be understood to entail that mental properties are metaphysically necessitated by physical 
properties. In Section 1.3, I introduce and endorse Horgan‟s (1993) argument that a 
supervenience-based formulation of physicalism is not good enough to distinguish 
physicalism from some anti-physicalist views, such as emergentism. His proposal is that 
physicalism should be formulated in terms of superdupervenience, which is a 
supervenience relation that is robustly explainable. Here, I will also introduce a relation 
that I call superhypervenience, which is a supervenience relation that is explainable, but 
the explanation that superhypervenience requires is different from the explanation that 
superdupervenience requires. In Section 1.4, I introduce the realization relation that is 
supposed to entail both superdupervenience and superhypervenience, and then propose that 
physicalism should be formulated as the view that mental properties are realized by 
physical properties. The two subsequent chapters will be devoted to the exploration of how 
the realization relation should be formulated.  
1.1 “Nothing Over and Above” 
Physicalism is usually understood as the view that nothing is over and above the physical. 
Understood this way, physicalism is quite a strong view, and it is not exactly the view that 
I am interested in this thesis. Stated this way, physicalism‟s domain is too large: it is a 
view about everything. It might be true that everything is ultimately physical, but the 
question that I am interested is what physicalism about the mind is. More precisely, I am 
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interested in the question what physicalism about mental properties is. By mental 
properties, I mean properties such as believing that it is raining, having a painful sensation, 
desiring to drink water and so on. So, physicalism, as I take it, is a view about properties, 
and specifically mental properties. Accordingly, the version of physicalism that I will focus 
on in this thesis is the view that mental properties are nothing over and above physical 
properties. Understood this way, physicalism is more or less captured by Smart‟s 
articulation that “sensations are nothing over and above brain processes” (1959: 145). Put 
in terms of properties, this is the view that having a sensation is nothing over and above 
being in some brain state or another.  
The “nothing over and above” locution is rather vague, but the thesis can be understood in 
the following way: mental properties are nothing over and above physical properties in a 
similar sense that wholes are nothing over and above their parts (and how those parts are 
arranged). I do not mean to suggest that the relationship between a mental property and 
some physical property (or properties) is the very same relationship as the one between a 
whole and its parts. However, there are important similarities between these relationships, 
and it is partly my aim in this thesis to explore these similarities. One important similarity 
has to do with the notion of “ontological innocence”.  
Lewis (1991: 82) has argued that mereological composition is ontologically innocent in the 
following sense: insofar as you are committed to the existence of the parts of an entity, 
such as a chair, the existence of the chair itself as a whole is not an additional ontological 
cost. To generalise, for any entities, insofar as you grant the existences of these entities, 
ontological commitment to the mereological composition of them does not violate 
ontological parsimony.
1
 Here, I am not taking up the task of defending this view about 
mereological composition. It is a controversial thesis that is challenged by some (e.g. 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 Armstrong (1997: 12-13) uses the phrase “ontological free lunch” for the products of mereological 
compositions to express a similar idea. 
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Merricks 2001). Rather, I am giving some content to the locution of “nothing over and 
above”. Similarly, one might think that sets are not mysterious, because once you grant the 
existence of Plato and Socrates, you can grant the existence of the set {Plato, Socrates} 
with no additional ontological cost. Accordingly, if you agree with these substantial 
philosophical claims about parts and wholes on the one hand, and sets and their members 
on the other hand, you might also agree that a chair is nothing over and above its parts in a 
similar way that the set {Plato, Socrates} is nothing over and above its members Plato and 
Socrates. The physicalist thesis in question should be read as the view that mental 
properties are not additional ontological costs to the physical properties whose existence 
we are ready to grant. 
Just as I will not pursue whether Lewis is right about composition or not, I will also not 
pursue whether physicalism about mental properties is true or not. What I will focus on is 
whether we can understand physicalism by means of using this analogy. The question is 
what it means to say that mental properties are nothing over and above physical properties. 
I take it that the predicate “is nothing over and above” is supposed to denote some relation 
in the world in the following way: if physicalism is true, then there is some relation 
between all mental properties on the one hand, and some physical properties on the other 
hand, such that the obtaining of this relation makes it true that mental properties are 
nothing over and above physical properties. 
Before proceeding to the exploration of what relations might be designated by the 
predicate “is nothing over and above”, I should note that I take physicalism to be a thesis 
about a given world (or a set of worlds). And, I take it that if physicalism is true in the 
actual world, it might be only contingently true. Again, I am not interested in defending 
physicalism, but for those who are willing to do so, this should be seen as a welcome 
constraint. Thanks to this constraint, one might defend physicalism against objections 
based on certain conceivability scenarios where mental properties are instantiated without 
physical properties. 
Let us take reductive physicalism to be the view that mental properties are identical with 
physical properties. The identity of any given mental property (that is instantiated in the 
actual world) with a physical property would explain why mental properties are nothing 
over and above physical properties. So, the reductive physicalists‟ relation that is denoted 
by the predicate “is nothing over and above” with respect to mental properties and physical 
properties is identity. That is, according to reductive physicalism, mental properties are 
15 
 
nothing over and above physical properties because mental properties are physical 
properties. 
However, reductive physicalism, understood this way, is known to be false, for the simple 
observation that organisms with different physical make-ups can and do have the very 
same mental properties (Putnam 1967; Fodor 1974). So in some cases, the very same 
mental property can be instantiated in different organisms with completely different 
physical make-ups, which makes it impossible to identify a mental property with any of the 
physical properties that any of these organisms have. If physicalism is true, it is clear that 
its reductive version cannot be true. So, identity should not be seen as a relation that is 
denoted by “is nothing over and above” in the formulation of a true variety of physicalism.  
So, at best, a non-reductive version of physicalism can be true. Let us take non-reductive 
physicalism to be the conjunction of two theses then: (i) physicalism: mental properties are 
nothing over and above physical properties; and (ii) non-reductionism: mental properties 
are not identical with physical properties. What we now know is that, because of (ii), the 
relation that is denoted by the predicate “is nothing over and above” in (i) is not identity.  
In the next section, I will discuss the proposal that supervenience is the relation that 
corresponds to the predicate “is nothing over and above” for the formulation of 
physicalism.  
1.2 Supervenience 
In the previous section, I suggested that, in order to formulate physicalism, we should find 
a suitable relation that corresponds to the predicate “is nothing over and above”, and that 
identity cannot be a relation to do this job. Here, I will discuss the proposal that 
supervenience can be such a relation. 
Many philosophers have appealed to the notion of supervenience to articulate the view that 
mental properties are nothing over and above physical properties (e.g. Davidson 1970; 
Horgan 1982; Lewis 1983; Kim 1984; 1993; Jackson 1998). Davidson has famously said 
that it might be 
that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on 
physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there 
cannot be two events alike in all respects but differing in some mental respects, 
or that an object cannot alter in some mental respects without altering in some 
physical respects (1970: 88, emphasis added). 
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In Lewis‟s words "[s]upervenience means that there could be no difference of one sort 
without difference of the other sort" (1986: 15). But more precisely, supervenience is a 
relation between sets of properties: a set of properties supervenes on another if and only if 
indiscernibility with respect to the latter set implies indiscernibility with respect to the 
former set. Then, physicalism formulated in terms of supervenience is the thesis that being 
indiscernible with respect to one‟s physical properties implies being indiscernible with 
respect to one‟s mental properties. That is, physicalism in this sense is the view that there 
cannot be mental differences without physical differences. As a first attempt, we can try to 
formulate physicalism as follows: 
(Physicalism-Supervenience-1) As a matter of nomological necessity
2
, for any 
mental property M, if an individual x has M, then there is a physical property P such 
that x has P, and if any individual y has P, then y has M. 
Physicalism-Supervenience-1 appeals to what has come to be known as weak 
supervenience (Kim 1984: 158): 
(Weak Supervenience) The set of properties A weakly supervenes on the set of 
properties B just in case, necessarily, for any property F in A, if an individual x has F, 
then there exists a property G in B such that x has G, and if any individual y has G, 
then y has F. 
Physicalism-Supervenience-1 is usually found to be insufficient for formulating 
physicalism, because weak supervenience is too weak to cover the purported relation 
between mental properties and physical properties (Kim 1984; Horgan 1993). Kim argues 
that weak supervenience lacks the “modal force” to explain the determination of the mental 
by the physical, or the dependence of the mental on the physical (1984: 159). Physicalism-
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
  As a consequence of the fact that the strength of this modal operator is only nomological, we can 
accommodate the contingency of physicalism.  
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Supervenience-1 says that there is no nomologically possible world where two individuals 
share all their physical properties but not their mental properties. However, it does not say 
anything about two (or more) individuals which might be inhabitants of different possible 
worlds. In order to fix this, we can appeal to strong supervenience (ibid: 163): 
(Strong Supervenience) The set of properties A strongly supervenes on the set of 
properties B just in case, necessarily, for any individual x and any property F in A, if 
x has F, then there is some property G in B such that x has G, and necessarily, for 
any individual y, if y has G then y has F. 
Physicalism formulated in terms of strong supervenience would be the following thesis: 
(Physicalism-Supervenience-2) As a matter of nomological necessity, for any 
individual x and any mental property M, if x has M, then there is some physical 
property P such that x has P, and necessarily, for any individual y, if y has P then y 
has M. 
What Physicalism-Supervenience-2 says is that, in order to have a mental property, it is 
nomologically required that one has a physical property that necessitates that mental 
property. The second modal operator gives physicalism the important “modal force” that 
Kim is looking for: mental properties are necessitated by physical properties. Although the 
strength of the first necessity operator in Physicalism-Supervenience-2 is nomological, it 
has been suggested that the second necessity operator‟s strength should be metaphysical 
(Noordhof 2003; 2010; 2013). Although the truth of the supervenience thesis might be 
contingent, insofar as a world is such that this strong supervenience holds, then mental 
properties in that world are metaphysically necessitated by physical properties.
3
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 Robert Kirk suggests that “the core of ... physicalism ... is the Strict Implication thesis, according to which 
the totality of physical truths strictly implies all truths about the mental states of organisms. Let the totality 
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What I said in the previous paragraph requires some elaboration. As I said, Physicalism-
Supervenience-2 makes a contingent claim, as the modal operator that binds the claim has 
only nomological strength: the given supervenience claim is true in the actual world and 
nomologically similar worlds. So, there might be worlds in which this supervenience does 
not hold. For example, there might be worlds where mental properties “float freely”, so to 
speak, without any underlying physical properties. But the actual world and the worlds that 
are nomologically alike are not such worlds. Moreover, and this is what the second modal 
claim in Physicalism-Supervenience-2 brings, the physical properties that accompany 
mental properties in the actual world and nomologically similar worlds are such properties 
that even if they were brought to worlds where supervenience does not hold, they would 
bring together the mental properties that they accompany. 
Noordhof (2003: 88-93) argues that the proposal that mental properties are metaphysically 
necessitated by physical properties is what distinguishes physicalism from some anti-
physicalist views that can also be formulated in terms of supervenience. Chalmers (2006), 
for example, defends an anti-physicalist view which takes mental properties to be only 
nomologically necessitated by physical properties.
4
 Whether this is sufficient to distinguish 
physicalism from some anti-physicalist views might be disputed (see Section 1.3 below), 
but it is less controversial that it is necessary for a physicalist view to imply that mental 
properties are metaphysically necessitated by physical properties. For a physicalist, strictly 
speaking, my brain states alone might not be metaphysically sufficient for the mental 
properties I instantiate now, but my brain states and the appropriate physical background 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
of physical truths be P, and the totality of truths about the mental states of organisms be Q. The Strict 
Implication thesis is that it is impossible that P should be true and Q false” (1996: 85). See also Stoljar 
(2010: Chapter 6) for a discussion of the proposal that physicalism is the view that mental properties are 
metaphysically necessitated by physical properties. 
4
 See also Van Cleve (1990: 222). 
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conditions taken together are metaphysically sufficient for the mental properties I have 
(Shoemaker 1981; 2007: 21-22; Levine 2003: 34-37; Noordhof 2003: 93).
5
  
Regardless of whether supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are good enough 
to capture what physicalism is about or not, in what follows, I will take the observations in 
the previous paragraph to be true. That is, I will assume that if physicalism is true in a 
world w, then mental properties in w are metaphysically necessitated by physical properties. 
Take a mental property M that is instantiated in the actual world. Let us say that, at a 
particular instant, M is instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of a physical property P. 
Physicalism entails that, at any possible world (including the nomologically impossible 
ones), if P is instantiated by x then M is instantiated by x too.
6
  
In the next section, I will discuss whether Physicalism-Supervenience-2 is physicalist 
enough.  
1.3 Superdupervenience and Superhypervenience 
In the previous section, I introduced a supervenience-based formulation of physicalism. I 
maintained that, regardless of whether such formulations are good enough or not, we 
should (or at any rate, I do) take physicalism to entail that mental properties are 
metaphysically necessitated by physical properties. 
The proposal that physicalism should be formulated in terms of supervenience is not 
accepted by many, including some authors who, in their earlier works, defended 
supervenience-based formulations of physicalism. Horgan (1993) argues that a 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 I will discuss this point about the background conditions at length in Chapter 2, Section 2.3. Some laws of 
nature may or may not be included in such background conditions, depending on one‟s understanding of 
the relationship between properties and laws of nature. I will closely examine what theories of laws a non-
reductive physicalist needs in Chapters 4 and 5. 
6
  P can be an extrinsic property with specifications regarding the background conditions. 
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supervenience-based formulation of physicalism is not sufficient to distinguish physicalism 
from some anti-physicalist views which also invoke supervenience relations. Kim says that 
“the mere claim of mind-body supervenience leaves unaddressed the question what … 
accounts for it” (1998: 13, emphasis deleted). Similarly, Heil argues that “[w]hen 
supervenience holds, the interesting issue is not that it holds but why it holds” (1998: 146, 
emphasis added). In this section, I will focus on Horgan‟s argument. 
Horgan reports that the concept of supervenience was introduced to the philosophical 
literature by Moore (1922), who argued that  
if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then 
not only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same 
degree, but also anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess 
it in the same degree (ibid: 261, cited in Horgan 1993: 555).
7
 
Horgan (1993: 560-563) reads this as the claim that moral facts (which are taken to be non-
natural) supervene on non-moral facts (which are taken to be natural). So, Moore‟s view 
takes non-natural facts to supervene on the natural ones. Horgan takes this to be the thesis 
of meta-ethical non-naturalism. The important point is that although moral properties 
(according meta-ethical non-naturalism) supervene on natural properties, this does not 
make them natural enough. In fact, Horgan argues that “no … naturalist position could 
embrace Moore's meta-ethics” (ibid: 561). We need not delve into Moore‟s meta-ethics to 
understand Horgan‟s analogy. All we need to note is that Moore‟s moral properties are not 
explainable in terms of natural properties although they supervene on natural properties.  
Horgan draws the following analogy: just as a naturalistically unacceptable meta-ethical 
theory can embrace a supervenience relation between moral facts and natural facts, a 
physicalistically unacceptable metaphysical theory can embrace a supervenience relation 
between mental properties and physical properties. In fact, Horgan argues that 
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 Though, Horgan notes that the term “supervenience” was first used to refer to this relation by Hare (1952). 
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emergentism of the sort that is defended by Broad (1925) is such a view. Broad has 
suggested that 
no amount of knowledge about how the constituents of a living body behave in 
isolation or in other and non-living wholes might suffice to enable us to predict 
the characteristic behaviour of a living organism. This possibility is perfectly 
compatible with the view that the characteristic behaviour of a living body is 
completely determined by the nature and arrangement of the chemical 
compounds which compose it, in the sense that any whole which is composed 
of such compounds in such an arrangement will show vital behaviour and that 
nothing else will do so (ibid: 67-68, cited in Horgan 1993: 559, emphases 
added). 
Emergentism is an anti-physicalist view. Roughly, it is the view that all mental properties, 
in some sense, depend on physical properties, but some mental properties are as 
fundamental as some physical properties, and can have causal powers that the physical 
properties that they depend on may not have.
8
 Such a view violates physicalism in at least 
three respects: (i) physicalists typically do not want mental properties to have causal 
powers that physical properties may not have
9
; (ii) physicalism is incompatible with the 
suggestion that mental properties are fundamental
10
; (iii) physicalists do not want it to be 
the case that the mental is not explainable (or predictable in Broad‟s sense above) in terms 
of the physical. At any rate, emergentists take mental properties to be over and above 
physical properties. 
Horgan suggests that emergentism is compatible with a supervenience thesis: 
Certain higher-level properties could be supervenient on lower-level ones 
(ultimately on physical ones) and also possess the two key features the 
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 An agreed-upon formulation of emergence does not exist yet. For a recent formulation that is along the lines 
of what I have suggested here, see Barnes (2012). 
9
 Though, see Noordhof (1999; 2013: 99) for a criticism of this view. I shall discuss Noordhof‟s criticism in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3.2. 
10
 See Wilson (2006). 
22 
 
emergentists stressed: (i) the supervenient higher-order properties could be 
fundamental causal properties, generating causal forces over and above 
physical causal forces; and (ii) the connections between lower-order and 
higher-order properties … could be metaphysically fundamental, hence 
unexplainable (Horgan 1993: 559). 
So a supervenience-based formulation of physicalism is compatible with emergentism, and 
since emergentism should not be compatible with physicalism for the reasons given above, 
formulating physicalism in terms of supervenience is not good enough.  
Horgan‟s proposal is that physicalism should be formulated in terms of a relation that 
explains the supervenience of the mental on the physical in a physicalistically acceptable 
way. He calls this relation superdupervenience, where superdupervenience is an 
“ontological supervenience that is robustly explainable in a materialistically explainable 
way” (ibid: 566). A supervenience relation is an ontological one when the supervening 
entities are genuine entities; and a supervenience relation is robustly explainable when 
there is an objective explanation of why supervenience holds.  
So, the proposal is that the predicate “is nothing over and above” in the mental-physical 
case is denoted by the superdupervenience relation that obtains between mental properties 
and physical properties. If we take supervenience in question as strong supervenience, the 
formulation of physicalism that is proposed should go as follows: 
(Physicalism-Superdupervenience) Mental properties strongly supervene on physical 
properties, and such supervenience is robustly explainable. 
Even if one might think that superdupervenience is good enough to formulate physicalism, 
it can still be questioned whether such a superdupervenience-based formulation of 
physicalism is required for this end. If one disagrees with Horgan and thinks that 
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supervenience is good enough to formulate physicalism, a superdupervenience-based 
formulation might be good enough, but not required.  
Noordhof (2003; 2010; 2013) disagrees with Horgan, and argues that a version of 
physicalism that is formulated in terms of strong supervenience cannot be conflated with 
anti-physicalist views that invoke supervenience relations, insofar as the strength of the 
second necessity operator in the strong supervenience relation that is appealed to by 
physicalists is metaphysical. After all, dualist views that appeal to supervenience relations 
suggest that mental properties are only nomologically necessitated by physical properties.
11
 
Noordhof writes: “I am as interested in the explication of supervenience relations as the 
next person. However, I do not think we should allow such preoccupations to distort our 
formulation of [physicalism]” (2003: 88). 
So, if Noordhof is right, then Physicalism-Supervenience-2 will be good enough, and 
Physicalism-Superdupervenience might be a possible formulation of physicalism, but will 
not be required. However, I disagree with Noordhof because there might be some room in 
the logical space for a dualist position that appeals to metaphysical necessity. Although the 
dualist accounts that Noordhof refers to appeal to only nomological necessitation, this does 
not mean that there cannot be any anti-physicalist who holds a strong supervenience 
relation that invokes metaphysical necessitation. So, going with a superdupervenience-
based formulation will be safer than following Noordhof‟s suggestion. Moreover, even if 
Noordhof might be right about the redundancy of superdupervenience, holding a 
superdupervenience-based formulation will not do any harm.  
Physicalism-Superdupervenience requires that there is an explanation of why mental 
properties strongly supervene on physical properties. But there is still a further, and 
arguably a stronger, kind of explanation that might be asked from physicalists. Although 
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 See Van Cleve (1990) and Chalmers (2006) for such formulations. 
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mental properties superdupervene on physical properties, it can still be asked why a certain 
property has a given property in its supervenience base. In order to explain this, I shall 
introduce the superhypervenience relation. Let us say that a set of properties A 
superhypervenes on a set of properties B just in case (i) A strongly supervenes on B, and (ii) 
there is an explanation of why a certain property in B necessitates a certain property in A. I 
shall formulate a version of physicalism in terms of superhypervenience, which goes as 
follows: 
(Physicalism-Superhypervenience) Mental properties strongly supervene on physical 
properties, and how a physical property necessitates a mental property is explainable. 
So, whereas Physicalism-Superdupervenience says that there is an explanation of the fact 
that mental properties supervene on physical properties, Physicalism-Superhypervenience 
says that the instantiation of a supervening property is explainable in virtue of the 
instantiation of the subvening property. I suspect that any physicalist should be happy with 
both Physicalism-Superdupervenience and Physicalism-Superhypervenience. 
Ideally, there should be a relation R that obtains between mental properties and physical 
properties such that R entails both superdupervenience and superhypervenience. In the next 
section, I will introduce the view that realization is such a relation.  
1.4 Realization 
In the previous section, I introduced Horgan‟s argument that a supervenience-based 
formulation of physicalism might not be good enough. The proposal is that physicalists 
need a robustly explainable supervenience relation, namely superdupervenience. Moreover, 
I argued that there can be concerns about explanation on another level: it can still be asked 
why superdupervenience relates a pair of properties.  
Let us say that being a duper-hyper relation is a role property in the sense that different 
relations can occupy the associated role. The associated role consists in entailing 
superdupervenience and superhypervenience. That is, all duper-hyper relations are 
supposed to entail both superdupervenience and superhypervenience. Now, the interesting 
question is which relations can occupy this role. (Of course, in an uninteresting way, the 
mere conjunction of superdupervenience and superhypervenience does this job. However, 
hopefully, there can be more interesting candidates for this role.) The proposal that I will 
take into consideration in the rest of this thesis is that realization is a relation that plays this 
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role when it comes to the formulation of non-reductive physicalism. The formulation of 
physicalism that is proposed is the following: 
(Physicalism-Realization) As a matter of nomological necessity, mental properties 
are realized by physical properties. 
If I am right, the following two should be true: first, mental properties superdupervene on 
physical properties because mental properties are realized by physical properties; second, 
mental properties superhypervene on physical properties because mental properties are 
realized by physical properties. 
Physicalism-Realization has been defended by a number of authors (e.g. Boyd 1980; 
Melnyk 1996; 2003; 2006; Wilson 1999; Shoemaker 2007). And the notion of realization 
has been regimented in a number of works (e.g. Shoemaker 2001; 2003; Gillett 2002: 2003; 
Shapiro 2004; Polger 2007; Polger & Shapiro 2008; Morris 2010; Bennett 2011, to name a 
few). It is my aim in the rest of this thesis to evaluate different accounts of realization, and 
find the most suitable one to appeal to for formulating physicalism. 
1.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I introduced physicalism as the view that mental properties are nothing 
over and above physical properties, and then discussed how we might understand the 
phrase “nothing over and above”. I suggested that we should take the predicate “is nothing 
over and above” to correspond to some relation in order for physicalism to be true. Then I 
explored what relations might be denoted by this predicate. This relation cannot be identity, 
because a reductive form of physicalism is false. I discussed whether this relation can be 
supervenience of some sort, but then considered the problem that a supervenience-based 
formulation of physicalism might not be sufficient to distinguish physicalism from some 
anti-physicalist views. I proposed that, in order to satisfy two related kinds of explanatory 
demand, physicalism can be formulated as the view that mental properties are realized by 
physical properties. In the next two chapters, I will discuss what the realization relation is, 
and evaluate several theories of realization. 
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CHAPTER 2: REALIZATION AND ITS ROLE 
2.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the debate about the formulation of physicalism, and, 
following the proposals of Boyd (1980), Melnyk (1996; 2003; 2006), Wilson (1999) and 
Shoemaker (2007), I suggested that physicalism (in philosophy of mind) can be formulated 
as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. I also maintained 
that physicalism might be only contingently true, and, in worlds where physicalism is true, 
mental properties are metaphysically necessitated by the instantiations of physical 
properties. In this chapter, I shall investigate the nature of the realization relation that is 
appealed to in the formulation of physicalism. 
In Section 2.1, I will specify the theoretical role that I want realization to play. This role 
will include (i) explaining the asymmetric necessitation of a property by its supervenience 
base, and (ii) accommodating the causal efficacy of the necessitated property. Some 
relations may satisfy the desiderata (i) and (ii) but may not be suitable to relate mental 
properties to their physical bases. So, in addition to satisfying this role, (iii) the realization 
relation should plausibly relate mental properties to their supervenience bases. Having 
specified a role for realization, in the next chapter, I will evaluate several theories of 
realization. In Section 2.2 of this chapter, I introduce the debate about the relata of 
realization, and argue that realization can be taken to be a relation between properties or 
property instances. In Section 2.3, I explain in what sense a realizer property (or a property 
instance) should be taken as metaphysically sufficient for a property (or a property instance) 
it realizes. For this, I invoke Shoemaker‟s (1981) distinction between core realization and 
total realization, and suggest that, in most cases, it is the total realizer, not the core realizer, 
that is metaphysically sufficient for the instantiation of a realized property. 
2.1 The Theoretical Role 
In this section, I will introduce the strategy that I will endorse in this chapter and the next 
chapter. The strategy is the specification of the theoretical role of realization and then 
evaluating several theories of realization against the background of this theoretical role. In 
order to specify this theoretical role, I will consider two problems that are associated with 
physicalism in philosophy of mind, and then propose that realization should be a relation 
the postulation of which might plausibly solve these problems. The first problem has to do 
with the explanation of how it can be explained that mental properties (if physicalism is 
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true) are necessitated by physical properties. The second problem is about the causal 
efficacy of mental properties: if mental properties are nothing over and above physical 
properties, it needs to be explained how minds can make genuine causal contributions in 
the physical world. 
2.1.1 Explanation of Asymmetric Necessitation 
The physicalist contention is that mental properties are “nothing over and above” physical 
properties. In the previous chapter, I suggested that we should understand this to amount to 
the contention that mental properties are “ontologically innocent” in the sense that the 
commitment to the existence of mental properties does not bring any additional ontological 
cost on top of the commitment to the existence of physical properties. In the previous 
chapter, I also introduced the view that wholes are nothing over and above their parts, and 
suggested that physicalism can be seen analogous to this view. Of course, physicalism is 
not the view that mental properties have physical properties as their parts. The feature that 
grounds the analogy is physicalism‟s commitment to the claim that mental properties are 
metaphysically necessitated by the instantiations of physical properties. In the same sense 
that parts and wholes they compose are metaphysically non-distinct, mental properties and 
the physical properties they depend on, according to physicalism, are metaphysically non-
distinct. So, the ontological status of mental properties is similar to the ontological status of 
wholes in the following sense: just as wholes are metaphysically necessitated by their parts, 
mental properties are metaphysically necessitated by physical properties. However, there is 
a disanalogy: the composition relation that relates parts to a whole is not mysterious, 
whereas the relationship between a mental property and a physical state of affairs is 
somewhat mysterious, at least prima facie. While the existence of a whole does not require 
a special explanation when the parts that compose the whole are present, the existence of a 
mental property requires some sort of explanation even when the physical state of affairs 
that gives rise to that mental property is present.  
So, if we assume physicalism, then we suppose that mental properties are metaphysically 
necessitated by physical properties. Moreover, we should also suppose that the relation in 
question is asymmetrical because the instantiation of a mental property does not necessitate 
the instantiation of any certain physical property that necessitates it. What we do not know 
is how this asymmetric necessitation obtains. The first problem that I consider with respect 
to physicalism is the problem of explaining the asymmetric necessitation of mental 
properties by physical properties. If realization is supposed to be a relation in terms of 
28 
 
which physicalism is formulated, then a theory of realization should explain how mental 
properties are metaphysically necessitated by physical properties.  
Moreover, a theory of realization should also be a theory of multiple realization. Multiple 
realization is the phenomenon whereby a given property can be realized by different 
properties at different instances. In fact, the observation that mental properties are such that 
individuals with completely different physical make-ups can instantiate them gave rise to 
the popularity of the non-reductive version of physicalism. Putnam (1967) and Fodor 
(1974) have persuasively argued that a reductive form of physicalism, according to which 
every mental property is identical with a physical property, cannot be true because of this 
observation. Take the property of having pain, for example. Different organisms with 
different neurophysiologies can have pain. Moreover, it is conceivable, and perhaps even 
nomologically possible that systems (such as robots) with no neurophysiology whatsoever 
have pain. Therefore, it is not possible to reduce having pain to a given neural property. 
The example generalises to (possibly) all mental properties, so mental properties are not 
reducible to physical properties. The constraint that the necessitation relations in terms of 
which physicalism is formulated should be an asymmetric one is due to the endorsement of 
what has come to be known as the multiple realization thesis. 
2.1.2 Accommodation of Mental Causation 
Non-reductive physicalism, namely the type of physicalism which asserts that mental 
properties are not identical with physical properties, but are asymmetrically necessitated by 
physical properties, is said to face a certain problem of mental causation. The problem is 
most notably illustrated by Kim (e.g. 1989; 1998; 2005). In a nutshell, the problem is that 
if non-reductive physicalism is true, then mental causation is not possible. This conclusion 
is obviously not welcomed by non-reductive physicalists. Hence, Fodor says that 
if it isn‟t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, 
and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is 
causally responsible for my saying ... if  none of that is literally true, then 
practically everything I believe about anything is false and it‟s the end of the 
world (1990: 56). 
This problem has come to be known as the exclusion problem, and the argument that is 
purported to show this problem has come to be known as the exclusion argument, because 
of its alleged conclusion that if non-reductive physicalism is true, then mental properties 
are causally excluded by physical properties that are said to necessitate them. I will 
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examine the exclusion argument premise by premise in detail in Chapter 7, so here, I will 
only introduce a simplified version. 
Suppose that I have a mental property, say believing that it is raining. If mental properties 
can be causes, one event that this property might cause would be my taking an umbrella 
with me when I am leaving home. So, believing that it is raining causes me to take an 
umbrella with me. Now, suppose that non-reductive physicalism is true. In this case, the 
property of believing that is raining is asymmetrically necessitated by a physical property, 
say P. According to the principle of causal closure, which is commonly held by 
physicalists, if a physical event has a sufficient cause, it has a physical sufficient cause. My 
taking an umbrella with me has a sufficient cause, so, according to the principle of causal 
closure, it should have a physical sufficient cause. We can unproblematically assume that 
the instantiation of P is causally sufficient for this event. But if this is the case, then my 
taking an umbrella with me has at least two sufficient causes, namely P and believing that 
it is raining. However, if this is true, the point should apply to all cases of mental causation. 
That is, every event that is caused by a mental property should also be caused by a physical 
property. Believing that this is true is accepting that there is systematic causal 
overdetermination in the world: every case of mental causation is a case of causal 
overdetermination. However, it is suggested that this cannot be true. There might be 
genuine cases of causal overdetermination, as in the death of a victim who is shot by two 
assassins simultaneously, but the world cannot systematically include causal 
overdetermination. So, it cannot be true that both P and believing that it is raining are 
causes of my taking an umbrella with me. At most, one of these can be a cause of this 
event. The principle of causal closure favours the physical property over the mental one. 
Therefore, P excludes believing that it is raining from being a cause. Or, so say some 
opponents of non-reductive physicalism. The point generalises to all putative cases of 
mental causation. So, if non-reductive physicalism is true, mental properties are causally 
excluded by physical properties that asymmetrically necessitate them. That is, non-
reductive physicalism implies epiphenomenalism, namely the view that mental properties 
are causally inefficacious.  
So, the second problem that I want to consider is that non-reductive physicalism is said to 
face the exclusion problem. There is a substantial literature on the exclusion problem, and 
non-reductive physicalists have resources to respond to this argument. I discuss these 
responses in detail in Chapter 7. What is important for the sake of this chapter is that a 
good theory of realization should not imply epiphenomenalism. This is because realization 
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is a tool for formulating physicalism and physicalism should not imply epiphenomenalism 
if it is going to be a plausible view. This is an important constraint, because, as I will 
illustrate in the next chapter, some theories of realization make it true by stipulation that 
mental properties are not causally efficacious. Such theories should not be endorsed. 
2.1.3 The Role of Realization 
Having identified two problems that physicalism is said to face, and having decided that 
physicalism should be formulated in terms of realization, I propose that realization is a 
relation whose postulation will help physicalists solve these two problems. I propose that 
the theoretical role of realization should consist in providing resources to solve these 
problems. Let us call this role the realization-role. An asymmetric necessitation relation R 
can play the realization-role if and only if (i) R‟s feature of necessitating one property in 
virtue of the other is explained, and (ii) the properties that are related by R do not causally 
exclude each other. Then, if physicalism can be formulated in terms of a relation that plays 
the realization-role, the instantiation of a mental property in virtue of the instantiation a 
physical property is explainable, and physicalism does not imply epiphenomenalism. (Note 
that the satisfaction of (i) amounts to being a superhypervenience relation discussed in 
Chapter 1). 
A physicalist should be able to show that there is a relation that plausibly plays this role. 
To do this, first, she should account for what it takes to explain an asymmetric 
necessitation relation. Some necessitation relations are not mysterious, so they do not 
require special explanations. Mereological composition is one example. There is not too 
much to say about how several parts make up a whole. But how a physical property 
necessitates a mental property requires an explanation.  
Second, a physicalist that appeals to realization should be able to explain how the 
necessitated relata are not causally excluded by the necessitating relata. Perhaps it is the 
nature of asymmetric necessitation that there is no causal competition between properties 
that are related with it. Or perhaps, it is because of the nature of a specific relation that 
plays the realization-role that there is no causal exclusion when this specific relation 
obtains. Either way, a physicalist who follows the strategy I am proposing should explain 
how the postulation of realization explains away the exclusion problem. 
And finally, a physicalist who follows this strategy should convince us that it makes sense 
to think that mental properties are related to physical properties by the relation she takes to 
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play the realization-role. The importance of this constraint will be clearer in the next 
chapter where I argue that some theories of realization fail to satisfy this criterion. There 
are relations that would satisfy the realization-role as I specified above but nevertheless 
may fail to relate mental properties to physical properties. Again, think of mereological 
composition. Mereological composition is an asymmetric necessitation relation, and, pace 
Merricks (2001), wholes are not causally excluded by the parts that compose them. But, a 
mental property is not a whole that is mereologically composed of physical properties. Or, 
determinable properties, such as being red, are asymmetrically necessitated by their 
determinates, such as being scarlet, but it might be argued, pace Yablo (1992), that mental 
properties do not have physical properties as their determinates.  
To recap: an asymmetric necessitation relation plays the realization-role just in case (i) the 
asymmetric necessitation in question is explainable and (ii) the necessitating relata do not 
causally exclude the necessitated relata. And, physicalism can be formulated in terms of a 
relation R only if (a) R plays the realization-role, and (b) R plausibly relates mental 
properties to physical properties. For the sake of the formulation of physicalism, it is 
important to show that a relation that plays the realization-role plausibly relates mental 
properties to their physical bases. However, this does not mean that this relation relates 
only mental properties and their physical bases. It could be a relation that relates different 
sorts of properties to each other. That is, it does not have to be that only mental properties 
are realized. Other, non-mental, higher-level properties can be realized by lower-level 
properties too. 
2.1.4 Other Features 
Realization (like many dependence relations) is also taken to be a transitive relation, and I 
shall assume in what follows that any relation that plays the realization-role should be a 
transitive relation. So, for all properties F, G, and H, if F realizes G, and if G realizes H, 
then F realizes H. This makes realization a strict order: asymmetric, irreflexive and 
transitive. 
Another feature that is commonly attributed to realization is synchronicity. Shapiro thinks 
that one of the features that distinguish between realization and causation is the fact that 
causation is, paradigmatically, a diachronic relation, whereas realization is a synchronic 
relation (2004: 35). Although realization should be taken as a synchronic relation, I do not 
think that distinguishing it from causation is a good reason to maintain this. First, some 
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might contend that causation could be synchronic in some cases. Second, the modal 
strengths of realization and causation are paradigmatically taken to be different: that is, 
whereas realization is stipulated to be a metaphysical necessitation relation, causation is 
thought to be a nomological necessitation relation. That alone can distinguish realization 
from causation. 
2.2 The Relata of Realization 
In 2.1.3, I specified the theoretical role that realization should play: an asymmetric 
necessitation relation plays the realization-role just in case (i) the necessitation of one 
property by the other is explainable and (ii) the necessitating relata do not causally exclude 
the necessitated relata. Moreover, if this relation is needed to help us formulate 
physicalism, it should be a relation that plausibly relates the mental to the physical. There 
might be several relations that are suitable for this role. But let us assume, for convenience, 
that there is one such relation, and let us call it realization. The mental is supposed to be 
realized by the physical, according to physicalism. But what are the relata of realization? 
In this section, I will report a debate about the relata of realization, and argue that a 
realization thesis can be formulated in terms of properties or property instances. 
First, I shall clarify a few things about my terminology. If we are after a useful theory of 
realization which does not disconnect our project completely from the previous literature 
on realization, it is worth spending some time on unifying different parts of the literature. 
In current literature, one encounters several kinds of entities as the relata of realization. On 
the one hand, we see statements like “properties are realized”, “types are realized”, and 
“kinds are realized”. On the other hand we encounter statements like “property instances 
are realized”, “tokens are realized”, “events are realized”, and “states are realized”.12 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 Heil (1999; 2003a; 2003b) takes realization (in particular, multiple realization) as a relationship between 
predicates and properties: the predicate “is in pain” truly applies to different organisms which have 
different physical properties. One might ask whether we should include predicates in this list of the 
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According to the traditional view about ontological categories, the first class of statements 
above, namely the ones about properties, types and kinds are about universals. And the 
second class of statements, namely the ones about property instances, tokens, events and 
states are about particulars, unless one means types of events by “events” and types of 
states by “states”. In order for my terminology to be continuous with a large part of the 
literature, when I talk about realization relations between universals, I will use the term 
“property”; when I talk about realization relations between particulars, I will use the term 
“property instance”, or sometimes simply “instance”. By a (property) instance, I mean the 
instantiation, or exemplification, of a property by an object at a time. So, when the 
property of being red is instantiated in two different objects at a given time or in the same 
object at different times, we have different instances of being red. 
Given the clarification of what I mean when I talk about properties and their instances, the 
relata question could be rephrased as follows: Is realization a relation between properties, 
or is it a relation between property instances? My answer to this question will be that the 
talk of realization between properties and the talk of realization between instances are 
equivalent if we note a few subtleties. 
Let me start with the examination of an argument by Polger and Shapiro (2008) for the 
conclusion that realization is not a relation between property instances. They give the 
following reductio against those who take realization as a relation between property 
instances: 
1. Assume (for reductio) that what are realized are property instances, and there is at least 
one property instance that is realized. 
2. Things that are realized are multiply realizable. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
possible relata. I think the answer to this should negative, because realization, according to this analysis, is 
reference: mental predicates multiply refer to different properties. This kind of predicate analysis is similar 
to those of Lewis (1966; 1972) and Kim (1998). 
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3. What is multiply realizable is repeatable. 
4. Therefore, at least one property instance is repeatable. 
5. Property instances are not repeatable. 
6. (Reductio complete from 1 and 2) Therefore, what are realized are not property 
instances. 
Gillett (2011), on the other hand, thinks that property instances are realized and do realize, 
and responds to Polger and Shapiro by suggesting that we can take realization as a relation 
between property instances once we accept the following condition: a property P realizes a 
property Q if and only if instances of P realize instances of Q. Although, I think, such a 
response is on the right track, we should be careful about a possible equivocation on 
“realization”. It is plausible to suspect that there might be a difference between a relation 
that takes properties as relata and a relation that takes instances as relata. So, I propose 
altering Gillett‟s claim in the following way: 
(E1) A property P realizes1 a property Q if and only if each instance of P realizes2 an 
instance of Q. 
(E2) An instance of P realizes2 an instance of Q if and only if P realizes1 Q. 
Let us call the conjunction of (E1) and (E2) the equivalence thesis. The equivalence thesis 
invokes two different relations, namely realization1 and realization2. Whereas realization1 
is a relation between properties, realization2 is a relation between property instances. (E1) 
defines realization1 in terms of realization2, and (E2) defines realization2 in terms of 
realization1. The equivalence thesis implies that if an instance of a property P realizes2 an 
instance of a property Q, then every instance of P realizes2 an instance of Q. 
I think that the analysis that the equivalence thesis gives us is helpful for the following 
reason. Some might think that realization is fundamentally a relation between properties 
and it is a relation between property instances only derivatively. That is, an instance 
realizes another instance because there is a corresponding relation between two properties 
that the instances are instances of. Or, some might think that realization is fundamentally a 
relation between property instances, but it holds between properties only derivatively. This 
is, for example, what Shoemaker implies when he says that “to speak of one property as 
realizing another is shorthand for saying that instances of one are among the possible 
realizers of the instances of the other” (2007: 3). However, once we hold the equivalence 
thesis as it is stated above, we can avoid taking a stance on this debate. 
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In what follows, I will not appeal to the subscript method, mainly for convenience. 
However, the reader is advised to remember that the talk of realization of properties is 
about realization1 whereas the talk of realization of property instances is about realization2. 
2.3 Metaphysical Sufficiency 
So far, I have specified the theoretical role of realization, and suggested that it can be seen 
as a relation between both properties and property instances. In this section, I will clarify in 
what sense realization can be seen as a metaphysical necessitation relation. In other words, 
in what sense is the instantiation of a realizer property metaphysically sufficient for the 
instantiation of the property that it realizes? First, I will consider counterexamples to the 
kind of sufficiency that realization is purported to imply. Second, I will introduce the total 
realization and core realization distinction to respond to these counterexamples. 
If physicalism is the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties, and if 
realization is a metaphysical necessitation relation, it might be argued that physicalism is 
clearly false. Here are the alleged counterexamples: 
 (Case 1) Suppose that in world w, the laws of nature are different than the laws of 
nature in the actual world. Some of these nomological differences have connections to 
human physiology. Consequently, in w, having C-fibre stimulation may fail to bring 
about the instantiation of having pain. This would be an example of the failure of 
metaphysical sufficiency.  
The next two cases suggest that having C-fibre stimulation is not even nomologically 
sufficient for having pain, let alone metaphysically sufficient.  
 (Case 2) Having C-fibre stimulation realizes having pain in human beings. But having 
C-fibre stimulation does not realize having pain in Martians. The point is not that 
having pain is realized by another property in Martians. Rather, even if Martians had 
C-fibres and their C-fibres fired, they would not have pain. The physiology of a 
Martian is so different from the physiology of a human being that such firings do not 
result in the instantiation of having pain. This means that having C-fibre stimulation is 
not metaphysically sufficient for having pain.  
 (Case 3) Even though having C-fibre stimulation realizes having pain in human beings, 
not every instantiation of having C-fibre stimulation in a human being brings together 
an instantiation of having pain. In human beings whose bodies do not function 
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normally, having C-fibre stimulation may not do the work that it is supposed to do 
normally. Moreover, even in normal human beings, having C-fibre stimulation may not 
always result in pain. Take a normal subject who is anaesthetized for a medical 
operation. She does not feel pain even when her C-fibres are firing. So, having C-fibre 
stimulation is not metaphysically sufficient for having pain.  
For the next case, assume content externalism: for being in certain mental states, namely 
the intentional ones, such as beliefs and desires, one has to be appropriately related to the 
environment (Putnam 1975b; Burge 1979). Beliefs are individuated by their truth 
conditions, and desires are individuated by their satisfaction conditions. 
 (Case 4) Take property P as a realizer of believing that water is wet. In Twin Earth, 
there is no such thing as water, but the transparent and odourless liquid that falls from 
the sky and fills the lakes and so on is XYZ, which is a chemically different substance 
from H2O. Eddie, who is an inhabitant of our earth, believes that water is wet, and he 
does so in virtue of P. However, on Twin Earth, Twin Eddie who is physically 
indiscernible from Eddie, despite having P, cannot entertain the same belief as Eddie, 
because Twin Eddie is not appropriately related to his environment in a way that 
enables him to have beliefs about water. Therefore, P is not metaphysically sufficient 
for believing that water is wet. 
Case 4 suggests that, for the realization of intentional properties, having intrinsic properties 
as realizers is not sufficient. The point is generalized by Robert Wilson (2001) to cases 
where realized properties are not mental properties. One might think that having a certain 
shape and being made of a certain material would count as a realizer of being a dollar bill. 
However, if the bill was produced by a fake dollar machine, it cannot really be a dollar bill.  
These cases may indicate two different things. First, it might be thought that the realizers 
of mental properties that philosophers have been giving examples of cannot be realizers in 
the intended sense, because they are not metaphysically sufficient for what they are 
supposed to realize. So, having C-fibre stimulation cannot be the realizer of having pain in 
human beings, but the realizers of pain have to be “wider”. All we have to do is to change 
our examples to accommodate the sufficiency claim. Robert Wilson thinks that this would 
result in dropping what he calls the constitutivity thesis: “realizers of states and properties 
are exhaustively physically constituted by the intrinsic, physical states of the individual 
whose states or properties they are” (ibid: 5). 
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Second, these cases may suggest that realizers are not sufficient for what they realize. I 
think this would be an overreaction. It would mean that we have to give up the consensus 
on the most commonly attributed feature of realization, namely metaphysical necessitation. 
(In fact, as cases 2 and 3 show, even nomological necessitation would be in jeopardy.) 
To deal with this problem, Shoemaker (1981; 2007) distinguishes between two kinds of 
realization: total realization and core realization. And correspondingly, there are two kinds 
of realizer: total realizers and core realizers. Total realizers are metaphysically sufficient 
conditions for realized properties, whereas core realizers are weaker conditions than total 
realizers. (A realizer can be seen as a condition in the following sense: if a property P is 
sufficient for a property Q, having P is a sufficient condition for having Q.) 
What is metaphysically sufficient for a realized property P is a total realizer of P which 
specifies a detailed sufficient condition for the instantiation of P. If we are going to take a 
total realizer as a metaphysically sufficient condition for what it realizes, we may have to 
include in it the appropriate background conditions. Such background conditions will 
include what kind of an organism the realizer property is instantiated in and what things 
exist (and do not exist) in the relevant environment. So, an instance of having C-fibre 
stimulation cannot be a total realizer of an instance of having pain. It might be thought that 
even the fundamental physical laws might be included in the background conditions, if 
laws of nature are deemed to be contingent. Let us assume, for the sake of illustrating this 
point, that laws of nature are contingent. Let us say that P is a property that is 
nomologically sufficient for the instantiation of having pain. P will have to be a very “wide” 
property, specifying what properties the environment that the bearer of the property has. 
But since laws of nature are assumed to be contingent, it is not possible to construe the 
instantiation of P as a metaphysically sufficient condition for the instantiation of having 
pain. Let us say L is the property that one has just in case one inhabits the actual world or 
any world that is physically alike. Then, the conjunctive property (P & L) will be 
metaphysically sufficient for having pain. So, it will be metaphysically necessary that if 
one has (P & L), then one has pain. That is, it will be true in all worlds that if one has (P & 
L), then one has pain. In worlds where L is instantiated, having P will entail having (P & 
L), which necessitates having pain. In worlds where L is not instantiated, (P & L)  is not 
instantiated either, in which case it will be vacuously true that, in such worlds, if one has 
(P & L),  then one has pain. So either way, (P & L) will metaphysically necessitate having 
pain. 
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From this, it follows that the state of the whole universe in a world is a total realizer of 
each property that is instantiated in that world. However, for every property instance, there 
will presumably be states of affairs that are “narrower” than the state of the whole universe, 
and these states of affairs will be total realizers of these property instances. Levine (2003) 
thinks that such less-than-global total realizers can be found in the following way. Take a 
world w which is like our world with the exception that it lacks a few molecules that we 
have. World w will still be like ours with respect to most of its states of affairs. When you 
change a little more, you might still not affect the instantiation of a given mental property. 
“Surely, there comes a point ... when a physical change will make a [mental] difference, 
and that point marks the boundary of [a less-than-global total realization]” (ibid: 36). 
Core realizers can be seen as parts of total realizers. If using the term “part” for a condition 
is found somewhat obscure, we can say that core realizers are conditions which are weaker 
than total realizers. According to Shoemaker‟s original introduction of the distinction 
between total realization and core realization, core realizers are property instances that are 
doing the salient work in the realization of a property instance. The common practice is to 
take the paradigm examples of realizers, such as having C-fibre stimulation for having pain, 
as core realizers. Since the total realizers of some properties will overlap to some extent in 
the sense that they will include similar background conditions, in many cases what 
distinguish between total realizers of different properties will be core realizers. 
Mostly, when we talk about realizers, we talk about core realizers. In order to keep the 
articulation of the issues simple, I will follow the following rule: when I say that a property 
P realizes a property Q, I take P as a core realizer, unless I specify otherwise. In order to 
accommodate the shared wisdom about the necessitation feature of realization, I propose 
that saying that an instance of a realizer property P is metaphysically sufficient for the 
instance of a realized property Q is shorthand for saying that the P instance, with the 
appropriate background conditions, is metaphysically sufficient for the Q instance. For 
example, saying that having C-fibre stimulation realizes having pain in human beings is 
shorthand for saying that, in worlds like ours, in normal human beings who are not 
anaesthetized and so on, having C-fibre stimulation is metaphysically sufficient for pain. 
Before concluding this section (and chapter), I should note that, in some cases, a total 
realizer and a core realizer of a property may fully overlap; that is, some core realizers may 
also be total realizers. This will be relevant when I argue, in the next chapter, that 
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determinable properties are realized by their determinates but every core realizer of a 
determinable property is identical with a total realizer of the same determinable property.  
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I identified the theoretical role of the realization relation. I proposed that 
realization should be seen as an asymmetric necessitation relation between properties (or 
their instances) whereby (i) the necessitation of a property is explainable and (ii) the 
necessitated property is not causally excluded. It is also important for the physicalist to 
show that the relation she postulates to play this role is a plausible candidate to relate 
mental properties to their physical bases. I then resolved a debate regarding the relata of 
realization. I argued that realization can be seen as a relation between properties or 
property instances. Finally, I explained in what sense realization is supposed to be a 
metaphysical necessitation relation. For this, I appealed to Shoemaker‟s distinction 
between a core realizer and a total realizer. In most cases, it is not the core realizer, but it is 
the total realizer (which is an extrinsic property that includes the core realizer and 
background conditions) that metaphysically necessitates the realized property. 
In the next chapter, I will evaluate several theories of realization according to the 
theoretical role of realization that I specified in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: VARIETIES OF REALIZATION 
3.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I identified the theoretical role of realization, and argued that, in 
order for it to help us formulate physicalism, it should be seen as an asymmetric 
metaphysical necessitation relation between properties (or their instances) whereby (i) the 
necessitation in question is explainable and (ii) the causal efficacy of the necessitated 
property is not excluded by the necessitating property. Moreover, (iii) a relation that plays 
this theoretical role should also be a plausible candidate for relating mental properties to 
their physical bases. In this chapter, I will evaluate different theories of realization by 
examining whether the relations they posit can plausibly play the aforementioned 
theoretical role of realization. 
In Section 3.1, I will make a distinction between two types of relation: whereas some 
relations relate properties of the same individual, other relations relate properties of 
different individuals. I shall call the first type of relations horizontal relations. In the 
remainder of Section 3.1, I will examine theories of realization that posit horizontal 
realization relations. Horizontal realization relations include (a) higher-order property 
realization (h-realization), (b) determinable property realization (d-realization), and (c) 
subset realization (s-realization). I shall call the second type of relations that I will 
consider vertical relations. In Section 3.2, I will examine theories that postulate vertical 
realization relations. These include (d) mereological realization (m-realization) and (e) 
coincidental realization (c-realization).  
I will argue in this chapter that s-realization is a promising candidate to play the theoretical 
role of realization that is specified above. Those who postulate this relation are the 
defenders of what has come to be known as the subset view of realization (Clapp 2001; 
Shoemaker 2001; 2007; 2013; Wilson 1999). The subsequent chapters will be devoted to a 
thorough analysis and a discussion of s-realization and the subset view. 
3.1 Horizontal Realization 
In this section and 3.2, I will discuss a number of theories of realization. For this, I shall 
introduce a distinction between two types of relations which will correspond to a 
distinction between two types of theories about realization. Whereas some relations that 
are candidates to play the realization-role are horizontal relations, some are vertical 
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relations. A horizontal relation relates properties of the very same individual. A vertical 
relation, on the other hand, relates the properties of different individuals. In this section, I 
will evaluate theories of realization that postulate horizontal relations as candidates to play 
the realization-role.
13
 The horizontal realization relations that are appealed to in the 
literature are, in my terminology, higher-order property realization (h-realization), (b) 
determinable property realization (d-realization), and (c) subset realization (s-realization). 
In sections 3.1.1, 3.1.2. and 3.1.3, I will introduce these relations (and the views that are 
associated with them) respectively. 
3.1.1 Higher-order Property Realization (H-realization) 
In this section, I will introduce h-realization as a candidate to play the realization role. H-
realization is a relation that is postulated by functionalism to be the relation that relates 
mental properties to physical properties. Because of this, I will start with an explanation of 
what functionalism is by discussing some varieties of it, and then focus on one variety that 
appeals to h-realization. I will conclude that h-realization is not a good candidate to play 
the realization-role.  
The idea that mental properties are multiply realizable usually goes hand in hand with 
functionalism, namely the view that mental properties are functional properties. A 
functional property is a property that is individuated by a causal role. So, functionalism 
about mental properties is the view that mental properties are individuated by causal roles. 
Such roles consist in what outputs are likely to be produced given certain inputs and 
internal states.  
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
 I am inspired by Carl Gillett‟s (2002; 2003) distinction between the flat and the dimensional views of 
realization. My reason to depart from his terminology is the following: whereas the flat view of realization 
(in Gillett‟s terminology) takes realization to be a horizontal relation (in my terminology), the dimensioned 
view of realization (in Gillett‟s terminology) takes realization to be a specific variety of vertical realization. 
I will discuss these relations and Gillett‟s view in Section 3.2.1 below in detail. 
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Let us start with what has come to be known as machine functionalism. It was Putnam 
(1960; 1967; 1973; 1975) who notably argued that the mind is a type of Turing machine, 
whose states are causal/functional states. A Turing machine is an abstract device that 
processes operations by following certain rules.  To understand how the machine works, 
imagine a physical machine that works with a program which consists of some basic rules. 
Imagine that the machine has a tape on which it can print symbols, a head that scans and 
prints symbols, and a number of states it can go into. The machine follows rules which are 
sensitive to the states it is at and the symbols it scans. Based on these rules, it can erase a 
symbol, move to another symbol on the tape, print another symbol, and change the state it 
is in. In order to see how a mind can be identified with such a machine, consider that the 
machine takes sensory information as inputs and produces motor actions as outputs. The 
machine would have rules that specify the probability of the production of the motor 
outputs and the new internal states for possible combinations of sensory inputs and other 
internal states. When the pool of possible sensory inputs, motor outputs, the internal states 
and the rules is rich enough, the machine in question might be aptly called a “mind”, 
according to this variety of functionalism. The machine in question is still an abstract 
entity, but, it could be implemented in a concrete entity if the concrete entity in question 
has a certain structure. In other words, this abstract machine can be physically realized.  
Putnam does not give us a formulation of realization. However, he stipulates an important 
constraint on it: functional isomorphism. A system (or a set of states) A realizes another 
system (or a set of states) B only if A and B are functionally isomorphic. Putnam explains 
functional isomorphism as follows. “Two systems are functionally isomorphic if there is a 
correspondence between the states of one and the states of the other that preserves 
functional relations” (Putnam 1975: 291, emphasis deleted). In line with this, van Gulick 
says that the realization of 
a formal machine description requires roughly that there be some mapping 
relation from the formal states, inputs, and outputs of the abstract machine 
table onto the physical states, inputs, and outputs of the instantiating system, 
such that under that mapping the relations of temporal sequence among those 
physical items are isomorphic to the relations of formal succession among the 
machine table items (1988: 80). 
So, the causal roles that individuate the states of a Turing machine are, so to speak, 
occupied by the physical properties of a system only if the machine and the system are 
functionally isomorphic.  
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The causal roles that are supposed to individuate mental properties are the ones that are 
assigned to them in one way or another. As it was introduced in a seminal work by Block 
(1978), there are (at least) two ways in which such roles are assigned. According to 
analytical functionalism, these role descriptions of mental properties are derived from a 
folk theory which consists of conceptual truths about the roles of mental properties. 
According to psychofunctionalism, these role descriptions are derived from the best 
explanations taken from empirical psychology. How the role descriptions are derived is 
orthogonal to the questions that I am dealing with here, therefore, I will not stress the 
differences between analytical functionalism and psychofunctionalism. 
A more pertinent question is the following: What is the relationship between the 
(analytically or empirically derived) role description of a mental property and the mental 
property in question? Functionalism can be divided into (at least) two varieties according 
to possible answers to this question: filler-functionalism and role-functionalism.
14
  
On filler-functionalism, a given mental property M is identified with a property that 
occupies a given role R. To illustrate filler-functionalism with an example, assume, for the 
sake of simplicity, that the role description of having pain is the following: having pain is 
the property that causes wincing in the case of tissue damage. Moreover, assume that 
having C-fibre stimulation is also the property that causes wincing in the case of tissue 
damage. From this, it follows that having pain is identical with having C-fibre stimulation. 
However, with the conclusion that having pain is to be identified with having C-fibre 
stimulation, filler-functionalism cannot be a true variety of physicalism, because, as I have 
explained in Chapter 1, reductive varieties of physicalism are false. The relation of role-
occupancy in the filler-functionalist‟s sense cannot be a candidate to play the realization-
role because what filler properties realize are not mental properties; filler properties are 
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 Here, I adopt McLaughlin‟s (2006) terminology. Sometimes, the distinction is made between realizer- 
functionalism and role-functionalism (Esfeld & Sachse 2011: Chapter 1). 
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rendered identical with mental properties, which do realize roles. So, the realization 
relation that filler-functionalism deploys relates mental properties to their roles; here, 
mental properties are the things that do the realizing, but they are also physical properties. 
Since it does not give an account of realization between mental properties and physical 
properties, there is no reason to discuss filler-functionalism here in detail. Nevertheless, a 
separate explanation of why filler-functionalism cannot be a true theory might give us 
further justification for not discussing it in detail. As I said above, the main problem with 
the filler-functionalist analysis of realization is the phenomenon of multiple realization. 
The multiple realization thesis says that mental properties are multiply realized by physical 
properties. It might be true that what occupies the pain-role in human beings is having C-
fibre stimulation, yet in different species, different neural properties occupy the pain-role. 
In Martians, let us suppose, it is having M-fibre stimulation that causes wincing when there 
is tissue damage. And since having C-fibre stimulation is not identical with having M-fibre 
stimulation, having pain cannot be identified with any of these properties.  
Lewis (1972) and Kim (1992; 1998) argue that the argument from multiple realization can 
be resisted by appealing to species-specific identifications. The argument is that there is no 
such property as having pain simpliciter, but there are properties such as having human-
pain, having Martian-pain and so on. While having human-pain is identical with having C-
fibre stimulation, having Martian-pain is identical with having M-fibre stimulation. In a 
way, it could be said that the predicate “is in pain” refers to different properties in different 
species.
15
  
It should be noted that, for this argument to work, one needs to attribute different causal 
roles to having human-pain and having Martian-pain. If their causal roles are identical 
with each other, given functionalism about the mental, namely the view that mental 
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 Put this way, this is also the view of Heil (1999; 2003a; 2003b). 
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properties are individuated by causal roles, having human-pain and having Martian-pain 
are identical. On the other hand, even when one attributes different causal roles to human-
pain and Martian-pain, it is not clear why the role that is attributed to having human-pain 
cannot be occupied by different properties in different individuals, or in the same 
individual at different times. Horgan (1993b; 2001) makes this point when he argues that 
mental properties are strongly multiply realizable: 
mental states we attribute to one another might turn out to be radically multiply 
realizable at the neurobiological level of description, even in humans; indeed, 
even in individual humans; indeed, even in an individual human given the 
structure of his central nervous system at a single moment of his life (Horgan 
1993b: 308, emphases deleted). 
So, filler-functionalism is presumably false, and it does not give us a theory of realization 
anyway. However, another variety of functionalism, namely role-functionalism gives an 
account of realization. 
According to role-functionalism, mental properties are higher-order properties.
16
 In this 
context, the first-order properties that the higher-order ones are defined over are properties 
that play causal roles. Actually, the convention is to take these properties as second-order 
properties, where a second-order property is the property of having a first-order property. 
Functionalism of this sort attempts to take realization as a relation between second-order 
properties and first-order properties. However, if mental properties are second-order 
properties, and they are realized by first-order properties, and if realization is a relation 
between second-order and first-order properties, it would have to be that a first-order 
property can never be realized. But this consequence seems false. We tend to think that a 
realizer property may be realized by another property. That is, we can have chains of 
realization in the following sense: a mental property may be realized by a neural property, 
and that neural property may be realized by a biological property and so on. So, we should 
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 See Block (1980), Loewer (2002) and Melynk (2003) for role-functionalist ideas. 
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not take role-functionalism to relate only second-order properties and first-order properties. 
Instead, we should take role-functionalism to suggest that the realized properties are 
higher-order properties of an order which is higher than the order of the realizer 
properties.
17
 
Role-functionalism says that a given mental property M is the property of having some 
property (or other) that occupies a certain role R. The properties that occupy R are the 
properties that can be said to realize M. Let us call this role-occupancy relation h-
realization. We can define h-realization as follows: 
(h-realization) A property P h-realizes a property Q if and only if for some role R (i) 
Q is the property of having a property that occupies R, and (ii) P is a property that 
occupies R. 
A h-realizer property is always of an order that is lower than the order of the h-realized 
property. Since being lower than is an asymmetric relation, h-realization is an asymmetric 
(and irreflexive) relation too. Therefore, no property can h-realize itself. Also, note that 
different properties could occupy the same role, so the same property can be h-realized by 
different properties. Having pain would be the property of having a property that causes 
wincing when there is tissue damage. Both having C-fibre stimulation and having M-fibre 
stimulation cause wincing when there is tissue damage, and therefore can be said to h-
realize having pain. 
Nevertheless, role-functionalism faces a problem that filler-functionalism does not. 
Properties that are h-realized seem to be causally excluded by the properties that h-realize 
them. And, this seems to be true, almost by stipulation. If so, then h-realization cannot be a 
good candidate to play the realization-role. Recall that one of the desiderata on a theory of 
realization is that it should accommodate mental causation (by ruling out causal exclusion).  
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 By suggesting this, I depart from the analysis of functional role realization given by Kim (1998). 
47 
 
What is the reason that h-realized properties are causally excluded? As it has been pointed 
out several times (Block 1990; Kim 1989; 1998; 2005; Shoemaker 2001; 2007), if one 
takes h-realization to be the right realization relation, then any causal role that we want to 
assign to a mental property will be excluded by its realizer. Because, for a property P to h-
realize a property Q is for P to play the causal role that specifies Q. That is, if P h-realizes 
Q, by stipulation, it does the causal work that Q is assigned to do. Block (1990) gives the 
example of the dormitivity of a pill. If one construes being dormitive as a higher-order 
property in the aforementioned sense, having the property of being dormitive would be 
having a property P that causes one to sleep. Then, when I take a pill which is dormitive, 
what causes me to sleep will be the lower-order property P that plays the dormitivity-role, 
not being dormitive itself. And Block generalizes the point to all functional properties 
which are higher-order properties in the aforementioned sense. According to Block, the 
only cases where such higher-order properties could be causally efficacious are the cases in 
which intelligent beings are aware of such properties. For example, if I see a pill which I 
know to be dormitive, I may take the pill, and my taking the pill would be caused by my 
recognition of the fact that the pill is dormitive. Except such cases, h-realized properties 
cannot be causally relevant. 
One might put the findings of this section in the form of a dilemma against functionalism. 
On the one hand, if we hold filler-functionalism, we cannot accommodate multiple 
realization of mental properties. On the other hand, if we hold role-functionalism, then we 
cannot explain the causal efficacy of mental properties. So, either functionalism is false, or 
it entails epiphenomenalism. In any case, filler-functionalism does not give us a theory of 
realization; and h-realization, which is role-functionalism‟s candidate to play the 
realization-role, cannot play this role.  
3.1.2 Determinable Property Realization (D-realization)  
In this section, I will introduce d-realization as a candidate to play the realization-role. On 
what I call the determination view of realization, the relationship between mental 
properties and their physical bases is the same relationship as the one between 
determinable properties and their determinates. Paradigmatically, colour properties are 
determinable properties, and their shades are their determinates, that have further 
determinates. So, on the determination view, the relationship between a mental property 
and its realizer is the same relationship as that between being red and being scarlet. In 
other words, mental properties have their physical realizers as their determinates. Here, I 
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will introduce the determination view, and consider objections against it. I will argue that 
d-realization can be considered to play the realization-role, but that it is questionable 
whether it relates mental properties their physical bases. I will suggest that we can count 
determinable properties to be realized by their determinates, but that it would be wrong to 
think that mental properties are determinables of physical properties. 
The classical source for the determination view is Yablo (1992),
18
 but varieties of it have 
been defended by Macdonald and Macdonald (1986; 1995)
19
, Shoemaker (2001)
20
, and 
Wilson (2009). Put simply, the view suggests that the relationship between mental 
properties and their physical realizers is the same as the relationship between determinable 
properties and their determinates. Paradigm examples of determinable properties and their 
determinates are colours and their shades. On the determination view, just as being scarlet 
is a determinate of being red, having C-fibre stimulation is a determinate of having pain. I 
shall call the relation that obtains between determinables and their determinates d-
realization:  
(d-realization) A property P d-realizes a property Q if and only if P is a determinate 
of Q.  
Then we should explain what it is to be a determinate of a determinable property:  
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
 See also Yablo (1997; 2001) for his defences of the same view. 
19
 Macdonald & Macdonald (1986; 1995) think that the relationship between a mental property and its 
realizer is analogous to the relationship between determinable properties and their determinates. They also 
think that every instantiation of a determinable property is identical with an instantiation of one if its 
determinates. The account of property instances that I work with in this thesis (See Chapter 2, Section 2.2) 
does not allow for the of identification of determinable property instances with their determinate instances, 
because I take property instances to be individuated partly by properties (that they are instances of), and a 
determinable property and its determinate are non-identical properties.  
20
 Shoemaker (2007: 23) has retracted this claim in his subsequent work. I will discuss Shoemaker‟s stance 
on this view in detail in 3.1.3 below. 
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(determination) A property P is a determinate of a property Q if and only if for an 
individual to have P is for it to have Q, not simpliciter, but in a specific way.  
So, if we rephrase the definition of d-realization, we obtain the following: 
(d-realization) A property P d-realizes a property Q if and only if for an individual to 
have P is for it to have Q, not simpliciter, but in a specific way. 
If one takes the relation between mental properties and their realizers as d-realization, then 
the multiple realization of mental properties would be a natural consequence. The very 
same determinable property may have multiple determinates. Necessarily, if something is 
scarlet, then it is red. But if something is red it is might not be scarlet; it might be another 
shade of red. 
It looks like d-realization satisfies the first desideratum for playing the realization-role. If 
mental properties are d-realized by their physical bases, that is, if mental properties are 
determinables of their physical bases, then there would be nothing mysterious about the 
necessitation of the mental by the physical. The instantiation of a mental property, such as 
believing that it is raining, would not be any more mysterious, or unexplainable, than the 
instantiation of having mass. Once you have a determinate mass property, such as being 73 
kg, you also instantiate having mass. 
What about the second desideratum for playing the realization-role? Are d-realized 
properties causally excluded by their realizers? The short answer to this is no. In fact, the 
determination view is known as a solution to the exclusion problem. Many people in the 
literature assume without providing an argument that determinable properties and their 
determinates do not causally compete. Macdonald and Macdonald articulate this 
assumption as follows: 
Many physical properties, like that of being coloured, or being an animal, are 
plainly distinct from the many determinate forms which they may take (such as 
being red, or [being] green, or being a tiger), since possession of a more 
determinate property (e.g., that of being red) by an object entails possession of 
the more determinable one (e.g., being coloured), but not vice versa. ... Does 
this mean that colour is causally inefficacious? Of course not; for any causally 
efficacious case in which a more determinate form of that property is 
exemplified is a case in which the exemplification of colour itself is efficacious 
(1986: 149, formatting added). 
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Yablo‟s (1992: 257) much-cited example for illustrating this point involves a pigeon 
named Sophie, who is trained to peck at only red things. When Sophie sees a red triangle, 
she pecks at the triangle. It is natural to think that the triangle‟s redness is causally relevant 
to the Sophie‟s pecking. But being red is a determinable property. Let us suppose that the 
red triangle in this example is scarlet. Being scarlet is a determinate of (or d-realizes) being 
red. Does the fact that being red is d-realized jeopardise the causally relevance of being 
red? Yablo‟s intuition is that it does not, because determinable properties and their 
determinates do not causally compete.  
As I said above, it is accepted by these authors without argument that properties do not 
causally compete with their determinables. I will provide my explanation of why 
determinable properties and their determinates do not enter into causal competition, and 
how the exclusion problem can be avoided, in much more detail, in Chapter 7. For the sake 
of evaluating the candidacy of d-realization to play the realization-role, let us grant that 
there is no exclusion problem for determinable properties and their determinates. If it is 
true that mental properties are d-realized by their physical bases, mental properties are not 
causally excluded by their physical bases.  
So, d-realization is a candidate to play the realization-role: (i) the necessitation of a d-
realized property is explainable; (ii) d-realized properties are not causally excluded by their 
realizers. However, for the sake of explaining the dependence of the mental on the physical, 
d-realization is not a plausible candidate for this role. That is, it is wrong to think that a 
mental property is a determinable property whose determinates are its physical realizers. In 
order to demonstrate this, I shall introduce four problems that the determination view faces. 
 (Problem 1) As I explained in the previous chapter, in most cases, physical realizers 
metaphysically necessitate what they realize only in the context of certain background 
conditions. But if we consider the paradigm examples of d-realization, such as the 
cases of the d-realization of a colour property by any of its shape properties, we see 
that the requirement for background conditions vanishes. Necessarily, if something is 
scarlet, then it is red, regardless of what kind of a thing it is, or what the environment is 
like, or what the laws of nature are and so on. However, if an organism is in C-fibre 
stimulation, it might not have pain. The organism has to be a non-anaesthetised normal 
human being in a world that is nomologically like ours in order to have pain in the 
presence of C-fibre stimulation. I think that this indicates that, at best, the cases of d-
realization can be special cases of a more general realization relation that we are 
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looking for, and that mental properties are not d-realized by their physical phases. 
(Mental properties can be d-realized by other mental properties, though. For example, 
having sharp pain d-realizes having pain, and having the former metaphysically 
necessitates having the latter.) 
 (Problem 2) Determinates of a determinable property are orderable with respect to their 
similarity relations, but physical realizers of a mental property are not orderable in this 
way. For example, being orange, being red and being blue are determinates of having a 
colour, and it is possible to arrange these colours according to their similarity to each 
other. Orange is more similar to red than it is to blue. However, there are no such 
similarity relations between the physical realizers of a given mental property (Ehring 
1996; 2011; Funkhouser 2006). So, it is possible to take cases of d-realization as 
special cases of a more general realization relation such that, in these special cases, 
realizers are orderable with respect to their similarity relations, whereas in other cases, 
such as the cases where mental properties are realized by their physical bases, such 
ordering does not obtain. (However, it should be noted that the defender of the 
determination view might respond to this by suggesting that being orderable with 
respect to similarity is not a necessary feature of the determination relation, but it is a 
feature that we find in paradigm cases.) 
 (Problem 3) It is not possible to have two (or more) distinct determinates (between 
which there is no determinable-determinate relationship) of a determinable property 
simultaneously, but it is possible to have two distinct realizers of the same mental 
property at a time (Ehring 1996; 2011; Funkhouser 2006). For example, an object 
cannot be uniformly scarlet and crimson at once, however it is possible to have C-fibre 
stimulation and another realizer of having pain at once. This might actually be the 
consequence of what we saw in the first problem above. Since having a core-realizer 
property is not sufficient for having what it realizes, it might be the case that only one 
of the realizers is “active” for the realization of having pain. That is, having C-fibre 
stimulation or having M-fibre stimulation alone does not necessitate having pain. An 
organism may have both of these realizers at once, but only one them might be 
accompanied by the appropriate background conditions. 
 (Problem 4) This problem is raised by Funkhouser (2006), and I think it presents a 
conclusive case against the determination view. Maximally determinate mental 
properties cannot be d-realized by physical properties as maximally determinate 
properties are properties that cannot be determined any further. Consider a maximally 
determinate belief property. Let us assume, as Funkhouser does, that the determination 
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dimensions of beliefs are their contents and their degrees. In the relevant sense, a 
maximally determinate belief property would be believing a proposition with a 
maximally specific content with a certain degree of belief. For example, believing that 
it is raining could be determined by believing with some confidence that it is drizzling. 
This determinate property can be further determined by believing with 0.86589643 
credence that there are 54594 rain drops falling from the sky on the top of 33 Glenfarg 
Street between times 9:32 am and 10:00 am. Let us assume that this is a maximally-
specified determinate of believing that it is raining. Call this property M7812. As 
physicalism requires, M7812 is physically realized, say by a physical property P. Now, 
d-realization cannot be the relation between M7812 and P, because if it were, being P 
would have been a determinate of M7812. However, there is no specific way of being 
M7812 because M7812 is already maximally determinate. 
The objection from the last problem clearly demonstrates that d-realization cannot be the 
realization relation in terms of which physicalism is formulated. Although d-realization is 
an asymmetric necessitation relation whereby necessitation is explainable and the causal 
efficacy of the necessitated properties are accommodated, there are considerable objections 
to the proposal that mental properties are d-realized by their physical base properties. 
However, this does not mean that d-realization cannot be considered as a realization 
relation. As I suggested, and will argue further in 3.1.3.3, we can take cases of d-
realization to be special cases of realization. 
3.1.3 Subset Realization (S-realization) 
In the following six subsections, I will discuss and evaluate the subset view of realization 
and the s-realization relation that this view postulates.  
3.1.3.1 The Subset View of Realization 
In this section, I will introduce s-realization as a candidate to play the realization-role. The 
core idea of what has come to be known as the subset view of realization is that the 
relationship between a mental property and its realizer is explainable in terms of the subset 
relationship between the causal powers of these properties. Different versions of the subset 
view have been proposed and defended by Lenny Clapp (2001), Sydney Shoemaker (2001; 
2003; 2007; 2011; 2013) and Jessica Wilson (1999). On a simplified version of the subset 
view, the relationship between a mental property and its realizer is s-realization: 
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(s-realization) A property P s-realizes a property Q if and only if the causal powers 
of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P. 
(I should stress that s-realization is not exactly the relation that all defenders of the subset 
view claim to obtain between mental properties and their realizers. Rather, a simplified 
version of the view can be said to postulate this relation. I introduce other formulations of 
this relation and the subset view in 3.1.3.5 below.)  
A lot has to be said about what causal powers are and how they might be related to the 
properties that are said to “have” them. I shall take up this task in the next chapter. In order 
to assess the subset view, a tentative explanation of what causal powers are will suffice. 
Properties can be said to have causal powers derivatively on their bearers. So, saying that a 
property P has a causal power CP is saying that bearers of P have CP. The classical 
example that Shoemaker (1980) gives is that the property of being knife-shaped has the 
causal power of cutting bread. This is to say that all things that are knife-shape have the 
power of cutting bread. But obviously, not all bearers of being knife-shaped can cut bread. 
So at best, in most cases, properties have their causal powers conditionally on the 
instantiations of other properties. A knife-shaped object has to be made up of a certain 
material in order to exercise this power.
21
 
The set of causal powers of a property is the set that contains all causal powers that the 
bearers of that property have. The term that is commonly used to explain the relationship 
between a property and its set of causal powers is conferment. It is said that a property 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
21
 I am not following Shoemaker‟s own terminology here. Shoemaker formulates s-realization in terms of 
causal features. Causal features can be divided into two groups: backward-looking causal features and 
forward-looking causal features. Backward-looking causal features of a property specify what might cause 
the instantiation of that property, under certain conditions. Forward-looking causal features specify what 
the instantiation of that property might cause, under certain conditions. So, in the terminology that I 
endorse in the text, a causal power is a forward-looking causal feature. 
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confers its causal powers on its bearers. There are a number of theories about the 
relationship between properties and the powers that they confer. The questions that these 
theories answer are mainly the following: Are properties individuated by the causal powers 
they confer on their bearers? Do properties have their causal powers necessarily? In the 
next chapter, I will discuss these theories in detail, and in Chapter 5, I will argue that the 
defenders of the subset view ought to give specific answers to these questions. For the sake 
of the issues that are discussed in this chapter, these questions can be kept aside. 
Let M and P be properties with the sets of causal powers {cp1, cp2} and {cp1, cp2, cp3} 
respectively. According to the formulation above, P s-realizes M, because {cp1, cp2} is a 
proper subset of {cp1, cp2, cp3}. An attractive feature of this account is that it 
straightforwardly explains how properties are multiply realized. Let P* be a property with 
the set of causal powers {cp1, cp2, c78}. P* would also s-realize M.  
A less formal illustration can be made through the classical example of the realization of 
having pain by having C-fibre stimulation.  For the sake of simplicity, let us take the set of 
causal powers of having pain to be {wincing, crying}. Suppose that there is a neural 
detector which reads what neural properties are instantiated in an organism‟s brain and 
then reports the results by signalling the name of the property. The set of causal powers of 
having C-fibre stimulation will include all the causal powers of pain, but will also have to 
include the power of making neural detectors of the aforementioned sort signal “C-fibres”. 
Let us call this causal power SCF. So, the set of causal powers of having C-fibre 
stimulation will be {wincing, crying, SCF, ...}. Now imagine that the neural detector is 
connected to a Martian who is in pain. Let us assume that, in Martians, typically, the neural 
base of having pain is having M-fibre stimulation. Then, in this case, the detector will 
signal “M-fibres”. Let us call this power in question SMF. As a realizer of having pain, 
having M-fibre stimulation will also have the causal powers of pain, and SMF. So, the set 
of causal powers of having M-fibre stimulation will be {wincing, crying, SMF, ...}. 
3.1.3.2 The Power Inheritance Principle 
In a nutshell then, the idea behind the subset view is that the causal powers of mental 
properties are included in the causal powers of physical properties that realize them. Let us 
call this the power inheritance principle. Jessica Wilson (1999) thinks that something 
along the lines of the power inheritance principle is a requirement of physicalism. She 
maintains that physicalists  
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cannot ... allow that mental properties have any causal powers that are different 
from those of their physicalistically acceptable base properties, for this violates 
the physicalist thesis that mental properties are „nothing over and above‟ their 
base properties (ibid: 41).  
It should be noted that not everyone thinks that the power inheritance principle is a 
requirement of physicalism. Two notable exceptions are Gillett (2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2010; 
2011; 2013) and Noordhof (1999; 2003; 2013). Gillett proposes his own theory of 
realization, which I will discuss in detail in Section 3.2.1 below. Here, I shall mention 
Noordhof‟s objection to the power inheritance principle.22  
Noordhof disagrees with the claim that a mental property has fewer causal powers than a 
given realizer of it. And if he is right, a mental property cannot inherit all of its causal 
powers from its realizers. Here is my reconstruction of Noordhof‟s argument (2013: 99). 
Let us suppose that pain experiences can cause pain behaviour in human beings and pain 
behaviour in Martians. So, two causal powers of having pain would be exhibiting human 
pain behaviour and exhibiting Martian pain behaviour. Having pain is realized by having 
C-fibre stimulation in human beings. So, if the power inheritance principle is true, both of 
the aforementioned causal powers are included in the set of causal powers of having C-
fibre stimulation. But, exhibiting Martian pain behaviour cannot be a power of having C-
fibre stimulation, because it is not a power that the bearers of this property (namely human 
beings) can exercise. Therefore, the power inheritance principle is false.  
I think that the defenders of the subset view (and others who endorse the power inheritance 
principle) can survive this objection. What underlies the disagreement between the 
defenders of the subset view and objection is a difference in understanding the relationship 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
22
 An ancestor of the power inheritance principle can be found in Kim (1992). Kim is not a defender of the 
subset view, and he is an ardent opponent of several varieties of non-reductive physicalism. Noordhof 
(1999) addresses Kim‟s version of the principle too, but his more recent discussions target the subset 
view‟s endorsement of this principle. 
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between causal powers and the properties that confer them. Those who subscribe to the 
power inheritance principle can deny that exhibiting Martian pain behaviour is a causal 
power of having pain in the first place. The reason for this is that they understand the 
causal powers of a property to be the causal powers that all bearers of that property have. 
In this case, exhibiting Martian pain behaviour would not be a causal power of having pain, 
because human beings that have pain cannot exercise that power.
23
  
3.1.3.3 S-realization and D-realization  
There is an interesting relationship between s-realization and d-realization. Something 
along the lines of the power inheritance principle must be true about determinable 
properties and their determinates, insofar as we consider these properties to have causal 
powers. The set of causal powers of being red are a proper subset of the causal powers of 
being scarlet, which suggests that, according to the definition of s-realization, being red is 
s-realized by being scarlet. To generalise, all determinable properties are s-realized by 
their determinates. And therefore, all cases of d-realization are also cases of s-realization.  
Shoemaker (2001) noticed this similarity between s-realization and d-realization, and once 
subscribed to the determination view that I have discussed above in the previous section. 
According to the determination view, mental properties are determinable properties, and 
their physical bases are their determinates. So, Shoemaker had once thought that all cases 
of mental-physical realization are also cases of d-realization. However, observing that (a) 
determinable properties are s-realized by their determinates is one thing, establishing that 
(b) mental properties are d-realized by their physical bases is another thing. And (b) clearly 
does not follow from (a). And if we take the considerations against the determination view 
that I have introduced in the previous section seriously, we can see that (b) is not true. 
Shoemaker has subsequently retracted his subscription to the determination view and 
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 I give the same reply to Noordhof‟s (2013) argument in Baysan (2014: 908). 
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agreed that although mental properties are not d-realized by their physical bases, all 
determinable properties are s-realized by their determinates (2007: 23). The relationship 
between s-realization and d-realization is then the following: every case of d-realization is 
also a case of s-realization, but some cases of s-realization (e.g. cases where mental 
properties are s-realized by physical properties) are not cases of d-realization. 
3.1.3.4 S-realization and Non-reductive Physicalism 
Before examining whether s-realization can play the realization-role plausibly, I shall 
discuss one objection that was raised against the subset view. This objection was raised by 
Kim (2010) and developed further by Morris (2011).  
Kim‟s objection goes as follows: physical properties have only physical causal powers; if 
the causal powers of mental properties are causal powers of physical causal powers, then 
mental properties have only physical causal powers. Kim maintains that “there seems no 
good reason not to consider these supposedly mental properties to be physical properties, 
pure and simple” (2010: 111). Kim thinks that this would make the subset view a reductive 
sort of physicalism, because, mental properties would turn out to be identical with physical 
properties. In order to avoid this consequence, we can grant mental properties some mental 
causal powers. However, once we do that, because of the postulated subset relation 
between these mental causal powers and the causal powers of their physical realizers, we 
end up with the consequence that the properties that are supposed to realize these mental 
properties have mental causal powers, in which case they cannot be purely physical 
properties. This is supposedly worse than the first option, because it leads to the conclusion 
that there are mental elements in supposedly fundamental properties, which is at odds with 
physicalism.  
Kim‟s objection can be formulated in terms of a dilemma: if mental properties are s-
realized by physical properties, either all mental properties are physical properties because 
they have only physical causal powers, or some physical properties have mental causal 
powers. Either way, the view in question cannot be a non-reductive physicalist view. If the 
first horn is held, non-reductivism fails; if the second horn is held, physicalism fails. 
However, this objection hinges on a number of ideas which are not supported, and can be 
resisted by the defenders of the subset view. One of them is the contention that physical 
properties have only physical causal powers. Kim does not provide an argument for this, 
but Morris (2011) does. Morris claims that that “there is some reason to think that a 
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physical property is only going to have physical causal powers ... [because] a physical 
entity, it seems, cannot have nonphysical components or parts” (2011: 322-323). However, 
this, I think, relies on a weak analogy, as it cannot be taken for granted that the relationship 
between a property and its causal powers is the same relationship between a physical 
object and its parts. Therefore, physical properties may be allowed to have causal powers 
of mental properties. 
It is also an unsupported idea that there is a dichotomy between mental causal powers and 
physical causal powers. As far as the subset view is concerned, nothing prevents the 
reduction of mental causal powers to physical causal powers, in which case, physical 
properties may be allowed to have mental causal powers, which in turn would also be 
physical causal powers. So, it may not be problematic that physical properties have mental 
causal powers, because such powers can be identical with physical causal powers. This 
may or may not be true, but it seems to be available as a response on behalf of the subset 
view.  
Moreover, having opinions about these matters, namely whether mental causal powers can 
also be physical powers or not, without having a clear account of what a physical causal 
power or a mental causal power is, seems wrong. Kim does not provide an account of what 
a physical causal power is, but Morris seems to do so. He suggests that physical causal 
powers are the powers that are “characterised in terms of other physical properties” 
(Morris 2010: 323). That is, a causal power CP is a physical causal power if and only if 
having CP leads to the instantiations of only physical properties. But ultimately, this 
characterisation is unhelpful, because Kim‟s and Morris‟s arguments use the premise that 
physical properties are the ones that have only physical causal powers. So, physical 
properties are characterised partly in terms of physical causal powers; and physical causal 
powers are explained in terms of physical properties.  
I think that Kim‟s and Morris‟s arguments are insightful, but they fail to establish that the 
postulation of s-realization is not coherent with non-reductive physicalism, mainly because 
they rely on ideas that can easily be resisted by non-reductive physicalists who formulate 
their view in terms of s-realization.  
3.1.3.5 Some Exegetical Issues 
I remarked in of 3.1.3.1 that s-realization is not exactly the relation that the defenders of 
the subset view postulate. Rather, it is a relation that a slightly simplified and a unified 
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version of the view might be said to postulate. The problem is that the defenders of the 
subset view postulate slightly different formulations of realization at different sources, and 
Shoemaker has changed his mind about his version several times. I think that s-realization 
as I formulate it is good enough to represent the core idea of the view, but I will briefly 
introduce other formulations for the sake of completeness. The three alternative 
formulations of the realization relation that different versions of the subset view postulate 
are the following: 
(s2-realization) A property P s2-realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal 
powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) P is not a conjunctive 
property that includes Q as a conjunct.  
(s3-realization) A property P s3-realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the forward-
looking causal features of Q are a proper subset of the forward-looking causal 
features of P; (ii) the backward-looking causal features of Q are a proper superset of 
the backward-looking causal features of P. 
(s4-realization) A property P s4-realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the forward-
looking causal features of Q are a proper subset of the forward-looking causal 
features of P; (ii) the backward-looking causal features of Q are a proper superset of 
the backward-looking causal features of P; (iii) P is not a conjunctive property that 
includes Q as a conjunct. 
Something along the lines of s2-realization is posited by Shoemaker (2001; 2007) and 
Wilson (1999; 2009). They feel the need to ban conjunctive properties as realizers of their 
conjuncts because, without such a ban, all conjunctive properties count as realizers of each 
and every conjunct they have. I am saving a detailed discussion of why such a ban might 
be problematic for Chapter 6, so I will not engage with this issue until then.  
Note that s3-realization and s4-realization invoke the notions of forward-looking and 
backward-looking causal features. Shoemaker‟s term “forward-looking causal features” 
refer to what I call “causal powers”. Backward-looking causal features of a property, on 
the other hand, specify what might cause the instantiation of a property under certain 
conditions. In his first treatment of the subset view, Shoemaker (2001) did not mention 
backward-looking causal features. But subsequently, he thought that a clause on backward-
looking causal features was required, so in his (2003) and (2007), he provided s3-
realization (and s4-realization). Due to arguments advanced by McLaughlin (2006; 2007), 
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Shoemaker changed his mind again, and in his (2011) and (2013), he argued that s-
realization (or s2-realization) was good enough. Some background knowledge regarding 
Shoemaker‟s metaphysics is required to report this issue. I address this issue in more detail 
in Chapter 5, Section 5.4. 
As I said above, I take s-realization to be good enough to represent the subset view, and 
unless stated otherwise, in what follows, the subset view refers to the view that realization 
is s-realization (not s2-realization, s3- realization or s4- realization). 
3.1.3.6 S-realization and the Realization-role 
I devote a significant part of the remainder of this thesis on the subset view and s-
realization. I will do this, mainly because I take s-realization to be a promising candidate to 
play the realization-role.  
First, let us see whether s-realization satisfies the first condition to play the realization-role. 
That is, in a case of s-realization, is the necessitation of an s-realized property explained by 
the instantiation of the base property? Take a property P with the set of causal powers {cp1, 
cp2, cp3}. Take another property, Q, with a set of causal powers of {cp1, cp2}. Because of 
the proper subset relationship between the causal powers of these properties, P s-realizes Q. 
But, is the instantiation of Q metaphysically necessitated by the instantiation of P because 
of the said proper subset relationship? Ideally, the subset view‟s answer to this question 
should be “yes”, in which case, we would at least have a candidate explanation for the 
metaphysical necessitation in question. Opponents of the subset view have argued that the 
proper subset relationship between the causal powers does not explain the metaphysical 
necessitation feature of realization (Melnyk 2006; Kim 2010). My view on this matter is 
that this metaphysical necessitation feature can be explained through this subset 
relationship when certain principles about the relationship between causal powers, 
properties, and their instances are granted. I will introduce theories about this relationship 
in the next chapter, and argue for their relevance for the success of the subset view in 
Chapter 5. For the time being, it should suffice to say that we have at least a promising 
candidate to explain the asymmetric necessitation of s-realized properties. So, the first 
condition to play the realization-role is provisionally satisfied by s-realization.  
The second condition s-realization must meet in order to play the realization-role is 
accommodating the causal efficacy of the necessitated property. The question to ask then is 
the following: Are s-realized properties causally excluded by their s-realizers? The short 
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answer to this question is “no”, so s-realization can be said to satisfy the second condition 
for playing the realization-role. The longer, yet still provisional, answer goes as follows: as 
all defenders of the subset view emphasise, the view is designed to solve the exclusion 
problem.
24
 I devote a full chapter (Chapter 7) to examine the solution that the subset view 
provides to the exclusion problem, so here, I shall only summarise it. The proposal is that, 
since the causal powers of an s-realized property are included in the causal powers of its s-
realizer, there is (something like) a part-whole relationship between the instances of these 
properties. Since parts and wholes do not causally compete, s-realized properties and their 
s-realizers do not causally compete. And since they do not causally compete, an s-realizer 
does not causally exclude the property it s-realizes.  
There is much to be said about the proposed solution, and mainly about the claim that 
because of the subset relationship between the causal powers of two properties, there is 
(something like) a part-whole relationship between the instances of these properties. I will 
examine this solution and the alleged link from subsethood to parthood in detail in 
Chapters 5 and 7. Here, it should suffice to say that s-realization is a promising candidate 
to satisfy the second condition of playing the s-realization role. 
So far, I have suggested that s-realization is a good candidate to play the realization-role 
because it provisionally satisfies the two conditions of playing this role. But there is 
another desideratum that I stipulated above: a relation that is candidate to play the 
realization-role should also be a plausible candidate for relating mental properties to their 
physical bases, at least for the sake of formulating physicalism. The way to test this is to 
ask whether the power inheritance principle is true for mental properties and their physical 
bases. I have argued in Section 3.1.3.2 that the power inheritance principle is true insofar 
as the powers of a property are understood to be the powers that all bearers of that property 
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 Clapp (2001: 133), Shoemaker (2007: 11), and Wilson (1999: 47-48) advertise their views as solutions to 
the exclusion problem. 
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have. So, I will take s-realization to be a relation worth pursuing in the remainder of this 
thesis. 
3.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Horizontal Realization 
So far I have only looked into horizontal relations, and I have argued that, among the 
horizontal relations that have been postulated to relate mental properties to their physical 
bases, s-realization is the promising candidate. In the next section, I will introduce vertical 
relations that might also be candidates to play the realization-role too. 
3.2 Vertical Realization 
In the previous section, I introduced several horizontal relations that are candidates to play 
the realization-role. A horizontal relation is a relation whose relata are properties of (or 
property instances in) the same individual. In this section, I provide a survey of vertical 
relations that might be candidates to play the realization-role. Vertical relations, unlike 
horizontal relations, are relations whose relata are properties of (or property instances in) 
different individuals. I will focus on accounts that have postulated vertical relations as 
realization relations. The two vertical relations that I will discuss are mereological 
realization (m-realization) and coincidental realization (c-realization).  
3.2.1 Mereological Realization (M-realization) 
M-realization is an asymmetric necessitation relation whereby one relatum is a property of 
an entity, whereas other relata are properties of the mereological parts of the same entity. 
There can be different asymmetric necessitation relations that satisfy this condition, but 
here, I shall consider one relation that does so, and call that relation m-realization. I borrow 
m-realization from Carl Gillett (2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2010; 2011; 2013), whose view on 
this matter has come to be known as the dimensioned view of realization. According to the 
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dimensioned view, the relation that relates mental properties to their physical bases (as 
well as any higher-level property to the lover-level ones) is m-realization: 
(m-realization) Property/relation instance(s) P1-Pn, m-realize an instance of a 
property Q, in an individual S, if and only if S has the causal powers of Q in virtue of 
the causal powers of P1-Pn that are conferred on the constituents of S, but not vice 
versa.
25
 
M-realization is formulated as a relation between property instances, rather than properties, 
unlike other relations that have been introduced above. This is due to the fact that Gillett 
articulates his dimensioned view of realization always in terms of instances, rather than 
properties. However, as I suggested in Chapter 2, Section 2.2, we can understand 
realization relations between property instances in terms of realization relations between 
properties, and vice versa. For the sake of continuity with Gillett‟s account, I shall talk of 
realization between property instances when I am discussing the dimensioned view. 
A recurring example in Gillett‟s works is a cut diamond. Gillett asks us to imagine a piece 
of cut diamond in which the property of being hard is instantiated. According to Gillett, 
being hard is instantiated in this cut diamond in virtue of the conferment of the causal 
powers of the diamond‟s having carbon atoms as its constituent parts with certain 
properties and relations. And this happens because the causal powers of being hard are 
conferred on the cut diamond in virtue of the conferment of the causal powers of the 
properties and relations of its parts. So, being hard is m-realized by the properties and the 
relations of the carbon atoms that are constituents of the diamond. What is crucial in this 
example is that although the carbon atoms that are parts of the cut diamond are not hard, 
the diamond itself is hard. 
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 This formulation allows for a special case where the constituent of S is an improper part of S and where 
there is only one P. Such a case would be a case of horizontal realization, so m-realization would have 
horizontal realization as a special case.  
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Before examining whether m-realization can plausibly play the realization-role, I shall 
discuss Gillett‟s view that realization is m-realization. Gillett claims that the concept of 
realization that is implicit in the scientific theories about the relationship between higher-
level properties (for example, functional properties) and lower-lever properties (for 
example, micro-physical properties) is the notion of m-realization (2003a: 594). And he 
maintains that other theories of realization, in particular the subset view of realization that I 
introduced above, fails to capture the scientific understanding of realization.  
According to Gillett, the subset view, among other “flat” views of realization, as he coins 
the term, fails to recognise that realization is a relation between properties at different 
levels.
26
 (Such views are called flat because their purported instances of realization take 
place in the same mereological level. Gillett‟s view, on the other hand, is called 
dimensioned, because the purported instances of realization obtain between different 
mereological levels.) The instantiation of being hard in the cut diamond does not depend 
on the instantiation of a putative realizer property in the same level of composition as the 
diamond. Rather, the instantiation of being hard depends on the properties of the micro-
level entities that compose the diamond. So, realization should be seen as a relation 
between the properties of entities at different levels, as Gillett suggests. 
As Gillett claims, a consequence of the claim that a realized property and its realizer 
properties belong to entities at different levels is that the causal powers of realized 
properties and their realizers cannot be identical. So, the observation that realization relates 
individuals at different levels, according to Gillett, implies that the power inheritance 
principle is false. Gillett aims to demonstrate this through his working example. He argues 
that it is clear that none of the causal powers that the cut diamond has are same as the 
causal powers that the carbon atoms that constitute the diamond. He then generalizes this 
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 Here, we should understand this “levels” talk in the following sense: think of a chair and then think of its 
parts; the chair is at a mereologically higher level than its parts. 
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point to all cases of m-realization and says that the realizer properties and the realized 
properties/relations in m-realization have “qualitatively distinct” causal powers (Gillett 
2010). The qualitative distinctness claim refers to the contention that properties at higher 
levels are different in kind, and such difference in kind is exemplified by the suggestion 
that such properties do not confer any common causal power to their bearers (ibid: 172).  
Note that the idea that there is such qualitative distinctness among the relata of realization, 
understood this way, is directly the rejection of the power inheritance principle, so there is 
hardly an argument for the qualitative distinctness claim. However, Gillett claims that  
a survey of any number of examples of mechanistic explanation in the sciences, 
or the entities found at the distinct „levels‟ related by such explanations, 
establishes that the relevant relata are usually of qualitatively different kinds 
(ibid: 172, emphasis added).  
As a response to Gillett‟s inductive argument for the qualitative distinctness claim, one can 
cite numerous cases of m-realization that involve properties that are not qualitatively 
distinct in this sense. Imagine that Lily builds a Lego castle by using only red Lego pieces. 
The redness of the castle would be instantiated in virtue of the redness of its pieces. The 
redness of each piece “works” in the m-realization of the redness of the castle because the 
castle has the powers that individuate being red in virtue of the powers that being red 
confers to the Lego pieces, but not vice versa. The causal powers that are conferred by the 
realized property and its realizers are type-identical, so this is clearly not a case of 
qualitative distinctness. Assuming that more and more examples of this sort can be 
generated, it follows that qualitative distinctness of relata is not a suggestive mark of m-
realization, or realization in general. 
So, if I am right, qualitative distinctness should not be seen as mark of m-realization. There 
can be cases in which an m-realized property has the same causal powers of the properties 
at the realization base. Now, I shall also show that Gillett is wrong in thinking that m-
realization is the realization relation. This can be seen through the observation that the 
obtaining of m-realization is compatible with the obtaining of a horizontal realization 
relation (such as s-realization). That is, that there is a vertical realization relation between 
the properties at different levels does not rule out the possibility of there being a horizontal 
realization relation between the properties at the same level, or between the properties of 
the same individual.  
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Moreover, the obtaining of an m-realization relation is not only compatible with the 
obtaining of a horizontal realization relation, but it also necessitates it. Gillett anticipates 
this objection, and his version of it goes as follows (2002: 320-321). Consider the piece of 
diamond which instantiates being hard; from the fact that it is m-realized by the 
properties/relations of the carbon atoms that constitute the diamond, it follows that the 
diamond has a property of having a certain structure of having constituents with such and 
such properties and so and so relations; that is, the diamond can be said to have a “highly 
complex structure of carbon atoms and their realizers and relations” (ibid: 321). Following 
Gillett, let us call this highly specific property COMBO. Both being hard and COMBO are 
properties of the very same object, the cut diamond. Also, note that the instantiation of 
COMBO necessitates the instantiation of being hard. And moreover, the causal powers of 
COMBO and being hard must match in a specific way. Given that COMBO necessitates 
being hard, all bearers of COMBO are also bearers of being hard. But not all bearers of 
being hard are also bearers of COMBO. Things can be hard without having this very 
specific micro-structure. From these, it follows that the causal powers of being hard are a 
proper subset of the causal powers of COMBO. Therefore, COMBO s-realizes being hard. 
This establishes that the obtaining of an m-realization relation necessitates the obtaining of 
an s-realization. If the dimensioned view is the view that the only realization relation is m-
realization, then the dimensioned view is clearly false.  
Gillett‟s response to this anticipated objection goes as follows. He asks us to consider the 
relationship between COMBO and the microphysical properties and relations that specify 
COMBO. COMBO is supposedly instantiated in the piece of diamond, and the 
microphysical properties and relations that are considered are instantiated in the 
constituents of the diamond. If the piece of diamond instantiates COMBO, it does so in 
virtue of the instantiation of the microphysical properties and relations of the constituents 
of the diamond. Given that the in-virtue-of relation in question is m-realization, Gillett 
argues that the instantiation of properties like COMBO “provide further cases of realization 
that [an account that appeals to a horizontal realization relation] ... fails to explain” (ibid: 
321). However, this hardly responds to the objection. Because, by this, we only see that 
COMBO is m-realized; nothing is said as to why COMBO does not s-realize being hard. 
There remains another way of blocking the argument from COMBO: denying the existence 
of properties like COMBO. Gillett (2010) argues that the postulation of properties such as 
COMBO is superfluous. He thinks that such properties are “ontological monsters”, where 
an ontological monster is a kind of entity that mixes together different kinds of entities 
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such as particulars, properties, relations and so on (ibid: 181). He thinks that having 
ontological monsters should be avoided, because we should keep ontological categories 
separate from each other. Unless we avoid these monsters, we end up with “complicated 
ontological frameworks which are neither parsimonious, nor easy to understand or assess” 
(ibid). Nevertheless, this strategy is not satisfactory either. The truth of a metaphysical 
theory does not depend on how easy it is to understand or assess it. If the metaphysical 
inquiry in question requires “mixing” categories so as to create new entities, the COMBO 
objection is legitimate. Apart from being called “monsters”, there does not seem to be 
anything wrong with ontological monsters.
27
 
There is another reason to think that the instance of a horizontal realization relation must 
be present when there is an instance of m-realization. Gillett‟s diamond instantiates being 
hard in virtue of the properties and the relations of the carbon atoms that constitute it. 
However, being hard comes in degrees, because it is a determinable property. Something 
cannot be hard without being hard in a specific way. The diamond cannot be hard without 
instantiating a determinate of being hard, say H1. As I argued above in Section 3.1.3.3, we 
have good reasons to think that the causal powers of a determinable property are a subset 
of the causal powers any of its determinate properties. That is, determinate properties s-
realize their determinable properties. Therefore, H1 s-realizes being hard. This, in turn, 
shows the inevitability of the existence of a horizontal realization relation. 
Gillett‟s dimensioned view fails to show that a vertical relation, in particular, m-realization, 
is the only realization relation that exists, for the reasons specified above. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that a mereological realization relation should not be regimented. 
Shoemaker acknowledges this when he says that  
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 Gillett can appeal to other arguments to deny structural universals like COMBO. However, that would be 
an independent issue, and at any rate, the rejection of such properties should not be part of a view about 
realization. I shall briefly discuss the role of structural properties in Chapter 6, Section 6.1. 
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we [also] need an account of realization that gives a role to the properties of 
micro-entities other parts of macroscopic objects ... [but] the cure for this is not 
to count the properties of parts of macroscopic objects as the realizers of 
properties of the macroscopic objects (2007:  32).  
That is, theorising about a realization relation that gives a role to micro-level entities and 
their properties might be required, but this does not mean that the relation through which 
this is to be established should be counted as the realization relation.  
Instead of taking realization as a relation between the properties of macro-level entities and 
the properties of micro-level entities that constitute the macro-level entities, Shoemaker 
provides us an explanation how such micro-level properties play a role in realization. Take 
a macro-level entity, say a cut diamond. Take the state of affairs Sdiamond that consists in the 
proposition that specifies the microphysical description of the cut diamond, namely, how 
its constituent atoms are related, and what properties they instantiate and so on. Sdiamond will 
be a microphysical state of affairs, because the proposition that constitutes the existence of 
the state of affairs is a proposition about the properties and relations of the microphysical 
constituents of the diamond.
 28
 According to Shoemaker‟s understanding of states of affairs, 
“the existence of a state of affairs simply consists in some proposition‟s being true” (ibid: 
33). Such a proposition can assert that a given particular instantiates a certain property, that 
several particulars instantiate some properties, that they bear certain relations to each other, 
and so on. These propositions can specify more global states, such as how the world is, 
what laws of nature are true and so on. (A state of affairs can also assert a negative 
proposition which asserts that some particulars do not have certain properties and do not 
stand in certain relations or that a world is not in a certain way.) 
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 Here, by “microphysical entities”, Shoemaker does not mean maximally fundamental entities. We do not 
know if there are maximally basic entities because it could be the case that “each sort of micro-entity is 
composed of more basic entities, which are composed of more basic entities, and so ad infinitum” (ibid: 
34). 
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Now, suppose that there is a property P which is individuated by the microphysical state of 
affairs Sdiamond in the following sense: P is a property that something has if and only if 
Sdiamond obtains within the boundaries of that thing. So, P is a highly determinate property 
that specifies the micro-physical makeup of the diamond alongside the obtaining of some 
facts in the surroundings of the diamond. P is a highly fragile property, in the sense that, as 
soon as Sdiamond fails to obtain (which might happen due to a minute change), the cut 
diamond ceases to be a bearer of P. In Shoemaker‟s own terminology, such properties like 
P are “microphysical states of affairs embedding (MSE) properties” (ibid: 35). 
Since the diamond‟s boundaries embed Sdiamond, the diamond is a bearer of P. Shoemaker 
suggests that P will s-realize (all) other properties of the cut diamond that are 
simultaneously instantiated with P. Once we have the formulation of s-realization, the 
explanation of this is very straightforward. Take Q as any property (except P) that the cut 
diamond has. All bearers of P are also bearers of Q, but not vice versa. So, a bearer of 
Sdiamond is also a bearer of Q. Shoemaker calls the relation that obtains between such 
microphysical states of affairs and the higher-level properties that the MSE properties of 
these states of affairs necessitate microrealization (2003b; 2007). Note that 
microrealization is not a relation between properties (or instances). It is a relation between 
states of affairs and properties (or their instances). For this reason, I do not take 
microrealization to be a realization relation. I take this story about microrealization to be 
an explanation of how, in realization, a role can be given to the properties of micro-entities. 
Another person who thinks that a role to micro entities can be given in realization without 
defining the realization relation as a mereological relation is Endicott (2011). On 
Endicott‟s view, the rivalry of an m-realization account (for example, the dimensioned 
view) and a horizontal realization account (for example, the subset view) is only apparent. 
According to what he calls “comprehensive functionalism”, there are at least two stories 
that can be told for the explanation of the instantiation of a higher-level property, such as 
the cut diamond‟s being hard. These two stories might be of interest for different scientific 
programs. One scientific program might want to explain how COMBO necessitates being 
hard, whereas another program might be interested in how COMBO is instantiated in the 
first place. While the former would appeal to a horizontal realization relation, the latter 
would make use of a vertical realization relation. 
In the remainder of this thesis, I shall not focus on m-realization (and the dimensioned 
view) for the following reasons. First, regardless of whether m-realization can play the 
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realization-role plausibly or not, its obtaining entails the obtaining of s-realization. We 
have already seen that s-realization is a promising candidate to play the realization-role, so, 
the appeal to m-realization, on top of s-realization, is superfluous for the sake of my 
project. Second, and more importantly, arguably, m-realization does not play the 
realization-role. Recall that one of the conditions for playing this role is providing 
resources to explain how a property is necessitated by the instantiation of a base property 
(or properties and relations, as far as m-realization is concerned). However, m-realization 
is defined over an in-virtue-of relation, which is not explained any further. According to 
the strategy I have been following, a good theory of realization should explain, in an 
informative way, how the instantiation of a realized property is metaphysically necessitated 
by the instantiation of its realizer(s). If we appeal to an in-virtue-of relation in the 
formulation of realization, then metaphysical necessitation comes for free without any 
informative explanation. That is, using the in-virtue-of relation in the formulation of 
physicalism makes it true, just by stipulation, that realization is a metaphysical 
necessitation relation. But that is not explaining why metaphysical necessitation is a 
feature of realization; that is merely saying that it is. So I do not find an account of m-
realization helpful for my purposes. 
Next, I shall discuss a vertical realization relation that is purported to obtain between some 
properties of distinct coincident entities. 
3.2.2 Coincidental Realization (C-realization) 
In this section, I will discuss a realization account given by Shoemaker (2003b; 2007) to 
account for the realization relation between the properties of coincident objects. I will call 
this relation c-realization. C-realization is a vertical relation, as it relates the properties of 
different individuals. Beyond this section, I will not discuss c-realization and Shoemaker‟s 
account of it; I am including a discussion of it merely for the sake of completeness. First, I 
will explain what coincident objects are supposed to be. Second, I will spell out how c-
realization relates the properties of these putative entities. Third, I will argue that, even if 
one thinks that there might be coincident entities, c-realization is not a fundamental 
realization relation: if it obtains, it obtains in virtue of a horizontal realization relation. For 
this reason, I will not examine whether c-realization plays the realization-role. 
Coincident objects are distinct objects that allegedly occupy the same space at a time. The 
idea that there are coincident entities is usually motivated by the cases like the following. 
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Consider a statue which is made of clay. Let us say that Lump is the name of the lump of 
clay that statue is made of. Naturally, one might be inclined to think that Lump and the 
statue are identical. However, Lump and the statue differ in many properties. For example, 
they differ in temporal properties: Lump existed before the statue existed. They also differ 
in their persistence conditions: while Lump can survive being melted, the statue cannot; 
once the statue is melted, it is not a statue anymore. From Leibniz‟s law, it follows that the 
statue is not identical with Lump. If Lump and the statue are not identical, given that both 
occupy the same space at a given time, then different objects could occupy the same space 
at a given time. 
Lump and the statue share some of their properties, and they differ with respect to some 
other properties. Presumably, there are some dependence relations between the properties 
of the statue and Lump. For example, the aesthetic properties of the statue partially depend 
on the shape properties of Lump. The question is whether there is any relation between the 
properties of the statute and Lump that might be thought to be a variety of realization. This 
question becomes more interesting when one considers the proposal that persons are 
coincident with their bodies and/or human animals. Shoemaker (2003b; 2007) thinks that 
this is the case. He takes this view to be a consequence of his neo-Lockean view of 
personal identity. On the neo-Lockean view, whereas persistence conditions for persons 
are psychological, persistence conditions for bodies are not. (I will not discuss 
Shoemaker‟s arguments for the neo-Lockean account of personal identity. Just as, I am 
neither defending nor rejecting the possibility of coincident entities, I am also impartial 
with respect to the proposal that persons and bodies are coincident.) 
If persons and their bodies are not identical but coincident, then it might be thought that the 
mental properties of a person are, in one sense, realized (through a vertical relation) by the 
physical properties of the body. However, if physicalism is true, persons are physical 
substances too. And if one takes persons as physical substances, then the neo-Lockean 
view with the postulation of a realization relation yields the “too many minds” problem 
(Olson 1997). The too many minds problem can be illustrated as follows. Both Jess and her 
coincident body B are physical substances. Many, perhaps all, physical properties of B will 
be inherited by Jess. For example, if B weighs 62 kg, so does Jess. If B is having C-fibre 
stimulation, so is Jess. Assuming that having C-fibre stimulation is a realizer of having 
pain, it follows that both B and Jess have C-fibre stimulations that should realize having 
pain. The point generalizes to all mental properties that Jess has. Then there will be two 
psychologically indistinguishable subjects at the same space-time region. 
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Shoemaker develops the c-realization account to respond to the too many minds problem. 
In order to explain what c-realization is, I shall introduce the two kinds of property that 
Shoemaker distinguishes between: thin properties and thick properties. Thin properties are 
“properties that can be shared by coincident things of different kinds” (Shoemaker 2007: 7). 
All physical properties a person and her body share will be thin properties. Thick 
properties, on the other hand, are “properties that can belong only to things that are of 
certain sorts and have certain persistence conditions” (ibid). Mental properties are thick, 
because while persons can have them, their coincident bodies cannot. This suggests that 
thick properties entail sortal properties, namely the properties things have just in case they 
are of certain sorts. Being a person is an example of a sortal property. If P is a thick 
property that can be had only by persons, having P entails having the sortal property of 
being a person. 
Thanks to the distinction between thin properties and thick properties, c-realization is 
formulated in such a way that a given physical property instance does not realize the same 
mental property in (two or more) substances: 
(c-realization) A property P of an individual A c-realizes a property Q of an 
individual B if and only if (i) A and B are coincident objects, (ii) P is a thin property; 
(iii) Q is a thick property that entails a sortal property S; and (iii) the conjunctive 
property (P & S) s-realizes Q. 
The following is an illustration of c-realization. Think of Jess and her body B again. Let us 
suppose that B instantiates having C-fibre stimulation. This property would be a thin 
property, and will be shared by Jess too. Jess, as a person, then can be said to have the 
conjunctive property (having C-fibre stimulation & being a person). Since this latter 
property is an s-realizer of having pain, it s-realizes having pain in Jess. So, having C-fibre 
stimulation in B c-realizes having pain in Jess. Note that, having C-fibre stimulation in B 
does not realize having pain in B in any way, so having pain is not instantiated twice over. 
Therefore, the too many minds problem is avoided. 
A shorter way of avoiding the too many minds problem, which is implied by this rather 
complicated account, would be to take mental properties to be such that they can only be 
instantiated in objects of certain sorts. Bodies are not the sort of things that can have pain, 
so having C-fibre stimulation in a body does not realize having pain in a body. Having C-
fibre stimulation realizes having pain only when it is instantiated in certain sorts of entities. 
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This suggests that total realizers of mental properties should also include specifications of 
sortal properties. 
Regardless of whether there can be coincident entities or not, it should be noted that c-
realization is not a fundamental realization relation in its own right. That is, it is a 
realization relation that is instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of another realization. 
Any c-realization relation between the properties of two coincident objects obtains in 
virtue of an s-realization instance among the properties of one of these coincident objects. 
So, in what follows, I will not discuss c-realization any further. But, if one believes that 
there are coincident objects (and that persons and their bodies are examples of such 
objects), and wants to explain the necessitation of some of the properties of one object by 
the instantiation of some of the properties of a coinciding object, then one can appeal to c-
realization. 
3.2.3 Concluding Remarks on Vertical Realization 
In this section, I introduced two types of vertical relation that are candidates to play the 
realization-role. As I explained, vertical relations are relations whose relata are properties 
that are instantiated in different individuals. The vertical relations I have discussed are m-
realization and c-realization. 
M-realization is a mereological relation whereby an instance of a property of an individual 
is instantiated in virtue of the properties and the relations of the constituents of that 
individual. I examined Gillett‟s dimensioned view of realization, which is the view that the 
right realization relation that should be invoked is m-realization. I have argued that Gillett 
is wrong, as he fails to notice that the existence of a vertical realization relation is 
compatible with the existence of a horizontal realization relation, such as s-realization. And, 
as I suggested in section 3.1.3 above, s-realization is a good candidate to play the 
realization-role. So, although, it might be thought that it is also required to explain how 
properties at macro-levels depend on properties at micro-levels, this does not have to be a 
constraint on formulating a relation that plays the realization-role. Moreover, I argued that 
m-realization cannot play the realization-role at any rate, as it is formulated in terms of an 
in-virtue-of relation, which is yet to be explained. 
Then I examined Shoemaker‟s proposal that there is a realization relation, namely c-
realization, which obtains between the properties of coincident objects. Whether c-
realization is a real relation hinges on whether there really are coincident objects. At any 
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rate, c-realization, as I argued, cannot be a fundamental realization relation, as it obtains, if 
it obtains at all, in virtue of the obtaining of a horizontal realization relation, such as s-
realization. Given that s-realization is already a good candidate to play the realization-role, 
I used these considerations to neglect c-realization as a candidate to play the realization-
role. 
3.3 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I discussed five relations that might be thought to be candidates to play the 
realization-role. These five relations are h-realization, d-realization, s-realization, m-
realization and c-realization. After providing the formulations of these relations, and 
discussing the views that are associated with these relations, I gave my reasons to focus on 
s-realization and the subset view of realization in the remainder of this thesis. The 
following is a brief summary of what I said about these relations, and why I shall focus on 
s-realization and the subset view. 
H-realization is the following horizontal relation: 
(h-realization) A property P h-realizes a property Q if and only if, (i) Q is the 
property of having a property that occupies a role R, and (ii) P is a property that 
occupies R. 
H-realization fails to play the realization-role, because it does not accommodate the causal 
efficacy of the realized property. The causal role of the h-realized property is screened off 
by stipulation, as the property that h-realizes it, by definition, occupies the causal role of 
the h-realized property. 
D-realization is the following horizontal relation: 
(d-realization) A property P d-realizes a property Q if and only if P is a determinate 
of Q.  
As I showed, although d-realization plays the realization-role (because the necessitation of 
a d-realized property by a d-realizer is explainable, and the causal efficacy of the d-realized 
property is presumably not in jeopardy), a mental property is not a determinable property 
whose determinates are the physical properties that serve as its realizers. Because of this, 
d-realization is not a plausible candidate for the sake of formulating physicalism.  
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S-realization is the following horizontal relation: 
(s-realization) A property P s-realizes a property Q if and only if the causal powers 
of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P. 
The (simplified version of the) subset view of realization is the view that the realization 
relation that physicalists should appeal to is s-realization. I argued that s-realization is a 
plausible candidate to play the realization-role. The subset view provides resources to 
explain how s-realized properties are metaphysically necessitated by their s-realizers. As I 
will argue in Chapter 5, once a certain view about the relationship between properties and 
their causal profiles is held, the metaphysical necessitation feature of s-realization can be 
explained in virtue of the proper subset relationship between the causal powers of an s-
realized property and its s-realizers. Moreover, because of the inclusion of the causal 
powers of the s-realized property within the causal powers of its s-realizers, the causal 
efficacy of an s-realized property can be maintained. Finally, as I maintained, once the 
relationship between a property and its causal powers is understood properly, there are no 
obvious unanswerable objections to the view that a mental property, according to 
physicalism, has a proper subset of the causal powers of its physical realizers.  
As I have explained in Section 3.2.3 above, I shall not focus on the two vertical realization 
relations that are introduced in the literature. These are m-realization and c-realization. M-
realization is the following vertical relation: 
(m-realization) Property/relation instance(s) P1-Pn, m-realize an instance of a 
property Q, in an individual S, if and only if S has the causal powers of Q in virtue of 
the causal powers of P1-Pn that are conferred on the constituents of S, but not vice 
versa. 
I argued that the existence of m-realization is compatible with, and in fact entails, the 
existence of a horizontal realization relation. And moreover, m-realization does not play 
the realization-role, as the in-virtue-of relation in terms of which it is formulated is yet to 
be explained. 
C-realization is the following vertical relation: 
(c-realization) A property P of an individual A c-realizes a property Q of an 
individual B if and only if (i) A and B are coincident objects, (ii) P is a thin property; 
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(iii) Q is a thick property that entails a sortal property S; and (iii) the conjunctive 
property (P & S) s-realizes  Q. 
C-realization, as I explained, is not a fundamental realization relation, because it obtains, if 
it obtains at all, in virtue of the obtaining of s-realization, which is a horizontal realization 
relation. 
Because of these considerations, in what follows, I will focus on s-realization and the 
subset view. Since the subset view, which is the theory of realization that I will focus on in 
the remainder of this thesis, takes realization to be ultimately a relation between the causal 
powers of properties, I will provide a comprehensive survey of the theories that explain the 
relationship between properties and their causal powers in the next chapter. This will be an 
important task for the sake of evaluating the subset view. As I will argue in Chapter 5, the 
subset view‟s plausibility hinges on the plausibility of certain theories about causal powers.  
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CHAPTER 4: REALIZATION AND CAUSAL POWERS, PART I 
4.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced several relations that are candidates to play the 
realization-role and I provided reasons to focus on the subset view of realization. In the 
previous chapter, I called the realization relation that the subset view postulates “s-
realization”. Since, I will be exclusively working on the subset view‟s account of 
realization in the remaining of this thesis, I will call this relation merely “realization”. 
Setting aside some technical and exegetical issues regarding different formulations of 
realization, the core claim of the defenders of the subset view is that a property P realizes a 
property Q if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of 
P. It can be seen that, on this view, realization is explained by means of appealing to a set-
theoretical relationship between the causal powers of properties. Having already discussed 
the motivations for not allowing mental properties to have causal powers that their 
realizers do not have, we can now turn to an assessment of the subset view with respect to 
its theoretical commitments regarding the notion of causal powers. Although most of the 
discussion of the subset view is based on an understanding of causal powers according to 
which properties are “tightly” connected to the causal powers that they confer to their 
bearers, it is yet to be investigated how relevant certain theories of properties and causal 
powers are to the subset view. There are various ways of explaining how properties might 
be related to causal powers. My main task in this chapter is to lay out a variety of views 
regarding this relationship. I shall start with explaining what causal powers are.  
Here is how I shall proceed. In Section 4.1, I will explain what philosophers mean by 
“causal powers” or “dispositions” and introduce a categorisation of different types of 
dispositions. In Section 4.2, I will introduce the distinction between dispositional and 
categorical predicates. In Section 4.3, I will give a summary of the debate on what is 
known as the conditional analysis of dispositions. In Section 4.4, I will provide the 
distinction between categorical and dispositional properties. In Section 4.5, I will discuss 
various views regarding the nature of properties with respect to the distinction between 
categorical and dispositional properties. Here, I will introduce the causal thesis, according 
to which properties are individuated by their causal profiles and have these profiles 
essentially. The remainder of Section 4.5 will include a survey of arguments for and 
against the causal thesis. Understanding what the causal thesis amounts to is important for 
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my purpose because I will argue in the next chapter that the causal thesis is highly relevant 
for the subset view. 
4.1 Causal Powers/Dispositions  
First, I shall start with a note on terminology: although there are some exceptions, “causal 
powers” and “dispositions” are used interchangeably in the literature. As we shall see, 
there are some types of dispositions that might not be appropriately called “powers”. Apart 
from the discussion of that issue in 4.1.2 below, I will follow the common practice in the 
literature on powers and use these two terms interchangeably.
29
 
If the subset view is true, the notion of causal powers is central to the metaphysics of 
realization, and hence to physicalism in philosophy of mind. But the notion of causal 
powers has been notorious, so to speak, because of the controversies surrounding it. There 
had been a tendency in metaphysics (perhaps until recently) to deny the philosophical 
substantiality of dispositions. For example, Hume announced powers to be “obscure and 
uncertain” (1748: Chapter VII). Goodman put dispositions alongside angels and devils 
(cited in Cross 2012). Quine called dispositions “pretty disreputable”, and suggested that a 
science that invokes dispositions is “rotten to the core” (quoted in Crane 1996: 3). Mellor, 
referring to the dismissive trend in metaphysics, said that dispositions are, “as shameful in 
many eyes as pregnant spinsters used to be–ideally to be explained away, or entitled by a 
shotgun wedding to take the name of some decently real ... [non-dispositional] property" 
(1974: 157). But what might be the reason to think that dispositions are strange entities? 
Crane identifies the source of the aforementioned discontent with dispositions as their 
reference to merely possible entities, which is associated with the idea that “an object can 
have a disposition without ever manifesting it” (Crane 1996: 3). When Goodman 
condemned dispositions as strange, he also said that  
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 See Heil (2005) and Choi & Fara (2012) for explicit endorsements of this terminological choice. 
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the peculiarity of dispositional predicates is that they seem to be applied to 
things in virtue of possible rather than actual occurrences–and possible 
occurrences are … no more admissible as unexplained elements than are occult 
capacities” (quoted in ibid, emphasis added).  
Since causal powers are central to the subset view of realization, the defenders of the 
subset view can be asked to provide an explanation of how these worries might be 
responded to. The defenders of the subset view should ideally show that there is nothing 
mysterious about causal powers. One of my aims in this chapter is to show that this is the 
case. We have a fairly good understanding of what philosophers mean when they talk 
about causal powers, and this is due to the fact that there is a substantial literature on how 
to analyse those ascriptions. This chapter should be read, in part, as a critical survey of this 
literature. 
4.1.1 What are Dispositions?  
Although there is no consensus in the literature regarding how to define causal powers or 
analyse dispositional ascriptions, there is some agreement that the causal powers of a thing 
have to do with the ways that thing behaves, or is likely to behave, or would behave, under 
certain circumstances. As Ellis points out, if we have information about the causal powers 
of an object, we have information about what that thing is likely to do, or how it is likely to 
react to certain circumstances (2002: 65). Note that this is a conditional, so whether such 
information is possible is not relevant to this tentative explanation of what a causal power 
is. 
Causal powers of things have to do with what those things are capable of doing. Of course, 
explaining powers in terms of capabilities is not very helpful. Nevertheless, in order to 
motivate an intuitive understanding of what causal powers might be, introducing notions 
from the same family is, at least, harmless. To fix ideas, consider a variation of 
Shoemaker‟s (1980) example of a sharp knife. A sharp knife is capable of cutting things. 
Depending on other features of the sharp knife, the capabilities of the knife vary. When we 
talk about the causal powers of things, we talk about such capabilities. 
There is an important question regarding the source, or the ground, of this capability. In 
virtue of what is the knife capable of cutting things? As we shall see below, the answers to 
this question (and related questions) vary. One explanation would be that the knife is 
capable of cutting things in virtue of having the property of being apt to cut. Such 
properties are usually called dispositional properties. For those who believe that there are 
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such properties, these are properties whose natures consist in disposing things to behave in 
certain ways under certain circumstances. Another explanation would be that the knife is 
capable of cutting things in virtue of having a non-dispositional property. It is common 
practice to call such properties categorical properties. Those who prefer this explanation 
usually take micro-structural properties to be categorical, and think that micro-structural 
properties ground such capacities, as long as the laws of nature permit. I will discuss these 
options, among others, in detail in Section 4.4 below. But it should suffice to show that, 
insofar as we are realist about properties (and we are, given that this thesis is about a 
relation between properties), the study of causal powers is tightly connected to the study 
of properties.  
4.1.2 Varieties of Disposition  
As I said above, the terms “causal powers” and “dispositions” are used interchangeably. 
Other notions which are in the same family these are (merely) “powers”, “capacities”, 
“liabilities”, “propensities” and “causal features”. There are subtle differences between 
these terms, and I will note those differences where appropriate.  
I use “powers” and “causal powers” interchangeably.30 It might be questioned whether 
“dispositions” and “powers” should be used interchangeably too because it might mask the 
differences between varieties of dispositions, some of which deserve the term “power” 
better than others. We can take the specification of the dispositions of a thing to refer to the 
ways in which it might behave under certain circumstances. And, we can take powers as 
active dispositions as opposed to passive dispositions. Ellis uses the term “liability” to refer 
to passive dispositions, which include dispositions like fragility (2002: 65). Perhaps it is 
ultimately a verbal point, but it sounds rather odd to take fragility to be a power. On the 
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 Though, note that Lowe (2013) thinks that the human will is a non-causal power. I shall exclude the 
discussion of the human will from this thesis. 
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other hand, if we consider the example of a sharp knife, its disposition to cut could be less 
problematically taken as an active disposition, or a power. Ellis uses the term “capacity” to 
cover both active and passive dispositions. Since nothing that I discuss in this thesis hinges 
on this issue, unless I specify otherwise, I shall be continuous with most of the literature 
and use “powers”, “causal powers” and “dispositions” interchangeably.  
Propensities are also taken to be in the same family with dispositions. The specification of 
the propensities of an object is the specification of how it is likely to behave under certain 
circumstances too. However, propensities can be taken as a special class of dispositions in 
the sense that the causal processes that they specify are stochastic. Ellis gives the example 
of “the emission of an electron from the nucleus of an atom resulting in an increase by one 
if its atomic number” (ibid: 78). As the example goes, nothing determines when an electron 
will be emitted, and the best that we can do is to calculate the probability of such emissions. 
Whether paradigm examples of dispositions are ultimately different from propensities is 
another question that might be asked. Nothing that we discuss hinges on this point, so I 
shall move on. 
A more substantial issue concerning types of dispositions is about the difference between 
conditional powers and powers simpliciter (Shoemaker 1980; 1998). Sometimes things 
have powers conditionally on having some properties. Let us go back to the original 
example of a sharp knife. Something that is knife-shaped has the power to cut the things it 
might cut conditionally on what it is made of. If it is made of wood, a knife-shaped thing 
can cut butter. If it is made of steel, it can cut rigid things too, such as wood. If something 
has the power to do something regardless of such conditions, then the power in question is 
a power simpliciter. 
Another aspect in which dispositions differ is that some dispositions are multi-track 
whereas others are single-track. A fragile thing, for example a glass, is disposed to shatter, 
or, it typically shatters when it is struck. (The locution “typically” is required to avoid 
some problems that I shall mention in Section 4.3.) Following the common practice, let us 
take the striking as the stimulus (or the triggering) condition, and the shattering as the 
manifestation (or the exercising) of the disposition. There is a sense in which dispositions 
can be understood in terms of the pairings of stimulus conditions and manifestations. The 
distinction between multi-track and single-track dispositions is related to the multiplicity of 
pairings that are required for a proper understanding of a given disposition. A disposition is 
multi-track if its specification refers to multiple stimulus conditions that can be paired with 
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multiple manifestations (Bird 2007: 21-24). In this sense, fragility can be characterised as a 
multi-track disposition, because fragile things tend to break in different ways in response to 
different types of strikes. 
The talk of causal powers, in some sense, refers to (actual or possible) causal processes. In 
virtue of having powers, things can do things in response to certain events. Or so would 
say those who believe that causal powers are real properties. In accordance with this, 
another distinction between kinds of causal powers concerns the things that are involved in 
these causal processes. Sometimes these causal processes involve multiple objects, and 
sometimes there is only one object that undergoes a causal process. Typically, in order for 
fragility to be exercised, we need at least two objects: the fragile object and the object that 
strikes it. On the other hand, the exercising of a radioactive substance‟s disposition to 
decay involves only one individual, namely that substance (Ellis 2002: 65).  
Another distinction among dispositions concerns the persistence conditions of the bearers 
of those dispositions (Zimmermann 2009: 681-682). With respect to persistence conditions, 
causal powers can be identity-entailing, identity-excluding or identity-neutral. An identity-
entailing disposition is a disposition such that having that disposition entails the persistence 
of the thing that has the disposition for some time after the disposition is manifested. A 
glass of hot water in a cold room will be disposed to get colder. Since in order to get colder, 
it has to persist at least until it gets cold, its disposition to become colder is an identity-
entailing disposition. An identity-excluding disposition is a disposition such that having 
that disposition entails the annihilation of the thing that exercises the disposition after some 
time. A substance‟s disposition to explode or burn is such a disposition, because its 
manifestation necessitates the cessation of the existence of the substance (at least as a 
uniform substance). An identity-neutral disposition is a disposition such that having that 
disposition implies neither the persistence nor the annihilation of the thing that exercises 
the disposition. Disposition to increase the temperature of a room would be an example for 
identity-neutral dispositions. 
Although they are not dispositions, backward-looking causal features and their contrast 
with causal powers should be mentioned here. In Shoemaker‟s terminology, (conditional) 
causal powers that properties confer on their bearers are called “forward-looking causal 
features”. They are contrasted with backward-looking causal features, which are the 
features that specify the possible causes of the instantiation of a property. (I will talk about 
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the relevance, or perhaps the irrelevance, of backward-looking causal features to the issues 
related to realization in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.) 
4.2 Dispositional and Categorical Predicates 
As I already mentioned, it is common practice to understand causal powers in terms of how 
they might be exercised under certain circumstances. It has been a source of dispute as to 
how to make use of this stimulus-manifestation pairing when analysing a dispositional 
expression. In particular, it is debated whether dispositional expressions can be analysed in 
terms of conditional statements that specify the stimulus-manifestation pairing. If they can 
be analysed in this way, we can make a distinction between dispositional predicates and 
non-dispositional, or categorical, predicates and stipulate that dispositional predicates 
entail certain conditionals whereas categorical predicates do not. I shall elaborate on this 
shortly. 
Before proceeding to the debate on analysing dispositional ascriptions, one issue that needs 
to be addressed is the distinction between conventional (or covert) and canonical (or overt) 
dispositional expressions (Bird 2007: 18-19). When I say that the lock on the main door is 
disposed to open when it is pushed by drunk teenagers, I overtly specify the stimulus 
condition and the manifestation of the disposition that I refer to. The dispositional 
predicate “is disposed to open when pushed by drunk teenagers” is a canonical 
dispositional predicate. On the other hand, when we say that a glass if fragile, we do not 
overtly specify the stimulus conditions and the manifestations of the disposition that we 
refer to. Rather, it is a linguistic convention that the things that typically break when they 
are struck are called “fragile”. For this reason, predicates such as “is fragile” are 
conventional dispositional predicates. 
It might be thought that conventional dispositional predicates could be translated to 
canonical dispositional predicates. Take a disposition D that is expressed by a dispositional 
predicate “is D”. Take the typical stimulus condition and the manifestation of D as S and M 
respectively. We might substitute the conventional dispositional predicate “is D” with the 
canonical dispositional predicate “is disposed to M when S”. However, as we shall see, 
when the stimulus-manifestation pairings are constructed in a simple way like this, there 
may be some problems.  
Either because of their overt reference to stimulus-manifestation pairings or because of the 
conventions that determine their meanings, there is a sense in which dispositional 
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ascriptions entail some conditionals. As Shoemaker claims, “it belongs to the meaning ... 
of a ... [dispositional] predicate that if it is true of a thing then under certain circumstances 
the thing will undergo certain changes” (1980: 210, emphases added). To say that 
something is fragile is to say that, typically, if it is stuck, it breaks. This sort of entailment 
is not true for all predicates. Although it is true that drinking very cheap tonic wine 
disposes teenagers to break into residential buildings (and let us suppose that this holds 
with metaphysical necessity), the predicate “drinks very cheap tonic wine” does not entail 
“breaks into residential buildings”. We can say that “drinks very cheap tonic wine” is a 
categorical predicate, and this difference with respect to entailing conditions marks the 
distinction between dispositional predicates and categorical predicates. 
As I will discuss in the next section, there are a number of counterexamples to the view 
that dispositional predicates entail conditionals. Before moving to the debate regarding that 
issue, I should mention that even the idea that categorical predicates do not entail 
conditionals is disputed by some. One paradigmatic example for a categorical predicate is 
“has a mass”. The ascription of having some mass to a body entails some conditionals 
about the body, such as the “subjunctive conditional stating what a body with that mass 
would do if it were to have that force exerted upon it” (Crane 1996: 5, emphasis deleted). 
Though, it might be disputed whether the latter is a part of the meaning of the term, so it is 
yet to be resolved if this is really a counterexample in the intended sense. 
4.3 The Conditional Analysis Debate 
The fact that there is a distinction between dispositional and categorical ascriptions in the 
sense that the former entail and the latter do not entail certain conditionals motivates the 
idea that one can analyse dispositional ascriptions in terms of conditional statements. This 
idea has provoked a debate the highlights of which will be introduced in this section. 
Let us take the typical stimulus condition and manifestation of fragility as striking and 
breaking respectively. Accordingly, let us, as a first approximation, define fragility in 
terms of the following stimulus-manifestation pairing: 
(1) Something is fragile iff it breaks if it is struck. 
One problem with (1) is that it renders anything fragile if it is never struck (Bird 2012: 
733). So, we need to change the indicative conditional in the right side of (1) to a 
subjunctive conditional in the following way: 
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(2) Something is fragile iff it would break if it were struck. 
Assuming that for every conventional dispositional predicate there is an equivalent 
canonical dispositional predicate, and given that we can form sentences like (2) for every 
canonical dispositional predicate, we could have a general rule for analysing all 
dispositional ascriptions: 
(3) (For disposition D with stimulus condition S and manifestation M) Something is 
D iff it would M if it were S. 
This is what is commonly known as the simple conditional analysis (SCA). Recall 
Shoemaker‟s comment that it is part of the meaning of a dispositional predicate that it 
entails certain conditionals. The right side of the biconditional in (3) is the type of 
conditional that dispositional predicates are typically thought to entail.  
However, the SCA has been susceptible to some counterexamples, and this has led to the 
development of a more detailed analysis for dispositional predicates. Let us begin with the 
case of finkish dispositions. The term “finkish” is derived from Martin‟s (1994) 
counterexample to the SCA which involves an “electro-fink”. Let us take “is live” (for an 
electrical wire) to be equivalent to the canonical disposition “is disposed to conduct 
electricity when touched by a conductor”. Then, the SCA would dictate the following: 
(4) A wire is live iff it would conduct electricity if it were touched by a conductor. 
Now suppose that there is an electro-fink connected to a dead wire. The function of the 
electro-fink is as follows. It detects if the connected wire is touched by a conductor, and if 
it is touched, then it makes the wire live. Now consider the dead wire that the fink is 
connected to. Because of the fink, it would conduct electricity if it were touched by a 
conductor. But as a dead wire, as the SCA says, it would not conduct electricity if it were 
touched by a conductor. We can imagine that the fink does the reverse when it is connected 
to a live wire, making it dead when it is touched by a conductor. Because of the fink, it 
would not conduct electricity when touched by a conductor. However, since it is live, as 
the SCA entails, it is supposed to conduct electricity.  
Variations of this counterexample are abundant. Lewis (1997: 147) asks us to imagine a 
sorcerer who wants to protect a fragile glass. The sorcerer watches over the glass to see if it 
will be struck, and he is determined to cast a spell to change the intrinsic properties of the 
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glass so that it will not be broken. Bird (2007: 26) gives an example of temperature–
dependent fragility: consider a glass that is warm enough that it will not be broken when it 
struck; the glass is very rapidly cooled down in the instance of striking, so that it becomes 
fragile. “So it is true of this object that were it to be struck it would break, but at the instant 
of striking it is not fragile” (ibid). 
The dispositions that can be lost or gained thanks to fink-like interferences (whereby the 
associated counterfactuals would still be true) are called finkish dispositions. The problem 
with finkish dispositions for the SCA is that, for these dispositions, the stimulus conditions 
can be same as the conditions in which these dispositions are lost.  
It should be noted that there must be a time interval between the stimulus condition and the 
manifestation in order for the finkish interference to take place. Typically, that is how 
dispositions are manifested. Finks (and sorcerers) take advantage of this fact. For example, 
Martin‟s electro-fink needs time to change the disposition of the dead wire to live before 
the manifestation takes place. At the moment of the touching of the conductor, the wire is 
dead. Right after the contact, it becomes live thanks to the electro-fink. Lewis‟s sorcerer 
also has to wait, perhaps for a very short period of time, for the spell to be effective. It has 
to be effective before the manifestation of fragility takes place. Bird‟s nonfragile glass has 
to cool down to gain fragility before the effect of the striking disappears.  
Responses to these objections vary. One issue that needs to be addressed is whether the 
conditional analysis should be abandoned or altered. Here, I will discuss ways of altering 
the conditional analysis.  
Lewis (1997) proposed a reformed version of the conditional analysis that can deal with 
finks, sorcerers and so on. This reformed version involves the time element and a clause 
regarding the intrinsic properties that are responsible for having the disposition. Consider 
the following analysis of the predicate “is live”. 
(5) A wire is live at time t iff, for some intrinsic property F that the wire has and for 
some time t* after t, if the wire were to be touched by a conductor at t and to 
retain having F until t*, then F and the touching of the conductor would cause 
the wire to conduct electricity. 
Let us see how this conditional analysis can deal with the case of electro-fink. What 
electro-fink does is to change the intrinsic properties of the wire during the interval 
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between the touching of the conductor and the manifestation of the disposition. However, 
according to (5), in addition to the stimulus condition, there is a condition for retaining 
intrinsic properties, and it is because of this requirement that the electro-fink fails to be a 
counterexample to (5). Generalising from this case, we can define disposition D (with 
typical stimulus condition S and the typical manifestation M) as follows: 
(6) x has D at time t iff, for some property F that x has at t, and for some time t* 
after t, if x were to undergo S at t and to retain F until t*, S and F would cause x 
to M. 
Something along the lines of (6) is known as the reformed conditional analysis (RCA). 
With the RCA, we can deal with electro-finks, sorcerers, temperature-dependent fragility 
and so on. Since both the sorcerer and the cooling-down system change the intrinsic 
properties of the glass, they fail to be counterexamples to the RCA. So, we can say that the 
RCA deals with finkish dispositions.  
The cases against the SCA that we considered above were cases in which intrinsic 
properties of the things were changed due to interference so that although the things do not 
have certain dispositions, the subjunctive conditionals that are associated with those 
dispositions are true (or false when they do bear dispositions). Those cases fail to be 
counterexamples to the RCA. Nevertheless, there are some other cases that are 
counterexamples to the RCA. 
Bird (2007: 29) gives the following counterexample. Suppose that we have an iron pot 
which is very robust, so not fragile, and that we have a very powerful bomb connected to 
the pot. The bomb‟s sensor can detect if the pot is struck, so that when it is struck, the 
bomb explodes. Nothing can resist the power of this explosion, so the iron pot breaks. 
Although we stipulated that the pot is not fragile, the pot is fragile according to the RCA, 
because it underwent the typical stimulus condition of fragility, namely striking, and it 
retained its intrinsic properties until the bomb‟s explosion. Such cases are called mimicking 
cases, because although the object does not have the disposition, the circumstances mimic 
the disposition by rendering the associated counterfactual true. 
Lewis considers a case of mimicking too (1997: 145-146). Styrofoam dishes are 
paradigmatically not fragile. In fact, that this is one of the reasons for making a dish out of 
Styrofoam. Suppose that someone strikes a Styrofoam dish next to the Hater of Styrofoam.  
The Hater obviously hates the Styrofoam and has some anger management problems. As 
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soon as he hears the sound of Styrofoam, as a response to the sound he does everything to 
smash the Styrofoam dish into pieces. As stipulated, the dish is not fragile, yet the 
counterfactual associated with fragility is true for the dish. The dish undergoes the typical 
stimulus condition of fragility and retains its intrinsic properties until the Hater breaks it.  
However, one might say, as Lewis (ibid) and Choi (2003) suggest, these cases of 
mimicking do not show that the RCA is false. All that they show is that what we take to be 
the typical stimulus conditions of fragility are not really the stimulus conditions of fragility. 
Choi says that the Styrofoam dish “has the disposition to break in response to being stuck; 
yet it is not fragile” (ibid p 184). This is the case because fragility is not the disposition to 
break when struck simpliciter. A more proper conditional analysis of fragility should 
exclude some non-standard cases of striking and non-standard cases of breakings from the 
analysis. I will come back to Choi‟s proposal at the end of this section. 
The cases that we will consider now cause trouble for both the SCA and the RCA. Bird 
(1998; 2007) gives cases of what might be called masking or antidote cases. Instead of 
changing the intrinsic properties of the glass (as the Lewis‟s sorcerer does), suppose that 
we cover a fragile glass with some packaging material. Or we can imagine the sorcerer to 
cast a spell on the glass, not to change the intrinsic properties of the glass, but “to 
administer shock waves to the struck glass which precisely cancel out the shock of the 
original striking, hence saving the glass from destruction” (2007: 28). The packaging, the 
administration of anti-shock waves, and so on are masks, or antidotes, for fragility.  
Let us see how this troubles the RCA. The masked glass is struck and it retains its intrinsic 
properties. However, it does not break, which suggests that the typical stimulus conditions 
of fragility and the glass‟s retaining of the intrinsic properties do not causally suffice for 
the breaking of the glass. From the RCA, it follows that the glass is not fragile. But we 
stipulated that it is fragile. Here, it might be objected that, as Choi (2003) says for the 
Styrofoam case, we do not have the appropriate stimulus condition for fragility. The 
appropriate stimulus conditions should exclude packaging materials, anti-shock waves 
administered by sorcerers and so on.  
Having proposed a way of defending the RCA against mimicking and masking on Lewis‟s 
behalf, Choi (2003: 184) gives a counterexample to the RCA. Suppose that we have a 
fragile glass, and a time bomb nearby the glass. At time t, the glass is struck, and shortly 
after t, the time bomb explodes. The glass breaks shortly after the explosion. And let us 
suppose that the cause of the breaking is not the striking, but the time bomb. (For this, 
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assume for the sake of the argument that the explosion is so powerful that even a glass 
which is not fragile would break in response to it.) The glass is struck and it retains its 
intrinsic properties until the breaking. But the glass does not break as a response to the 
striking, because, as we stipulated, it breaks as a response to the explosion. So, the 
antecedent of the counterfactual in the RCA is true, but the consequent is false, which 
means that the counterfactual is false. The RCA suggests that the glass is not fragile, and 
this contradicts our stipulation. 
It might be suggested that the above considerations do not show that a conditional analysis 
of dispositions is false, but we need more sophisticated analyses of dispositions. Let us 
consider the case of the time bomb again. Choi suggests that if the glass “were to be struck 
in the absence of the time bomb, then the striking would cause it to break through a certain 
direct and standard process” (ibid: 186). We have already seen that the alleged 
counterexamples might suggest that we should exclude things like finks, masks and 
mimickers from the stimulus conditions. Considering the case of the time bomb, we might 
also want to exclude some non-standard processes from the specification of the 
manifestation. 
Generalising from these, we can say that, in order for a conditional analysis for 
dispositions to be true, one should specify the stimulus conditions and the manifestations 
of the dispositions carefully enough to exclude all sorts of non-standard cases. We can try 
an analysis for fragility as follows: 
(7) A glass is fragile at time t iff, for some property F that the glass has at t, and for 
some time t* after t, if the glass were struck at t in the absence of mimickers, 
masks, finks, pre-empters, etc., and to retain F until t*, the striking and F would 
jointly cause the glass to break. 
If (7) is the right conditional for fragility, one lesson that can be taken from this discussion 
is that the translation of a conventional dispositional expression to a canonical one is not 
that easy. If something along the lines of (7) is correct, “x is fragile” is not synonymous 
with “x is disposed to break when struck”. So, perhaps, unlike what Shoemaker (1980) 
suggests, it does not really belong to the meaning of “is fragile” that if something is fragile, 
then if it were struck it would break. But does it belong to the meaning of “is fragile” that 
right hand side of (7) is true? Arguably, it is not. Then, if (7) is not an analytical truth, the 
aforementioned distinction between (conventional) dispositional predicates and categorical 
predicates might vanish.  
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I said that if the notion of dispositions is central to a theory, that theory should say 
something explanatory about dispositions. This is a challenge, because there has been some 
discontent with the notion of dispositions, as they were deemed “obscure”. Now we have 
seen that dispositional locutions are not really obscure, because they are somehow 
explainable in non-dispositional terms. Varieties of conditional analyses provide such 
explanations. Not every form of conditional analysis is successful, but the fact that there 
has been great effort to explain them by conditionals show that it is part of our 
understanding that dispositional ascriptions tell us about what is likely happen under 
certain circumstances. This brings us to where we started: information about the 
dispositions of a thing gives us information about how that thing is likely to behave. 
4.4 Dispositional and Categorical Properties 
In the previous section, I discussed the nature of dispositional ascriptions, the difference 
between conventional and canonical dispositional predicates, whether there is a 
semantically significant difference between dispositional and categorical predicates, and 
how to analyse dispositional locutions. Perhaps a metaphysically more interesting question 
is in virtue of what a dispositional ascription can be true. When an object is disposed to do 
something, in virtue of what is it disposed to do so?  
By analysing the meaning of a dispositional ascription, it might not be possible to 
understand the nature of a disposition. For Ellis, “it is the business of natural science, not 
of semanticists, to discover and describe these natures” (2002: 78). It can be disputed 
whether natural science could reveal the nature of dispositions or not, but it is not 
controversial to suppose that if a dispositional ascription about something is true, it is true 
in virtue of the way that thing is. Even if a variant of a conditional analysis is true of 
dispositions, the associated counterfactuals (either simple or sophisticated) are true because 
of the properties of the objects that those ascriptions are about.  
The remainder of this section will proceed on this assumption that when dispositional 
ascriptions about things are true, they are true because those things have certain properties. 
In other words, dispositional predicates designate properties in such a way that the 
instantiation of these properties make it true that things have those dispositions. The 
metaphysically interesting question is the following: What sorts of properties are 
designated by dispositional predicates in this way? As it might be predicted, similar to the 
distinction between dispositional and categorical predicates, there is a distinction between 
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dispositional properties and categorical properties (at least for those who believe that 
there can be both kinds of property). Reformulating the question, we might ask: Do 
dispositional predicates designate dispositional properties? Do they designate categorical 
properties?
31
 
For those who believe that there are dispositional properties, dispositions are either 
dispositional properties or conjunctions of dispositional properties. And they can be truth-
makers of dispositional ascriptions: when I truly say that a glass is fragile, the truth of the 
ascription is grounded in the fact that the glass is the bearer of a dispositional property.
 32
 
For those who believe in dispositional properties, fragility would be a paradigmatic 
example for such a dispositional property. Such properties are individuated by their causal 
profiles, namely the specifications of their stimulus conditions and their manifestations. 
Moreover, they have their causal profiles essentially. Necessarily, if something is fragile, 
typically, it is disposed to break when struck. It may never be struck, or it may never break 
(either because it is not struck, or because of masks or mimickers), but it is disposed to 
break.  
Before proceeding to the discussion of categorical properties, it should be noted that 
dispositional properties do not have to be relational properties. It might be tempting to 
think that since dispositional properties are individuated by their stimulus conditions and 
manifestations, they are relational in the sense that they are related to their stimulus 
conditions and manifestations. But sometimes (and most of the time) dispositions are not 
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 Surely, if one acknowledges the existence of dispositional properties, it would be natural to take 
dispositional predicates to designate such properties. But it is logically consistent to acknowledge 
dispositional properties and yet still think that (at least some) dispositional predicates designate categorical 
properties.  
32
 Of course, one can believe that there are dispositional properties but hold that the truthmakers of 
dispositional ascriptions are categorical properties. (See footnote 31 above.) I cannot think of any reason 
to hold such a view, so I shall omit the discussion of such a view. 
92 
 
manifested, either because the stimulus conditions do not take place or because they are 
masked, finked, etc. Then, taking dispositional properties as relations is, in effect, taking 
them as relations to mere possibilia. So, if one does not want to admit real relations to 
mere possibilia, then it seems to be the right thing to deny that all dispositional properties 
are relational properties.
33
 
For those who believe that there are categorical properties, either all or some properties are 
categorical. I will elaborate on this difference below. But before moving on to that, what is 
meant by a categorical property should be clarified. Again, for those who believe that there 
are categorical properties, such properties are not individuated by their causal profiles (if 
they have causal profiles), and they do not have their causal profiles essentially (if they 
have causal profiles). They may dispose their bearers to behave in certain ways depending 
on background conditions and the laws of nature. Or, they may just not dispose their 
bearers in any way, in which case they would be epiphenomenal. Paradigm examples of 
categorical properties (for those who believe that there are categorical properties) are shape 
properties. Consider the property of being spherical. Lowe thinks that “what it is for an 
object to be spherical is simply for the object to have as its boundary a surface all the 
points of which are equidistant from a given point” (2010: 19). From this perspective, 
being spherical is not something that is to be understood in virtue of having some 
manifestations under certain stimulating conditions. Spherical things may have some 
typical dispositional features. A spherical thing is disposed to roll from a hill, leave a round 
impression on sand and so on. But for someone who thinks that being spherical is a 
categorical property, such causal features neither individuate it nor are essential to it. 
Fragility is a paradigmatic example of a dispositional property, for those who believe that 
there are dispositional properties. Being spherical is a paradigmatic example of a 
categorical property, for those who believe that there are categorical properties. Obviously, 
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  Heil (2003: 82) appeals to this argument to show that dispositional properties are not relational properties. 
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for someone who believes that all properties are categorical, any real property will be an 
example of a categorical property. Similarly, for someone who believes that all properties 
are dispositional, any real property will be an example for a dispositional property.  
What I call “real” properties are “genuine” properties in Shoemaker‟s (1980) terminology, 
and such properties exclude mere-Cambridge properties. Mere-Cambridge properties are 
properties whose acquisition and loss result in mere-Cambridge changes. If at time t I have 
a property P, and at time t* after t, I cease to have P, then between t and t* I undergo a 
change, according to the Cambridge understanding of change. Fodor‟s (1988: 33) example 
of being an H-particle is a mere-Cambridge property in this sense: a particle is an H 
particle if and only if the coin that Fodor most recently tosses lands heads. When Fodor 
tosses tails, the particle changes a property; it is not an H-particle anymore. Such properties 
are rendered not genuine, because they make no difference in world. However, as Heil 
correctly observes, “causally idle properties would „make a difference‟ to their possessors, 
just not a causal difference: such properties would have no effect on what their possessors 
do or would do” (2003: 78). This understanding of genuineness is built on the assumption, 
which is put into slogan form by Kim, that to be is to have (causal) powers (1993: 202).  
“Real” may also be taken to refer to sparse properties as opposed to abundant properties. 
According to an abundant conception of properties, for every predicate, (paradoxical cases 
aside) there is a property that is picked out by that predicate. Those who do not believe in 
disjunctive properties, for example, condemn such properties as non-sparse. According to 
the abundant conception of properties, a red ball and a blue desk share the property of 
being a red ball or a blue desk, for example. On this conception, we might say that every 
set of possible things is the extension of a given property. There is a set of all red balls and 
all blue desks, and this set would be the extension of the property of being a red ball or a 
blue desk. But apart from being members of this set, there is (arguably) no interesting thing 
that is common to all members of this set, so it is plausible (at least to some) to assume that 
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being a red ball or a blue desk is not a real property.
34
 According to a sparse conception of 
properties, only a proper subset of all properties is the set of real properties.  
4.5 Theories of Properties and Powers 
Now that we have a working understanding of what causal powers are, and that we are 
familiar with the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties, let us lay out 
a logical space for views regarding the nature of properties regarding these issues. For this, 
in 4.5.1, I will explain dispositionalism and categoricalism. In 4.5.2, I will introduce the 
causal thesis (for properties), which is entailed by dispositionalism. 4.5.2 will be crucial for 
my argument in the next chapter, where I will show that the defenders of the causal thesis 
is highly relevant for the success of the subset view of realization. In sections 4.5.3 and 
4.5.4, I will provide a survey of arguments for and against the causal thesis respectively. 
4.5.1 Dispositionalism and Categoricalism 
Proceeding from the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties in the 
previous section, I will introduce several views regarding the nature of real properties. 
Before starting this, let us consider the possibility of a third kind of property, a property 
which is both categorical and dispositional at once. I consider such possibilities in order to 
accommodate Heil‟s (2003) view in the logical space. 
The first distinction that I will make is between monism, dualism, and pluralism. Monist 
theories will say that there is only one type of property. Dualist theories will say that there 
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 Armstrong argues that “disjunctive properties offend against the principle that a genuine property is 
identical in its different particulars. Suppose a has a property P, but lacks Q while b has Q but lacks P. It 
seems laughable to conclude that from these premises that a and b are identical in some respect. Yet both 
have the „property‟ P, or Q” (1978: 20). 
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are two types of property. And pluralist theories will say that there are more than two types 
of property. 
According to our distinction between three types of property, there are three types of 
monism. According to the first type of monism that we will consider, the only genuine 
properties are dispositional properties (Shoemaker 1980; 1998; Bird 2007).
 35
 I shall call 
this view dispositionalism. For a dispositionalist, when dispositional ascriptions are true 
about things, they are true because things have dispositional properties that the 
dispositional predicates designate. However, since on this view there are only dispositional 
properties, any ascription that is true would be true because things have dispositional 
properties.  
Leaving the issue of causally inert and mere-Cambridge properties aside, for 
dispositionalists, the properties that are paradigmatically known to be categorical are to be 
explained away. The allegedly paradigmatic categorical properties, such as shape 
properties, are rendered dispositional according to dispositionalism. In Shoemaker‟s (1980) 
original account, properties are clusters of causal powers. Being spherical is, perhaps, not a 
simple disposition, yet it is a conjunction of several dispositions. So, the dispositionalist 
can think of being spherical as equivalent to a cluster of simpler dispositional properties, 
such as being disposed to roll when pushed from a hill, being disposed to leave a round 
impression when located on sand and so on. If the latter are not simple enough, they can be 
analysed into conjunctions of simpler dispositions. 
According to the second type of monism about properties, all properties are categorical. 
This view is called categoricalism. Lewis (1986; 2009) and (Armstrong 1997; 1999) are 
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 Shoemaker does not use the term “dispositional” for properties because he thinks that the dispositional-
categorical distinction is a semantic distinction, in the sense that dispositional ascriptions conceptually 
entail certain conditionals whereas categorical ascriptions do not. This is merely a terminological 
preference. 
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the main references for categoricalism and other associated views. According to 
categoricalism, when dispositional ascriptions are true, they are true because of the 
categorical properties of things (and background conditions). On Armstrong‟s (1997) view, 
instantiating a categorical property on its own is not sufficient for something to have a 
disposition to do something. Certain laws of nature have to be true in order for a 
categorical property to make a dispositional ascription true. According to Lewis (1986; 
2009), things are rather more complicated, because laws of nature also supervene on the 
array of categorical property instances. I will come to Lewis‟s account in Section 4.5.4 in 
more detail. 
Alternatively, one might be tempted to present categoricalism as a reductive theory of 
dispositional properties. Accordingly, allegedly dispositional properties are reduced to, or 
identical with, categorical properties. Take fragility as a purported dispositional property. 
Saying that a glass is fragile is, in effect, saying that it has some categorical micro-
structural property (or properties), and because of the instantiation of that property and the 
laws of nature, the glass is likely to break when it is struck. The problem with this way of 
presenting categoricalism is that the fragile behaviour of the micro-structural property is 
only contingent. If you change the laws of nature, the glass may not be fragile anymore. So 
identifying dispositional properties with categorical properties seems impossible unless 
one thinks that identity can be contingent. 
According to the third type of monism, all properties are both dispositional and categorical 
at once. Although properties have double-sided natures on this view, it is appropriate to 
take this view as a monist view, because it says that there is only one type of property. 
Martin (1996; 1997) and Heil (2003; 2005) are typically cited as main sources of this view. 
Following Martin, Heil uses the term “qualitative” instead of “categorical”, and says that 
all properties to be “powerful qualities”. His main reason to think that properties have 
qualitative features in addition to dispositional ones is that a world without qualitative 
properties would be materially empty.  
Dualist theories about properties say that properties can be divided into two types. Since 
we are considering a distinction between three types of property, namely categorical 
properties, dispositional properties and powerful qualities, we have three possible dualist 
views. According to the first one, there are dispositional properties and categorical 
properties. On the second view, there are dispositional properties and powerful qualities. 
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And on the third one, there are categorical properties and powerful qualities. I shall omit 
the discussion of the latter two, because I cannot think of any reason to hold such views.  
Dualists say that both dispositional and categorical properties exist. There are yet two ways 
of being a dualist of this sort. According to one version, there is a supervenience relation 
between dispositional properties and categorical properties, in the sense that for an object 
to have a dispositional property, it has to instantiate some categorical property (or 
properties) that grounds that dispositional property. A seminal source for the defence of 
this view is Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982). They argue that, for a dispositional 
property to be a cause of an event, or in other words, for a disposition to be manifested, it 
needs to have a causal basis. By a causal basis, they mean “the property … of the object 
that … is the causally operative sufficient condition for the manifestation” (ibid: 251). The 
requirement for a causal basis comes from the observation that, if something is fragile, and 
if it breaks, there must be a causally sufficient antecedent for the breaking. (Note that a 
dispositionalist can respond to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, and identify the sufficient 
cause with the dispositional property of being fragile.) An interesting consequence of this 
account is that, at least as Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson argue, dispositional properties are 
epiphenomenal. They argue that once the existence of a categorical causal basis and the 
non-identity of categorical and dispositional properties are granted, (unless manifestations 
are systematically causally overdetermined by dispositional properties and their categorical 
bases), it follows, according to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that the causal roles of 
dispositional properties are excluded. 
Note that one can be a property dualist and believe that there are both dispositional and 
categorical properties, yet deny the grounding thesis that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 
provide. Examples for this version are Place‟s (1996) and Elliss‟s (2002) views according 
to which all properties except spatial and temporal properties are dispositional. On Place‟s 
view, “the only things that are „purely categorical‟ are the existence of the property bearer 
and the spatio-temporal relations between its parts and between it and other substances” 
(1996: 22). Among categorical properties, Place adds properties regarding the origins of 
things too (ibid: 27). 
And finally, one can be a pluralist about properties, in which case one would take 
dispositional properties, categorical properties and powerful qualities to be real and distinct.  
In the next section, I will introduce the causal thesis which is entailed by dispositionalism. 
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4.5.2 The Causal Thesis (for Properties) 
If dispositionalism is true, in other words, if all properties are dispositional properties, then 
what I call the causal thesis is true. The causal thesis is the conjunction of two theses. 
(C1) Properties are individuated by their causal profiles; 
(C2) Properties have their causal profiles essentially.  
The first of these theses, (C1), provides an identity criterion for properties. It says that, for 
all properties F and G, if F and G have the same causal profile, then F is identical with G. 
If two properties confer the same causal powers to their bearers under same circumstances, 
we do not have two properties, but we have only one property. Suppose that we discover a 
property that behaves exactly like charge, and call it marge. (C1) dictates that marge is 
charge. 
According to the second thesis, (C2), the causal profile of a property is essential to it. To 
put it more formally, for all properties F and G and for all worlds w1 and w2, if F in w1 and 
G in w2 have different causal profiles, then F is not identical with G. In effect, (C2) fixes 
the causal profiles of any property to all possible worlds in which they can be instantiated. 
Since the causal profile of charge is such that like charges repel (but not attract), according 
to (C2), it is impossible for like charges to attract.  
There are different ways in which (C2) might be true.
36
 On the one hand, it might be the 
case that the set of all possible worlds are exhausted by nomologically possible worlds. In 
that case there would be no worlds whose laws of nature are different from the laws of 
nature in the actual world. Since all worlds would be governed by the same laws of nature, 
the causal profiles of properties would be fixed by the same laws across all possible worlds. 
On the other hand, it might be allowed that there are worlds which are nomologically 
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 See Schaffer (2005) for a disambiguation. 
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different from the actual world, but some properties would exist in only some worlds. In 
that case, with the change of laws, some properties would fail to exist in some worlds. So, 
if a property P in a world w is not allowed by the laws of nature in w to do the things that 
charge in the actual world does, then P fails to be identical with charge. In what follows, 
when I talk about (C2), I will be neutral between these different readings of (C2).  
(C2) is closely connected to a specific understanding of laws of nature. From this 
perspective, (C2) can be ultimately seen as a thesis about the relationship between 
properties and laws of nature. According to this interpretation, one of the roles of laws of 
nature is to govern causal relations, and laws hold with metaphysical necessity. So, on this 
view, if a law L governs the behaviours of a property P, it does so with metaphysical 
necessity: since it is metaphysically necessary that L is true, P cannot have different causal 
profiles in different worlds. 
It is common practice to motivate (C2) from this understanding of laws. Shoemaker (1980; 
1998), Swoyer (1982) and Bird (2001; 2007) are examples of those who provide such 
accounts. However, there is (at least) one exception: Mumford (2006) argues that 
something along the lines of (C2) is true, but that it gives us reasons to think that laws of 
nature should be dispensed with. My reconstruction of his argument is as follows: the 
central role of laws of nature is to govern events; according to (something along the lines 
of) (C2), the modal nature of properties governs events; in other words, (C2) gives the role 
of governing to properties; so, if (C2) is true, laws of nature are redundant. Note that 
Mumford‟s conclusion can be resisted if we think that there is more to laws then governing 
events, or if we think that the governing role could be occupied by both properties and 
laws.  
There two things to note about the relationship between (C1), (C2) and dispositionalism. 
First, there is a sense in which dispositionalism might be false without rendering the causal 
thesis false. It is possible that some properties are not dispositions, yet for some reason, 
(C1) and (C2) are true of them. Regarding (C1), perhaps, in addition to their causal profiles, 
there are other dimensions in which properties are individuated. It would be true that 
having a certain causal profile C is sufficient for being the property Q, but C is not the only 
thing that individuates Q. The following analogy might be helpful. Think of Neil and his 
son Finn. Since we are not entitled to have more than one biological father, being the father 
of Finn individuates Neil. Now consider, Aoife, Neil‟s daughter. What we said for Finn is 
also true for Aoife: being the father of Aoife also individuates Neil. By analogy, although 
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properties might be individuated by their causal profiles, there could be more to them than 
their causal profiles. 
Second, as far as I can see, neither (C1) nor (C2) entails the other. (C2) does not entail (C1), 
as entities with the same essential properties may fail to be identical. It appears to me that 
(C1) does not entail (C2) either. Going back to the analogy in the last paragraph, it is true 
that being the father of Finn individuates Neil, however, it is not an essential property of 
Neil to be the father of Finn. He was Neil before Finn was born, and (assuming trans-world 
identity for individuals) he is Neil in possible worlds in which he exists but Finn does not. 
By analogy, properties might be individuated by causal profiles, so whenever a property P 
has causal profile that individuates property Q, P is identical with Q, but P can cease to 
have this causal profile.
37
  
As far as I can see, (C1) and (C2) motivate each other, and they jointly motivate 
dispositionalism. However, motivation is one thing, entailment is another. For this reason, 
during my discussion of the causal thesis and the subset view‟s relationship to it, I will 
examine (C1) and (C2) in separation as much as it is possible to do so. 
4.5.3 Arguments for the Causal Thesis 
Now that we have identified the two theses that jointly constitute the causal thesis, let us 
discuss some reasons that have been given in order to motivate these two theses. The 
considerations in favour of the causal thesis can be divided into four groups: arguments 
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 Hawthorne (2001: 377) observes the following trivial entailment of (C2) from (C1). Take (C1) as a 
sufficiency thesis according to which having a given causal profile A is sufficient for being the property P. 
Take (C2) as a necessity thesis according to which having a given causal profile B is necessary for being P. 
Now think of other causal profiles C and D, each of which individuates P. Then we can identify B with the 
disjunction of A, C and D, in which case B would be both sufficient and necessary for being P. Apart from 
taking the individuative and essential causal profiles to be disjunctions of causal profiles, it seems, (C1) 
does not entail (C2) 
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from knowledge, arguments from science, the argument from anti-quidditism, and the bad-
intuition argument. 
4.5.3.1 Arguments from Knowledge 
The most commonly mentioned motivation for the causal thesis is the observation that 
rejecting (C1) or (C2) is not compatible with what we take ourselves to know (or have 
good reasons to believe). In favour of both (C1) and (C2), without distinguishing between 
them explicitly, Swoyer says that  
if we subtract the active and passive ... powers that a property bestows upon its 
instances, whatever is left would not enable it to affect our sensory apparatus, 
measuring instruments, or anything else (1982: 214).  
Swoyer‟s concern is that if we rule out the possibility of causally interacting with 
properties through sensory experience or scientific means of (perhaps meditated) 
observation, we can never take ourselves to acquire knowledge about properties.  
Shoemaker (1980: 237) argues for each thesis separately. As he notes, if (C1) were false, 
different properties could have same causal profiles, so from the fact that an object exhibits 
the same behavioural patterns, we could never know (or believe with good reasons) that it 
retains its properties. Similarly, if (C2) were false, properties could change their causal 
profiles, so from the fact that an object changes its behavioural patterns radically, we could 
never know (or believe with good reasons) that it changes its properties.  
In order to make these arguments more conclusive, we need to assume that we know (or 
have good reasons to believe) certain facts about things in the world and their properties. 
As it stands, Shoemaker‟s and Swoyer‟s implicit assumption is that the costs of scepticism 
about the properties (of the things that we observe) is too much to accept. Bird, on the 
other hand, is more explicit about this rather wishful approach; he says that “we do not 
want our metaphysics of properties to condemn us to the necessary ignorance of them” 
(2005: 453, emphasis added). 
Though, Shoemaker does more than just wanting that we have such knowledge. Regarding 
(C1), he writes: 
if there are sets of properties whose members are identical with respect to their 
causal features, we necessarily lack the resources for referring to particular 
members of these sets. . . So if there are such properties, they don‟t fall within 
the extension of our term „property‟. Which seems to imply that if there are 
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such properties, they aren‟t properties; which seems to imply that there are no 
such properties (Shoemaker 1998: 66). 
The success of this argument depends on the truth of Shoemaker‟s claim that the term 
“property” denotes what Shoemaker‟s theory of properties takes it to denote. But at any 
rate, this argument seems resistible: one might question Shoemaker‟s move from the claim 
that one does not have singular reference to properties to the claim that such things would 
not be properties. Therefore, this argument does not seem to be successful. In general, the 
epistemic arguments for the causal thesis fail to be persuasive.  
4.5.3.2 Arguments from Science 
Sometimes the causal thesis is motivated by some scientific concerns. The gist of this 
approach is that scientific explanations invoke actual or possible causal relations, so the 
investigation of scientifically acceptable properties should be about their causal features. 
Blackburn says that “just as the molecular theory gives us only things with dispositions, so 
any conceivable improvement in science will give us only a better pattern of dispositions” 
(1990: 62). Esfeld and Sachse (2011, Chapter 2) argue that physical explanations are 
causal explanations in nature, so properties that physics invoke are causal properties.  
Let us try to identify scientific arguments for (C1) and (C2) individually. In defence of 
something along the lines of (C1), Ellis (2002) argues that the nature of scientific 
classification requires that we ought to explain similarity by the similarity of dispositional 
patterns: 
[e]lectrons have something in common in virtue of which they have the same 
causal power to generate electromagnetic fields. ... The things classified 
together as being of the same kind are so classified because they have the same 
or similar causal powers (ibid: 67). 
Since, the truth of (C2) partially depends on the viability of some commitments regarding 
laws of nature, showing that (at least some) laws of nature are metaphysically necessary 
can provide reasons to believe that (C2) is true. Bird (2001) provides such an argument 
from a scientific point of view. In summary, he argues that scientific explanations 
regarding the nature of water and salt molecules and Coulomb‟s law demonstrate that it 
metaphysically necessary that salt dissolves in water. (Coulomb‟s law is a law that explains 
electrostatic attraction.) Let us call the law that salt dissolves in water L.  
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Bird‟s argument goes as follows. Let us assume, for reductio, that L is contingent. For L to 
be contingent, there must be a world in which L is false. Call this world w. Note that in w, 
salt and water must exist, otherwise L would be vacuously true. (If there were no salt 
molecules in w, it would be true that all salt molecules dissolve in water.) So far, w is a 
world in which there is salt and water, and L is false. Then, Bird argues that for L to be 
false, Coulomb‟s law must be false too. (For the sake of argument, Bird assumes that 
Coulomb‟s law is contingent too). But, why does he think that Coulomb‟s law entails L? 
He argues as follows: 
[i]t is the polar nature of the molecules that make up water that enables it to 
dissolve sodium chloride ...  [T]he process of dissolving is ... entirely 
electrostatic in character. The force of electrostatic attraction between ions and 
dipoles, as between any charged objects, is just the force governed by 
Coulomb‟s law. Hence, if there were a world in which salt failed to dissolve in 
water, that would have to be a world in which Coulomb‟s law is false (ibid: 
269). 
After the observation that Coulomb‟s law entails L, we can describe w again: in w, salt and 
water molecules exist, L is false, and Coulomb‟s law is false. Now, Bird‟s crucial step is to 
claim that Coulomb‟s law is necessitated by the existence of water molecules. 
What makes a water molecule a molecule is not merely that there is an oxygen 
atom neighboured by two hydrogen atoms, but that these neighbouring atoms 
are chemically bonded to one another in a certain way. So the chemical 
bonding found in water is an essential feature of it, and any world in which 
there is water is a world in which there exists that kind of bonding (ibid: 270). 
And it is Coulomb‟s law that explains this bonding. In fact, Bird says that the same holds 
for the relationship between the existence of salt molecules and Coulomb‟s law too. 
The ionic character of salt is essential - any world in which there is salt is a 
world in which there exists an ionic bond. An ionic bond is, by definition, a 
bond that exists in virtue of the electrostatic attraction between ions. And 
electrostatic attraction is, necessarily, the force that exists between charged 
objects in virtue of Coulomb's law. Hence a world in which there is salt is a 
world in which Coulomb's law is true (ibid). 
With the last two observations, we can describe w again: in w, salt and water molecules 
exist, L is false, Coulomb’s law is false and Coulomb’s law is true. With the demonstration 
of this contradiction, the reductio is complete: there is no world in which L is false, which 
means that L is metaphysically necessary.  
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Although it is not my aim to defend or reject either (C1) or (C2), I should mention that 
Bird‟s argument for (C2) is not persuasive. To begin with, it is only an argument for the 
necessity of one law, namely L. So, Bird‟s aim can be seen as motivating (C2) by 
providing a case study.  But even so, this case study about the alleged necessity of L is 
problematic. Bird‟s argument invokes at least three controversial and objectionable claims. 
First, he says that it “is the polar nature of the molecules that make up water that enables it 
to dissolve sodium chloride” (ibid: 269). However, why should we disallow that, in w, not 
the polar nature of the molecules, but something entirely different grounds dissolving? 
Even if the polar nature of molecules is necessary, why should we assume that only 
Coulomb‟s law can ground this fact? Second, he argues that “the chemical bonding found 
in water is an essential feature of it” (ibid: 270), and that this bonding is explained by 
Coulomb‟s law. And third, he argues that the same is true for the ionic character of salt. 
For these latter two points, Bird follows Kripke (1980) in holding that the properties of 
nomic substances are essential to them. However, as Psillos (2002) observes, Kripke‟s 
account does not say that all properties of these substances are essential. Some of these 
properties may be contingent. So, it can be said in response to Bird that the chemical 
bonding of water and the ionic character of salt may be only contingent. Therefore, there 
does not seem to be any conclusive argument from science for the causal thesis. 
4.5.3.3 The Argument from Anti-quidditism 
The argument from anti-quidditism, variations of which have been explicitly or implicitly 
proposed, has the following structure: if (C1) is false, quidditism is true; quidditism is false 
(or, we do not want quidditism to be true); therefore, the causal thesis is true (or, we do not 
want the causal thesis to be false).  
Quidditism is the thesis that properties are individuated by their inner natures, where this 
inner nature cannot be specified by a causal profile, or anything else other than the 
suchness of the property. To understand quidditism, we should explain what a quidditistic 
difference is. Two things, x and y are quidditistically different just in case x and y are 
different, and nothing constitutes their difference apart from the fact they are different. We 
can call such facts quidditistic facts. According to quidditism, distinctness of properties is 
constituted by quidditistic facts. Similarly, their identities are constituted by quidditistic 
facts. Relating it to a version of the causal thesis, Black defines quidditism as the thesis 
that  
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nothing constitutes the fact that a certain quality playing a certain nomological 
[or causal] role in that world is identical with a certain quality playing a 
different role in ours; they just are the same quality, and that's all that can be 
said (2000: 92). 
So, quidditism is the rejection of (C1), as (C1) could be read as the thesis that for all 
properties F and G, and for all causal profiles C, the fact that F and G both have C 
constitutes the fact that F is identical with G.  
Quidditism is usually taken to be the analogue of haecceitism for properties. Haecceitism is 
a view about individuals, not properties. According to haecceitism, an individual A in 
world w1 could be distinct from an individual in w2, although A and B share all of their 
properties. In other words, the indiscernibility of two individuals in different worlds does 
not entail their identity. Haecceitism is commonly taken to be a counterintuitive view, at 
least for those who believe that the trans-world identity of individuals is possible.  
Since quidditism rejects the causal thesis, those who think that quidditism is 
counterintuitive might motivate the causal thesis from this point of view. To some, there 
are some reasons to be uncomfortable with quidditism. First, its similarity to haecceitism is 
found problematic (for those who find haecceitism problematic). Those who think that 
indiscernibility of individuals in different worlds entails their identity might think that an 
analogue of it should be true for properties. Second, it is thought that quidditism entails 
“distinctions without differences” (Black 2000: 94). And if there is no principled reason to 
make distinctions, one should not make them. Or, so the objection goes. 
It should be noted that the opponents of the causal thesis (categoricalists, for example) 
ardently hold quidditism (Armstrong 1997; Lewis 2009), so the argument from anti-
quidditism cannot be persuasive for them. As we shall see in the next section, Lewis (2009) 
argues for quidditism and its supposedly counterintuitive implications. Moreover, Dustin 
Locke (2012) argues that there is nothing counterintuitive about quidditism insofar as it is 
understood as merely a thesis for numerical identity of properties. According to Locke, 
whereas two properties can be qualitatively identical in having same causal features, they 
may yet be numerically distinct. Therefore, it should be concluded that no version of the 
argument from anti-quidditism makes a persuasive case for causal thesis. 
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4.5.3.4 The Bad-Intuition Argument 
The final case for the causal thesis that I will consider could be explained very briefly as 
follows: opponents of the causal thesis are misled into thinking that properties are not 
individuated by their causal profiles and that properties do not have these profiles 
necessarily, because these philosophers have bad modal intuitions. Consider the following 
analogy. Although water is H2O, one might have the wrong intuition that water‟s 
molecular structure could have been XYZ. Similarly, although the causal profile of electric 
charge is such that like charges repel, one might have the wrong intuition that like charges 
could attract. Or one might have the wrong intuition that the causal roles of mass and 
charge could have been swapped. As Bird notes, such conceptions do not yield new 
possibilities: the world in which mass does what charge does in the actual world and vice 
versa “is just the actual world plus a decision to swap the names „electrical charge‟ and 
„mass‟” (2005: 450).  
I do not believe that this argument is persuasive. First, it seems to be doing nothing more 
than favouring one‟s intuitions over the intuitions of others. But, second, the argument is 
resistible because one can either dispute the apparent contingency of water‟s coextension 
with H2O, or accept this apparent contingency but reject the analogy. 
Having introduced a number of arguments for the causal thesis, I concluded after each 
section that no conclusive case for the causal thesis has been made. Next, I shall introduce 
the arguments against the causal thesis. 
4.5.4 Arguments against the Causal Thesis 
Now, let us consider reasons to reject (C1) and (C2). The first group of considerations 
against the causal thesis that I will discuss are motivated by the nature of dispositions: 
these are arguments against dispositions. The second group will take the nature of laws of 
nature to suggest that the causal thesis is false: these are arguments from contingent laws. 
And finally, we will consider Lewis‟s endorsement of quidditism and its allegedly 
uncomfortable consequences: this is the “so-what” argument. 
4.5.4.1 Arguments against Dispositions 
The first argument against the causal thesis that we will consider is by Armstrong (1997, 
Chapter 5; 1999). Armstrong thinks that the individuation of properties by their causal 
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powers requires the individuation of them partly by the manifestations of those powers. 
However, most of the manifestations of the causal powers that properties confer to their 
bearers are never actualised. A fragile glass can be fragile although it might never be 
broken (because it might never be struck). Armstrong thinks that this is a form of 
Meinongianism, named after Meinong who permitted possible-but-not-actual entities to his 
ontology. Although this is not a knockdown argument against (C1), Armstrong thinks that 
this is a reason to be unsatisfied with (C1).  
This argument echoes the quotations that I introduced in the beginning of Section 4.1 
above to explain discontent with the notion of dispositions. The counterfactual nature of 
dispositions seems problematic to some. Armstrong (1996: 15-16) thinks that if some 
properties are dispositional, then dispositional ascriptions are true in virtue of instantiation 
of these dispositional properties; but this entails a wrong understanding of truthmaking 
according to which something about the actual world is true because things about non-
actual possible worlds are true. This makes a counterfactual state of affairs a part of the 
actual world. If Armstrong is right that no proposition can be true in virtue of a non-actual 
state of affairs, then grounding dispositions in their possible manifestations would be a bad 
strategy. However, an argument needs to be given why this is the correct understanding of 
truthmaking. So, I do not think that this is a conclusive argument against dispositions.  
The next argument that we will consider is an argument against dispositionalism, 
according to which all properties are dispositional. This argument is known as the always-
packing-never-travelling objection. Armstrong introduces it as follows:  
[c]an it be that everything is potency, and act is the mere shifting around of 
potencies? … Given a purely Dispositionalist account of properties, particulars 
would seem to be always re-packing their bags as they change their properties, 
yet never taking a journey from potency to act. For „act‟, on this view, is no 
more than a different potency (1997: 80).  
The objection involves a beautiful metaphor, but the metaphor needs unpacking. Here is 
how I understand it: if every property is a disposition, then the stimulus conditions of these 
dispositions are instantiations of dispositions too; the stimulus conditions of these stimulus 
conditions are dispositions too, and ad infinitum; so, the stimulus conditions of a 
disposition can never be actualised; then, nothing ever happens. 
There is a possible response to the always-packing-never-travelling objection: that all 
properties are dispositions does not mean that no manifestation is ever actualised. If the 
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stimulus condition of a disposition D2 is itself the instantiation of a disposition D1, once D1 
is instantiated, even if it is not manifested, D2 can be manifested as a response to the 
instantiation of D1. So, things could happen. Following the metaphor, particulars could 
travel as a response to other particulars‟ packing their bags. Therefore, if my interpretation 
of Armstrong‟s metaphor is correct, then the always-packing-never-travelling objection 
can be resisted.  
4.5.4.2 Arguments from Contingent Laws 
Another objection that is commonly given against the causal thesis is that it is not 
compatible with some of the most commonly shared views about laws of nature. Here, I 
will discuss two views of laws: the relation view and the Humean view. What is common 
to these views is that both take laws of nature to be contingently true. If laws of nature are 
contingent, and same properties can be instantiated in worlds with different laws, (C2) is 
rendered false because different laws could hold in different worlds, and properties could 
be causally related to each other in ways different than they are in the actual world. 
The relation view is attributed to Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1983: 
Chapter 6; 1989 Chapter 7; 1997, Chapter 15). Here I shall take Armstrong‟s account to be 
the representative of this view. According to Armstrong, laws are relations between 
properties in the following sense. Let us suppose that it is a law that all Fs are Gs, and let 
us take F and G to denote properties. For it to be a law that every F is also a G, there must 
be a relation between the properties that F and G denote such that having the former 
lawfully necessitates having the latter. The relation that relates these properties is 
symbolised as “N(F,G)”. Note that if we take properties and relations as universals, N is 
rendered a higher-order universal, a universal relating two universals.  
Armstrong thinks that we need a nomic necessitation relation to explain laws in order to 
explain the intuition that laws govern some states of affairs. A law L is not merely a 
statement that expresses that all Fs are Gs. If it were, we would not have had the resources 
to distinguish between mere regularities and lawful regularities. This claim is motivated by 
the intuition that only some contingent truths are lawful. (This feature of the relation view 
also marks its difference from the Humean view that I will discuss shortly. Whereas the 
relation view gives laws the role of governing, the Humean view takes laws to be a special 
class of regularities.)  
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What is crucial about the relation view regarding the discussion of the causal thesis is the 
modal status of these nomic necessitation relations. Most lawful truths are taken to be a 
special class of contingent truths.
38
 So, the relation view takes this nomic necessitation 
relation N that obtains between properties that F and G denote as a contingent relation. At 
first, it might sound puzzling to take a necessitation relation to be contingent. However, 
although it is contingently true (if it is true) that N is a law, in any world in which N is a 
law, F (metaphysically) necessitates G. In other words, it is contingent that N is a law, but 
necessarily, if N is a law and if something is F, then it is G.
39
 
That laws of nature are contingent in this view is central for the rejection of the causal 
thesis. It seems that Armstrong wants the relation view to be consistent with the commonly 
held view that laws of nature are contingent. But why is it commonly believed that laws of 
nature are contingent? One reason might be this: it is conceivable that salt does not 
dissolve in water and that like charges attract, so it must also be possible for salt not to 
dissolve in water and for like charges to attract. However, it should be noted that this 
would not convince the defender of the causal thesis, because she can argue that such 
conceivability scenarios result from having bad modal intuitions. 
It is also true that, unlike laws of logic, laws of nature are empirically discovered. This 
suggests that true lawful statements are knowable a posteriori, not a priori. So, it might be 
said that the a posteriori nature of lawful statements motivate the idea that laws of nature 
are only contingent. However, it should be noted that there is an immediate response to this. 
As Kripke (1980) has convinced nearly everyone, not all a posteriori truths are contingent. 
It is known a posteriori that water is H2O, nevertheless water is necessarily H2O. But as a 
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 Lawful truths of logic are not contingent, but they are not laws of nature anyway. 
39
 When the law in question is probabilistic, the law is still a necessitation relation, with the only difference 
that, instead of necessitating being G simpliciter, the law N and having F necessitate a certain objective 
probability of having G (Armstrong 1989: 100) 
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response to this Kripkean point, Schaffer (2004) argues that using the Kripkean view for 
the necessity of laws is not appropriate. Kripke‟s water example is an example about 
identity, namely the identity of water and H2O. The fact that identity relations are 
necessary goes without saying. But lawful relations are different from identity relations. 
Schaffer maintains that “any conception of water being XYZ can only be an illusion. But 
the relation between [e.g.,] charge and Coulomb‟s law is governance rather than identity, 
and hence no comparable compulsion to necessity exists” (ibid: 218, emphasis added). 
Unlike the relation view, on the Humean view, laws are a special class of regularities, and 
they do not govern events. Instead, laws supervene on events. But, like the relation view, 
the Humean view takes laws to be contingent. The defenders of the Humean view include 
David Lewis (1973 1986; 1994; 2009), Barry Loewer (1996), Helen Beebee (2006). Here, 
I shall take Lewis‟s view as the representative of the Humean view. 
The Humean view is based on Lewis‟s thesis of Humean Supervenience. This thesis can be 
explained by the following classic passage from Lewis: 
[Humean Supervenience] is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast 
mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then 
another. … We have geometry: a system of external relations of spatio-
temporal distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe 
point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields, maybe both. And at those points 
we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need 
nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have an 
arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference without 
difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on that (1986, 
ix-x, emphasis added). 
Before moving to the discussion of the above quote in relation to the Humean View of 
Laws, one thing about this quote should be noted: the structure allegedly supervenes on 
intrinsic properties, or qualities. Intrinsic qualities, according to Lewis, are categorical 
properties. To someone who argues against the causal thesis from the thesis of Humean 
Supervenience, it would be a fair objection that their argument assumes the truth of 
categoricalism. So, let us take the Humean view (and its endorsement of the thesis of 
Humean Supervenience) as an account of laws of nature, formulated and defended 
independently on the discussion of the causal thesis. This particular argument from the 
contingent laws against the causal thesis would have the following structure: (i) we have 
good reasons to think that the Humean view is true; (ii) the Humean view entails the falsity 
of the causal thesis; (iii) therefore, we have good reasons to think that the causal thesis is 
false. 
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The thesis of Humean Supervenience says that, for every world, the distribution of 
qualities, namely the arrangement of particulars with respect to their properties and their 
relations is fundamental. Anything that is true in each world is true because of this 
fundamental distribution of particulars. This will be true for laws of nature too. Moreover, 
this will render laws of nature contingent, as I will explain below. 
For the thesis of Humean Supervenience to render laws of nature contingent, we need to 
invoke something along the lines of the combinatorial principle of possibility. According 
to this principle, every possible recombination of the distribution of particulars is a 
different possible world. As Lewis suggests, we  
can take apart the distinct elements of a possibility and rearrange them. We can 
remove some of them altogether. We can reduplicate some or all of them.  We 
can replace an element of one possibility with an element of another (2009: 
208). 
Most importantly, this method of recombination is as liberal as it gets, and it is because 
“there is no necessary connection between distinct existences” (ibid, emphasis added). The 
latter statement is what is commonly known as Hume’s dictum.40 (What counts as distinct 
and what counts as non-distinct is disputable. “Distinctness”, on one interpretation, is more 
than “non-identity”. Wholes and their parts are non-identical, but they are not wholly 
distinct. The parts of a whole cannot be separated from the object without resulting in a 
change in the whole. So, there are necessary connections between parts and wholes.) 
When the combinatorial principle of possibility is combined with Hume‟s dictum, it 
follows that, in order to have a different possible world, we can change the distribution of 
any quality in a world as long as it is not bound by non-distinct entities. While the 
alteration of an electron does not necessarily result in the alteration of another electron, the 
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 David Hume‟s own words for the dictum are as follows: “There is no object, which implies the existence 
of any other if we consider these objects in themselves” (as  quoted in Wilson, 2010). 
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alteration of one part of an object may result in the alteration the whole. Now, recall that, 
as the thesis of Humean Supervenience says, in a world, everything, including each law, 
supervenes on the distribution of particulars. So, for each pair of possible worlds each of 
which has a sufficiently different distribution of particulars from the other, there are 
different sets of laws of nature. Given that laws of nature could change from world to 
world, they are contingent. And if they are contingent, (C2) cannot be true. (It should also 
be noted that, the endorsement of Hume‟s dictum is a rejection of (C2). Since there are no 
necessary connections between distinct existences, two distinct electrons with like charges 
could have attracted each other without thereby changing their charges.)
41
 
The set of arguments against the causal thesis that we considered in this section rely on the 
stipulation that laws of nature are contingent. In order to have a persuasive case against the 
causal thesis, it needs to be established that laws of nature are contingent. I discussed two 
theories of laws that are supposed to support this conclusion. I believe that the one that I 
attributed to Armstrong could be resisted, as nothing in the core of that view rules out the 
possibility that the relations that laws are identified with are necessary connections. The 
relation view could well take the nomic necessitation relation as a metaphysical 
necessitation relation. For example, Swoyer (1982) thinks that the relation view is accurate 
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 Although this short explanation is sufficient to explain why someone who holds this view would not 
subscribe to the causal thesis, as it stands, it is not a complete explanation of the Humean view as Lewis 
and others hold it. My discussion of the Humean view allows for an interpretation according to which laws 
are regularities. However, although it is true that laws are regularities, according to Lewis, not every 
regularity is a lawful regularity. Lewis takes laws to be the true statements of the best deductive system for 
a given world. A deductive system is the set of theorems that are derived from a set of axioms. Each 
different set of axioms yields a different deductive system, because, from different axioms, different 
theorems follow. Some deductive systems are more precise than others, because they have more true 
axioms and theorems. And some deductive systems are simpler than others, because they are derived from 
fewer axioms. The best deductive system is obtained by having the optimal combination of precision and 
simplicity. 
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in essence, but he thinks that the modality of the lawful necessitation relation should be 
strengthened to metaphysical from only nomological. Moreover, the account that I 
attributed to Lewis, presupposes that properties have intrinsic natures, or quiddities. So, 
although one might find the Lewisian picture plausible independently, it seems rather 
difficult to argue for it without rejecting (C1) in the first place. 
4.5.4.3 The “So-what” Argument 
The final argument against the causal thesis that I will discuss is from Lewis‟s (2009) 
posthumously published article „Ramseyan Humility‟, in which he argues that quidditism 
and its epistemological consequences are inevitable but should not be worrisome. This can 
be seen as an argument against the causal thesis indirectly. It can be read as follows: (i) the 
causal thesis is motivated by the epistemic worries associated with its failure; (ii) there is 
nothing epistemically worrisome about the failure of the causal thesis; (iii) therefore, the 
causal thesis is not well-motivated. What follows is Lewis‟s argument for the premise (ii) 
of this argument. 
First, let us accept that causal roles are occupied by properties. Let us invoke what is 
known as the “Ramsey-Lewis method” and Ramsify the world in the following way. Once 
we conjoin all law statements which are in the form of “Fs cause Gs”, we substitute each 
term that denote a property by a variable. Then we add an existential quantifier for each 
variable to the beginning of the sentence. Let us call this existentially quantified sentence 
“R”. R could be made true by different possible arrangements. What makes R true in the 
actual world is its actual realization. But R has multiple realizations. It could be made true 
by different states of affairs in different worlds. According to this understanding, both laws 
(construed as such Ramsey sentences) and causal roles of properties are multiply realizable.  
To show that these Ramsey sentences have multiple realizations, Lewis invokes his 
permutation argument. The permutation argument is an extension of the combinatorial 
principle of possibility (together with Hume‟s dictum) that I introduced above. Take the 
aforementioned Ramsey sentence R to be true in the actual world. It is true in virtue of a 
global state of affairs which is constituted by particulars instantiating fundamental 
properties. Take two of these properties, F1 and F2. It is crucial for the argument that F1 
and F2 are distinct properties. Perhaps F1 and F2 are instantiated in only a few individuals, 
or perhaps they are instantiated all over the world. Now substitute every F1 with an F2, and 
vice versa. The combinatorial understanding of possibility (together with Hume‟s dictum) 
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allows this possibility. But moreover, it also allows this new arrangement to be a realizer 
of R. Before proceeding to the next step, let us note that, as we already saw above, this 
combinatorial understanding (together with Hume‟s dictum) already rejects (C2). 
If we allow different properties to occupy same causal roles, and in effect, allow different 
arrangements of particulars (with respect to their properties and relations) to realize same 
Ramsey sentences, then we separate properties from their causal profiles. In Lewis‟s 
Ramseyan account, (C2) is already explicitly rejected; but with this, we also deny (C1). If 
we allow F1 in world w1 to occupy the causal role of F2 in world w2, and yet take F1 and F2 
to be distinct properties, we cannot say that properties are individuated by their causal 
profiles. 
According to Lewis, we can know what laws are true and what causal roles are occupied. 
But from this knowledge, we cannot derive which states of affairs make those laws true 
and which properties occupy those causal roles. In this picture, F1 and F2 are taken to be 
properties that occupy causal roles, or ground dispositions. Lewis says that to “be the 
ground of a disposition is to occupy a role, but it is one thing to know that a role is 
occupied, another thing to know what occupies it” (ibid: 204). No information can tell us 
what properties occupy these roles. So, R could be true in virtue of indefinitely many 
different states of affairs, each of which is different with respect to the distribution of F1, 
F2, and other properties. So, “no possible observation can tell us which one is actual, 
because whichever one is actual, the Ramsey sentence will be true.” (ibid: 207) 
The conclusion is usually stated as the thesis of Humility. Humility is a thesis about our 
ignorance about properties: “we are irremediably ignorant about the identities of the 
fundamental properties that figure in the actual realization of the true final theory” (ibid: 
214). Lewis takes Humility to spread to most properties, not only to fundamental 
properties. Properties that are not fundamental are taken to supervene on fundamental 
properties. As Lewis correctly observes, if “Humility applies to most or all of the 
fundamental properties, then it spreads to a great range of less than fundamental properties, 
intrinsic and extrinsic alike” (ibid: 204). 
According to Lewis, Humility is a consequence of quidditism, which in turn is a 
consequence of Lewis‟s understanding of laws and causal structures. And both quidditism 
and Humility are welcomed by Lewis: “[w]hy is Humility „ominous‟? Who ever promised 
me that I was capable in principle of knowing everything?‟‟ (ibid: 211). This final 
statement is the reason I call this argument the “so-what” argument. If one agrees with 
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Lewis with respect to this latter point, the arguments from knowledge that we considered 
in favour of the causal thesis in the previous section will not be compelling. However, it 
should be noted that the Ramseyan account that Lewis gives already presupposes the 
rejection of (C1) and (C2). So, as an argument against the causal thesis, it would not 
persuade the defender of the causal thesis.  
Before closing, I should mention that Lewis‟s argument for Humility is not unanimously 
accepted. Schaffer (2005), for example, argues that although some sort of quidditism might 
be accepted, Humility can be resisted. He takes Humility as a form of external world 
scepticism, and claims that there are a vast number of possibly effective ways of rejecting 
external world scepticism. 
This concludes my discussion of arguments against the causal thesis. We saw that some of 
these arguments are, ultimately, arguments against the reality of dispositions. Those who 
take dispositions to be real would not be convinced by them. And we also saw that other 
arguments that are construed against the causal thesis are motivated by theses like Hume‟s 
dictum, which are fundamentally at odds with the causal thesis. So, it seems like it is 
perhaps impossible to reconcile the defenders of the causal thesis and its opponents. 
4.6 Conclusion 
I started this chapter with the suggestion that we ought to understand what causal powers 
are and how they might be related to properties in order to assess the subset view of 
realization. After providing a survey of several issues related to the notion of causal 
powers, including varieties of disposition, the debate about the conditional analyses of 
dispositions, dispositionalism, categoricalism and other views, I focused on what I call the 
causal thesis. According to the causal thesis, (C1) properties are individuated by their 
causal profiles, and (C2) properties have their causal profiles essentially. I gave a survey of 
accounts that are in favour of and against the causal thesis. Independent discussions of (C1) 
and (C2) are required because I will show in the next chapter that these theses are relevant 
to the subset view for different reasons. 
Before proceeding to the next chapter, I should reemphasise that none of the arguments for 
the causal thesis will persuade its opponents, and none of the arguments against it will 
persuade its defenders. This is why I suggest that we should suspend judgment on this 
debate, at least as far as this chapter is concerned. Then it might be questioned why a rather 
long chapter is devoted to this debate in this thesis. There are three reasons for this: first, 
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one quick objection against the subset view of realization says that the subset view defines 
realization in terms of causal powers, and that causal powers are mysterious entities. From 
this survey-like chapter, we can conclude that this objection is not fair. There is no 
conclusive case against the legitimacy of metaphysics of causal powers. 
Second, since the subset view defines realization in terms of causal powers, a full treatment 
of the subset view requires an elaboration on what causal powers might be. As I have 
shown, there are various ways of understanding what they are, and how they are related to 
properties. Someone who is studying the subset view, thanks to this survey, will have more 
resources to evaluate the subset view. 
Third, in the next chapter, I will examine what the defenders of a viable version of the 
subset view should say about how causal powers are related to properties. I will argue that, 
in order to explain the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization, defenders of the 
subset view can hold the causal thesis. Since I provided a detailed treatment of the causal 
thesis in this chapter, one can easily find the implications of the subset view through 
studying the implications of the causal thesis in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: REALIZATION AND CAUSAL POWERS, PART II 
5.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I stressed that the notion of causal powers is central to the subset 
view of realization because the subset view explains realization in terms of a proper subset 
relation between the causal powers of properties. I suggested that, in order to assess the 
subset view properly, we should understand what causal powers are, and how they might 
be related to the properties that are said to “have” them. Having defined realization in 
terms of a relation between the causal powers of properties, it might be expected from the 
defenders of the subset view to also hold that that there is a “tight” connection between 
properties and their causal profiles. In the previous chapter, I identified two theses about 
the connection between properties and their causal profiles: (C1) Properties are 
individuated by their causal profiles; (C2) Properties have their causal profiles essentially. 
I called the conjunction of these two theses the causal thesis. The causal thesis provides a 
tight connection between properties and their causal powers. My main claim in this chapter 
is that the causal thesis is highly relevant to the subset view. 
In Section 5.1, I will introduce what I call the independence thesis. According to this thesis, 
the issues regarding the nature of properties and their relationships with causal powers are 
irrelevant to the issues regarding the subset view. In Section 5.2, I will introduce a problem 
for the subset view. The problem is that the subset view cannot explain the metaphysical 
necessitation feature of realization unless a story about properties and their relationships 
with their causal powers is told. In Section 5.3, I will argue that the causal thesis provides 
resources to solve this problem and avoid a further problem that I call the overrealization 
problem. In Section 5.4, I will discuss a somewhat exegetical issue regarding Shoemaker‟s 
different formulations of the subset view against the background of the causal thesis. 
5.1 The Independence Thesis 
Let us recall how the simplified version of the subset view defines realization: a property P 
realizes a property Q if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal 
powers of P. Having formulated realization in terms of a relationship between the causal 
powers of properties, it might be expected that the defenders of the subset view could hold 
a view according to which properties and their causal powers are “tightly” connected. In 
any case, it is natural to expect from the defenders of the subset view an explanation as to 
what causal powers are, and how they might be related to properties that confer them. An 
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explanation of a tight connection between properties and their causal profiles can be given 
by the causal thesis: 
(C1) Properties are individuated by their causal profiles. 
(C2) Properties have their causal profiles essentially. 
Note that I am not arguing that the best explanation of how properties are related to their 
causal profiles is given by the causal thesis. Rather, I am pointing out that if one thinks that 
there is a tight connection between properties and their causal profiles, the causal thesis 
would account for that tight connection. So, it might be expected from the defender of the 
subset view to also hold the causal thesis. 
Nevertheless, Wilson (2011) argues that such expectations would be mistaken. She thinks 
that issues that are related to causal powers and their relations to the properties that confer 
them are irrelevant to the issues that the subset view is concerned with. In a discussion of 
whether the subset view is committed so something along the lines of the causal thesis, she 
says that “even a Humean categoricalist may endorse a powers-based account of 
realization and associated subset strategy” (ibid: 133). Recall that both (C1) and (C2) are 
false according to Humean categoricalism.
42
 So, if the subset view is compatible with 
Humean categoricalism, then the subset view is not shown to be interestingly connected to 
the causal thesis. Note that Wilson is not merely saying that the defender of the subset 
view is not committed to the causal thesis. Her claim is stronger; she argues that the 
defender of the subset view is not committed to any theory about the nature of properties 
regarding their connection to the powers that they confer. Let us call this the independence 
thesis. 
Wilson‟s reasoning in favour of the independence thesis is as follows. Take two opposing 
views regarding the nature of properties and their causal powers: dispositionalism and 
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 See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2 for a discussion of Humeanism and categoricalism. 
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Humean categoricalism. These two views can be said to be on two extreme sides of a 
spectrum of views regarding properties and their relationships with their causal profiles. 
According to dispositionalism, both (C1) and (C2) are true; according to Humean 
categoricalism, both (C1) and (C2) are false. Wilson maintains that issues concerning (C1) 
and (C2) are irrelevant to the issues concerning the subset view (or any view as to what 
realization is). The subset view is a theory of realization, and it concerns the formulation of 
physicalism and the explanation of mental causation. However, whether any of (C1) and 
(C2) is true or not hinges on whether properties can have non-causal features in addition to 
their causal features. Whether properties have non-causal features is irrelevant to the 
explanation of mental causation. It is also irrelevant to a formulation of physicalism, 
because any physicalistically acceptable explanation of a phenomenon will only refer to 
causal features; physical explanations will not be sensitive to non-causal, epiphenomenal, 
features of entities. 
I should note that, in the same work where Wilson argues for this claim, she takes 
realization to be a nomological necessitation relation (ibid: 124). That is, if a property P 
realizes a property Q, then, P nomologically necessitates Q. She thinks that in order to 
explain the nature of a nomological necessitation relation, one does not have to endorse 
theses about the profiles of properties in all metaphysically possible worlds. The modal 
strength of the necessitation feature of realization that I am interested in this thesis, 
however, is metaphysical, as I explained in Chapters 1 and 2. The question that I want to 
address here is whether the subset view can explain the metaphysical necessitation feature 
of realization. So, the argument that I will provide in what follows will not directly target 
Wilson. 
Although Shoemaker does not invoke the independence thesis, he thinks that the subset 
view is not committed to the causal thesis (2001; 2007). He thinks that a modally weaker 
thesis is sufficient for the subset view to effectively explain realization. This is an 
exegetically interesting fact because Shoemaker himself (1980; 1998), for independent 
reasons, believes that (C1) and (C2) are true. The modally weaker version of the causal 
thesis would say that properties in the actual world and nomologically similar worlds are 
individuated by the causal powers that they confer in those worlds, and they have these 
causal powers only with nomological necessity. He thinks that although this modally 
weaker version of the causal thesis might be true, we can still take realization to hold with 
metaphysical necessitation; all we have to do is to include the laws of nature into the 
background conditions of total realizers, and metaphysical necessitation comes for free 
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(2001: 435, footnote 12). But still, a story needs to be told about how it is the case that 
when something has a property P, it also has another property with a proper subset of the 
causal powers of P.  
As far as I know, this leaves Clapp (2001) as the only defender of the subset view who 
motivates the view from a theory of properties that entails the causal thesis. But still, he 
does not argue that the subset view entails the causal thesis; instead, he argues that the 
subset view is implied by the causal thesis. His construal of the subset view assumes a 
version of dispositionalism according to which properties are clusters of causal powers. 
Clapp argues that  
[t]his account of realization ... is strongly suggested by the causal power model 
of properties ... On the causal power model of properties, an object instantiates 
a property if and only if it possesses every causal power in the set that 
constitutes that property (ibid: 129).  
I believe that Clapp is doing the right thing by presenting the subset view as an extension 
of a causal understanding of properties. I shall show that this is the right thing by 
explaining how certain questions about realization can be answered thanks to the causal 
thesis. 
5.2 The Problem of Metaphysical Necessitation  
According to a minimal physicalist thesis, mental properties strongly supervene on 
physical properties. On this understanding, in order for something to instantiate a mental 
property M, that thing must instantiate a physical property P such that P necessitates the 
instantiation of M. As I have explained in Chapter 1, the necessitation relation in terms of 
which physicalism is to be formulated is a metaphysical necessitation relation, even if one 
thinks that physicalism is only contingently true. That is, it might be possible for some 
non-physicalist worlds to exist in which mental properties are instantiated without physical 
properties, but necessarily, when a supervenience base of M is instantiated, M is 
instantiated too.  
In Chapter 2, I stipulated that one of the roles of the realization relation is to explain the 
metaphysical necessitation of mental properties by their physical bases. Necessarily, 
whenever a realizer of M is instantiated, M is instantiated too. I call this feature the 
metaphysical necessitation feature of realization. If P is a realizer of Q, then that 
something has P metaphysically necessitates that it has Q. 
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On a simplified version of the subset view, a property P realizes a property Q if and only if 
the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P. If the subset view‟s 
account of realization is to be successful with respect to the satisfaction of the said role of 
realization, than its proposed definition of realization should account for the necessitation 
feature of realization. So, the following conditional should be true:  if the causal powers of 
Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P, then, necessarily, if something has P, it 
has Q.  
Let us, for the sake of illustration, specify two properties P and Q and two associated sets 
of causal powers as illustrated below: 
P: {cp1, cp2, cp3} 
Q: {cp1, cp2} 
As far as the subset view‟s definition of realization is concerned, P realizes Q because 
{cp1, cp2} is a subset of {cp1, cp2, cp3}. If metaphysical necessitation is a feature of 
realization, and if the subset view is true, then P necessitates Q because {cp1, cp2} is a 
subset of {cp1, cp2, cp3}. However, although having cp1, cp2 and cp3 necessitates having 
cp1 and cp2, we need an explanation of why P necessitates Q. This is the problem of 
metaphysical necessitation for the subset view.
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  Similar remarks have been made by Melnyk (2006). “Why assume that along with possession of power-
tokens of certain types there automatically comes possession of a property ... that would have conferred 
them? Even if being N essentially confers causal power-tokens of certain types on objects that possess it, it 
doesn‟t follow – at least from anything that ... [the subset view] says – that causal power-tokens of those 
types are essentially such as to be conferred by being N. The property of being N is one thing, the causal 
powers that it confers are another, and nothing in ... [the subset view] entails that the presence of the latter 
guarantees the presence of the former” (2006: 139-140). See also Kim (2010: 108) for the same 
observation.  
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Next, I shall show that the problem of metaphysical necessitation is soluble if the causal 
thesis is true. 
5.3 The Causal Thesis as a Solution 
The subset view faces the problem of metaphysical necessitation as I explained above. As 
this problem shows, the fact that a property P has the causal powers cp1, cp2 and cp2 does 
not necessitate that that any bearer of P is also a bearer of the property Q which has the 
causal powers cp1 and cp2. In order for this problem to be solved, the defender of the 
subset view should give an explanation along the following lines: 
(i) having P necessitates having cp1, cp2, and cp3; 
(ii) having cp1, cp2, and cp3 necessitates having cp1 and cp2; 
(iii) having cp1 and cp2 necessitates having Q; 
(iv) therefore, having P necessitates having Q. 
Since (ii) is an analytic truth, the soundness of (i)-(iv) hinges on the truth of (i) and (iii). In 
order to make sense of (i) and (iii), we need to invoke principles that tie the instantiations 
of properties to their causal powers.  
Let us start with (iii). It can be explained by a principle that relates the causal powers of 
properties to their instances in virtue of the following principle: 
(IP1) Necessarily, if an individual S has the causal powers of a property F, then S 
instantiates F.
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 Before moving on, I should mention that, although he never discusses it explicitly, Shoemaker seems to 
implicitly hold something along the lines of (IP1). This has been observed by Zimmerman (2009) too. As 
Zimmerman says, “the claim I find implicit in Shoemaker‟s remarks on these topics is that having all the ... 
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We need to explain (i) by the converse of (IP1) so that we can relate the instantiations of 
properties to the conferment of their causal powers thanks to the following thesis: 
(IP2) Necessarily, if an individual S instantiates a property F, then S has the causal 
powers of F. 
In order to explain the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization, we can appeal to 
the conjunction of (IP1) and (IP2). Let us call this conjunctive thesis (IP3): 
(IP3) Necessarily, an individual S instantiates a property F if and only if S has the 
causal powers of F.
45
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
[causal powers] conferred by a property is sufficient for having that property” (ibid: 679, emphasis in the 
original).  
45
 I have been calling the three-place relation between properties, causal powers and individuals 
“conferment”: properties confer causal powers on their bearers. If (IP3) is true, then it can explain what is 
meant by conferment. On this proposal, saying that a property confers a causal power on an object is 
nothing more than saying that if that property is instantiated by that object, that object has that causal 
power. It would be a mistake to take conferral to be ontologically seriously as if properties “transfer” their 
causal powers to objects. Seeing conferral that way would cause some problems. Audi (2011), when he 
criticises the subset view, sees conferral in this ontologically serious fashion. He proposes a dilemma to 
the subset view. The dilemma goes as follows. Let us assume that the subset view is true and P realizes Q. 
P and Q cannot both confer cp1 and cp2 distinctly, because if that were the case, then there would be 
systematic causal overdetermination. So, cp1 and cp2 are conferred by either P or Q. If they are conferred 
by P, then Q does not confer any causal powers, so cannot be causally efficacious. However, if they are 
conferred by Q, then Q would not need to be realized by P because it can confer its causal powers without 
P. In either case, we have unsatisfactory results. This problem vanishes if we do not take the conferral 
locution literally. It is not that P transfers its causal powers to the individual S, and then Q also transfers 
its causal powers to S too. Conferral should be understood as a conditional, or in fact, as a biconditional: S 
has Q iff S has cp1 and cp2. 
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One might be inclined to explain the necessity of this biconditional statement by 
identifying property instances with the causal powers that are conferred. On that proposal, 
(IP3) would be true because of the following identity thesis: 
(Power-Instance-Identity) An instance of a property F is identical with the causal 
powers that F confers. 
If Power-Instance-Identity is true, an instance of P would be a cluster of the instances of 
causal powers cp1, cp2 and cp2. Since, according to Power-Instance-Identity, any cluster 
of the instances of cp1 and cp2 would be an instance of Q, it would be straightforward to 
see how a P instance metaphysically necessitates a Q instance. However, (IP3) does not 
entail this Power-Instance-Identity: (IP3) says that having the causal powers of a property 
F is both sufficient and necessary for having F. Power-Instance-Identity, on the other hand, 
says that property instances are identical with causal powers. So, Power-Instance-Identity 
is a logically stronger thesis than (IP3). So, as far as the solution to the problem of 
metaphysical necessitation is concerned, Power-Instance-Identity is not required, but 
something along the lines of (IP3) is required.
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Now, consider (IP3). One conjunct of the thesis, namely (IP2), is equivalent to (C2). The 
causal profile of a property is the specification of the conferment of the causal powers of 
that property. To say that a property confers its causal powers necessarily is to say that it 
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    Melnyk (2006) thinks that the subset view is committed to Power-Instance-Identity. He identifies the gap 
between the instantiation of a property and the conferment of the causal powers of the property, and 
argues that, in order to close the gap, the “key move is to identify property-instances with something like 
clusters of [conferred causal powers]” (ibid: 140, emphasis added). In order to show that Power-Instance-
Identity is required, Melnyk gives another reason. He argues that only the identification of property 
instances with the tokenings of causal powers can explain Shoemaker‟s comments that a realized property 
instance is a part of the instance of its realizer. However, as I will argue in Chapter 7 in detail, we should 
not take Shoemaker‟s claim about parthood literally.  
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has its causal profile essentially. This observation brings us to my first conclusion: the 
independence thesis should be rejected. The reason for this is that this observation shows 
that (C2) is crucial for the subset view, as without (C2), the defenders of the subset view 
lack resources to explain the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization.
47
  
If I am right, a Humean categoricalist should not hold the subset view. Wilson (2011) 
argues that issues about the causal or non-causal features of properties are not relevant to 
the issues about realization. However, physicalism as a strong-supervenience-entailing 
thesis requires the metaphysical necessitation of the mental by the physical, and realization 
is the relation by which the required necessitation is supposed to be explained. If a theory 
of realization cannot explain this necessitation feature, this should be seen as a failure on 
its part.
48
  
Now, I will show how (C1) becomes relevant to the subset view. Perhaps, one might use 
Wilson‟s reasoning for the independence thesis with respect to only (C1). Asking whether 
(C1) is true is asking whether properties with identical causal profiles could yet be distinct. 
If they can be distinct, then it should be granted that they have non-causal features. With 
this reasoning, we might think that whether there are such features or not is irrelevant to 
issues regarding physicalism and mental causation. Next, I will show that it is, in fact, 
relevant. 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
47
  If one were to modify the subset view in the following way, (IP1) would be sufficient to explain the 
metaphysical necessitation feature of realization: a property P realizes a property Q if and only if, 
necessarily, the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P. Then, the need for (IP2) 
would vanish. What (IP2) does it is to guarantee that the proper subset relationship between the causal 
powers of P and Q holds necessarily, which makes the modification of the relation that the subset view 
postulates redundant. 
48
  As I said above, since Wilson takes realization to be a nomological necessitation relation, her version of 
physicalism does not face this problem. 
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The subset view‟s need for a thesis like (C1) comes from the observation that the subset 
view with (C2) but without (C1) encounters the overrealization problem. The 
overrealization problem can be explained as follows. According to a view of properties 
which accepts (C2) but rejects (C1), it is possible that Q and Q* are distinct properties with 
the same causal profiles that are essential to them. Let us call properties like Q and Q* 
doppelganger properties. Given that the subset view defines realization as a function of the 
causal profiles of properties, it follows that if Q and Q* are doppelgangers, then the subset 
view should take any realizer of Q to be a realizer of Q* too. Take the property P to be a 
realizer of Q. Since realization is a metaphysical necessitation relation in the sense 
specified above, then necessarily, whenever P is instantiated, both Q and Q* are 
instantiated. If Q has other doppelgangers, they are also instantiated. Let us call this 
overrealization. If overrealization is a problem, the easiest way for the subset view to solve 
it would be to give up the possibility of doppelgangers, so hold (C1). Next, I will show that 
overrealization is a problem indeed.  
Overrealization leads to a problem of causal overdetermination. Suppose that we want to 
explain the causal efficacy of Q, and for this, we (somehow) explain that P does not 
exclude the causal role of Q. For the subset view, both P and Q could be causally sufficient 
for a subsequent event without problematically overdetermining it. And more importantly, 
since there is an asymmetry between P and Q (either because of the proper subset relation 
between their causal powers or because of the proper parthood relation between their 
instances), we can choose one but not the other as the more appropriate cause of a 
subsequent event.  
But what are we going to do with Q*? Any event that is purported to be caused by Q is 
also caused by Q*. There seems to be no non-arbitrary way of choosing between Q and Q* 
to be the cause of a subsequent event, because their causal profiles are identical. There is 
no asymmetry between Q and Q* that can break the causal competition in question. For 
any event E, if Q is a cause of E, Q* is also a cause of E. Therefore, Q and Q* causally 
overdetermine their effects systematically. To generalise, whenever a property realizes 
another property, if the latter is a cause of an event, all doppelgangers of it are causes of 
that event. 
Recall that the subset view is advertised as a solution to the exclusion problem, and one of 
the sources of the exclusion problem is the contention that there is no systematic causal 
overdetermination. If the subset view faces another problem of systematic 
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overdetermination, its solution to the exclusion problem would not be complete. 
Overrealization is what would cause this sort of systematic overdetermination, and 
endorsing (C1) blocks overrealization. 
I should note that it might be possible to solve this overdetermination problem by 
appealing to the fact that Q and Q* are metaphysically non-distinct. I will discuss the 
solutions to the exclusion problem in Chapter 7 in detail, and one of those solutions can 
solve this problem too. If that is the case, then (C1) would not be required for the solution 
of this problem. At any rate, I take it that (C1) provides resources to solve this problem, 
which speaks to the fact that what one thinks about (C1) is not irrelevant to what one 
thinks about realization and mental causation. Given that my intended conclusion in this 
chapter is that the causal thesis is relevant to the subset view, I take it that the fact that 
there might be other solutions to the overrealization problem does not refute my point. 
This concludes my demonstration that the causal thesis is relevant for the subset view. (C2) 
provides resources to explain how mental properties are metaphysically necessitated by the 
properties that realize them. (C1) provides resources to block the problem of 
overrealization. 
5.4 Backward-looking Causal Features and Metaphysical Necessitation 
Before starting, I should mention that the discussion in this section is purely exegetical of 
Shoemaker‟s philosophy, as it examines how his accounts of the subset view develops 
from 2001 to 2013.
49
 Here, I will report an issue about the subset view, regarding the 
causal profiles of properties and the necessitation feature of realization. The issue has now 
been resolved after a debate between McLaughlin (2007; 2009) and Shoemaker (2011; 
2013), but its discussion is central to the issues that I examine in this chapter, so I will 
summarise the debate, and relate it to the main claim of this chapter. 
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 Shoemaker (2001; 2003; 2007; 2010; 2011; 2013). 
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Although I formulated the subset view in terms of a relationship between causal powers of 
properties, Shoemaker‟s original formulation invoked causal features rather than causal 
powers. So, in his terminology, the formulation of realization goes as follows: 
(s-realization*) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if the forward-looking 
causal features of Q are a proper subset of the forward-looking causal features of P.  
Except for the exclusion of the possibility of conjunctive properties realizing their 
conjuncts, this is the formulation that Shoemaker gives in (2001).
50
 
For Shoemaker, causal powers are forward-looking causal features, the features that 
specify what the instantiation of the property would cause under certain conditions. 
Shoemaker contrasts forward-looking causal features with backward-looking causal 
features. Whereas the forward-looking causal features of a property are the causal powers 
of that property, the backward-looking causal features of a property specify what might 
cause the instantiation of that property under certain conditions. In his postscript to his 
paper “Causality and Properties” (1980), Shoemaker says that he was told by Richard 
Boyd that it might be possible that properties with same forward-looking causal features 
could be distinct in virtue of having different backward-looking causal features. Although 
Shoemaker says that he was never convinced that properties with same forward-looking 
causal features could differ with respect to their backward-looking causal features (1998; 
2007:12), in his (2003) and (2007) versions of the subset view, he includes in the definition 
of realization a clause on backward-looking causal features: 
(s3-realization) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the forward-
looking causal features of Q are a proper subset of the forward-looking causal 
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 I will discuss the issues regarding conjunctive properties in the next chapter. 
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features of P; (ii) the backward-looking causal features of Q are a proper superset of 
the backward-looking causal features of P.
51
 
He thinks that this would do no harm, and satisfy those who think that Boyd‟s 
aforementioned point is plausible. We have seen the reasons why the forward-looking 
causal features of Q are taken to be a subset of the forward-looking causal features of P. 
But why are the backward-looking causal features of Q supposed to be a superset of the 
backward-looking causal features of P? It is because of the observation that since a 
realized property (typically) has multiple realizers and since anything that causes each of 
the realizers is also a cause of the realized property, the backward-looking causal features 
of the realizer property includes the backward-looking causal features of any of its 
realizers. To fix ideas, take Q to be realized by P1 and P2. Anything that is a cause of P1 is 
also a cause of Q; anything that is a cause of P2 is also a cause of Q. So, causes of Q 
include the causes of P1 and P2. But things that can cause P1 might fail to cause P2 and vice 
versa. So, the backward-looking causal features of Q include as a proper subset of the 
backward-looking causal features of both P1 and P2. 
But, McLaughlin (2007; 2009) observes that the addition of a condition on backward-
looking causal features actually causes a serious problem for the subset view.
52
 The 
problem is that, according to McLaughlin, this formulation fails to capture the 
metaphysical necessitation feature of realization. Let us assume that the property P realizes 
the property Q. So, P must metaphysically necessitate Q. The problem that McLaughlin 
identifies can be illustrated as follows. The fact that an object S has P necessitates the fact 
that S has a property with a subset of the forward-looking causal features of P.
 53
  (For 
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 I introduced this relation in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3.5. 
52
 See also Hofmann (2007), who uses McLaughlin‟s observation to criticise the subset view. 
53
 Here, it becomes clear that both Shoemaker and McLaughlin (at least for the argument‟s sake) are 
assuming what I called (IP1): having the causal powers of a property is sufficient for having that property. 
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example, if you have forward-looking causal features x, y, z, then you have x and y.) 
However, the fact that S has P does not necessitate that S has a property with a superset of 
the backward-looking causal features of P. (For example, when you have backward-
looking causal features x and y, you may fail to have backward-looking causal features x, y 
and z.) Therefore, if the formulation of realization as it is given in s3-realization is true, 
then P does not necessitate Q.
54
 
In his more recent discussions (2011; 2013), Shoemaker agrees with McLaughlin and goes 
back to the original formulation that he gave in 2001. So, he thinks that we do not have to 
give a role to backward-looking causal features in the formulation of realization: 
realization can be explained in terms of a relationship between the forward-looking causal 
features of properties. In order to justify this simplification, he gives an argument to show 
that the alleged possibility of two distinct properties with same forward-looking causal 
features but different backward-looking causal features is not really a possibility. 
The original example that Shoemaker (1980, postscript) considers for the alleged 
possibility of two properties with same forward-looking causal features but different 
backward-looking causal features is as follows. Suppose that we have two substances, X 
and Y. X is the resultant of the combination of two simpler substances A and B, and Y is 
the resultant of the combination of two simpler substances C and D (where A, B, C and D 
are distinct substances). Suppose that being X and being Y are alike with respect to their 
forward-looking causal features. However, their instantiations are caused by different 
events. Being X is caused by the combination of A and B, whereas being Y is caused by the 
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 I am not sure if McLaughlin‟s objection really goes through, but at any rate, Shoemaker (2013: 43) thinks 
that it does. McLaughlin argues that having the backward-looking causal features of a proper subset does 
not necessitate having another property with the superset of the backward-looking causal features of that 
property. However, the notion of backward-looking causal features can easily be understood in the 
following way, in which case, the objection can be resisted:  a property P has B as its set of backward-
looking causal features if any bearer of P has some member of B. 
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combination of C and D. So, it appears that being X and being Y differ with respect to their 
backward-looking causal features.  
As Shoemaker (2011, 2013) correctly observes, this example does not show that two 
distinct properties could differ with respect to their backward-looking causal features when 
they have the same forward-looking causal features. There is nothing incoherent about 
taking being X to be identical with being Y (because they have the same forward-looking 
causal features) but taking being X to have different possible causes. We can take being X 
as a multiply realizable property. It can be realized by the being the combination of A and 
B, and being the combination of C and D.
55
  
I take the issue of backward-looking causal features to be resolved, and I shall not refer to 
s3-realization when I talk about the subset view‟s realization relation. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Having introduced in Chapter 4 the causal thesis and its two constituents, namely (C1) and 
(C2), in this chapter, I proceeded to my central argument, namely that the defenders of the 
subset view require something along the lines of the causal thesis in order to explain 
realization. I argued that if nothing is told about how properties are related to the causal 
powers that are said to “have” them, as it stands, the subset view cannot explain how 
mental properties are metaphysically necessitated by their realizers. Since the explanation 
of this sort of metaphysical necessitation is part of the theoretical role of the realization 
relation, I take it that this is a serious problem for the subset view as a theory of realization. 
Then I showed how this problem can be sidestepped if the causal thesis is held. I also 
demonstrated how the causal thesis provides resources to block a particular sort of causal 
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 Note that, if (C1) is true, we do not have a case of multiple realization here. Not only the substances X and 
Y would be identical, but also what appear to be their different realizers would be identical too. At any rate, 
X and Y would be identical, and that is what matters for the sake of Shoemaker‟s reply.  
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overdetermination. In the final section, I reported a debate between Shoemaker and 
McLaughlin regarding realization and causal features of properties. 
In the next chapter, I will present a new problem for the original formulations of the subset 
view. The problem is that the subset view does not have a principled way of identifying 
when a conjunctive property can realize its conjuncts and when it cannot. I will propose 
my own version of the subset view in order to solve this problem. 
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CHAPTER 6: REALIZATION AND FUNDAMENTALITY 
6.0 Introduction  
In the previous chapters, I introduced and evaluated several theories of realization, and 
focused mainly on the subset view of realization defended by Clapp (2001), Shoemaker 
(2001; 2007: 2013) and Wilson (1999). According to a simplified version of this view, a 
property P realizes a property Q just in case the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of 
the causal powers of P. I argued that the defenders of a viable version of the subset view 
should endorse something along the lines of the causal thesis, according to which 
properties are individuated by their causal profiles and have these profiles essentially. It is 
the task of this chapter to explain why the aforementioned formulation of the subset view 
is a simplified one. None of the writers mentioned above want it to be the case that 
arbitrary conjunctions of properties realize their conjuncts. However, the aforementioned 
formulation of realization, when it is conjoined with the causal thesis, entails that this must 
be the case.  
In 6.1, I introduce the problem of conjunctive realizers in terms of a dilemma: on the one 
hand, it is undesirable that conjunctive properties are realizers of their conjuncts; on the 
other hand, once a ban on conjunctive realizers is stipulated, granting some assumptions, 
no property can realize another property. In sections 6.2 and 6.3, I introduce Shoemaker‟s 
attempts to solve this problem and then argue that he is not successful in doing so. 
Although Shoemaker‟s response is on the right track because it captures the fact that the 
dilemma mentioned above is a false one (because only some conjunctive properties might 
be undesirable as realizers), I argue that his criterion for demarcating the problematic cases 
from the unproblematic ones does not work. In 6.4, I introduce my own solution to this 
problem. I argue that if it is established that realization is a priority relation in the sense 
that a realized property is always less fundamental than its realizers, we can exclude the 
problematic cases of conjunctive realizers. In 6.5, I consider some possibly problematic 
cases that my proposal does not exclude. I leave it open whether these cases raise a 
genuine problem for my proposal. But I suggest that if they do so, a further restriction on 
realization can be imposed: the realizing property is always explanatorily connected to the 
realized property.  
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6.1 The Problem of Conjunctive Realizers 
Before I start the main argument of this chapter, I shall acknowledge an assumption that I 
am making: there are conjunctive properties. In fact, I assume that for all properties F and 
G, if an individual has both F and G, it also has a conjunctive property (F & G). For those 
who do not believe in conjunctive properties, the problem of conjunctive realizers that I 
will illustrate in this chapter will not arise. But, most participants of this debate (and I) do 
believe that there are such properties. In fact, the existence of such properties is central to 
this literature in many ways.  
First, structural properties in general are central to this work, as many issues that I have 
discussed involved such properties. Total realizers (as opposed to core realizers) (see 
Chapter 2) and structural properties (see Chapter 3) are such properties, for example. And, 
following Armstrong, I take it that “if there are complex [properties] at all, then 
conjunctions of [properties] should qualify” (1997: 31). Armstrong is  
inclined to deny that there are disjunctive and negative [properties]. But 
conjunctive [properties] seem much more acceptable. Given that F and G are 
distinct [properties], then F&G can be a [property], provided always that a 
particular exists at some time which is both F and G (ibid).  
Those who deny the existence of disjunctive and negative properties argue that there are no 
such properties because different instances of the same allegedly disjunctive or negative 
property do not always bear resemblance to each other. However, this problem (if it is a 
problem at all) does not arise for conjunctive properties: different instances of the same 
conjunctive property will always resemble each other. 
Second, conjunctive properties are nothing over and above their conjuncts, in a similar 
sense that wholes are nothing over and above their parts. So, those who appeal to the 
principle of parsimony to deny the existence of conjunctive properties by saying that we do 
not need them on top of simple properties can be responded by saying that conjunctive 
properties, like wholes, do not violate parsimony. They are not additional beings over and 
above their conjuncts; they are “ontologically innocent”, so to speak. 
Third, following Armstrong (1978: 32), I take it that it is a genuine possibility that all 
properties are conjunctive properties. In the same sense that it is possible that the world 
does not have a bottom, fundamental, level, so that each and every entity could be divisible 
to other entities, it is also possible that there are no simple properties so that each and every 
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property could be divisible to simpler properties. Armstrong notes that this is not only a 
logical possibility, but also an epistemic possibility. That is, for all we know, it is possible 
that there are no simple properties.
56
 Now, suppose that the denier of conjunctive 
properties is right; then it would be the case that only properties that exist are the simple 
ones. But given that it is an epistemic possibility that there are no simple properties, then it 
should also be an epistemic possibility that there are no properties at all. I take it that the 
consequences of such a possibility are detrimental to the type of metaphysics that most of 
the participants of this debate are doing. So, I shall hold on to my assumption that there are 
conjunctive properties. 
Now that one central presupposition I have is acknowledged, I shall proceed to the main 
argument of this chapter. We have seen that, on the simplified version of the subset view, a 
property realizes a property if and only if the causal powers of the latter are a proper subset 
of the causal powers of the former. The reason this is a simplified version of the view is 
that this formulation allows for some cases of realization that the defenders of the view do 
not want to allow. Such cases are the ones where the realizer property is a conjunctive 
property which includes the realized property as a conjunct. Take two non-identical 
properties P and Q. The set of causal powers of the conjunctive property (P & Q) will be 
the union set of the sets of the causal powers of P and Q. So, if one takes realization to be 
the relation that the aforementioned simplified version of the subset view takes it to be, the 
conjunctive property (P & Q) will be a realizer of P (and also of Q), because the causal 
powers of (P & Q) will include as a proper subset the causal powers of P (and also of Q). 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
56
 Even Lewis, who argues against complex properties, grants to Armstrong this argument: “[m] aybe there is 
no end to this complexity. Maybe there are no simples, just structures of structures ad infinitum. (Or maybe 
there are simples but not enough of them--if elecetronhood were simple but protonhood were a matter of 
structures ad infinitum, that would be enough to defeat the plan of dispensing with hydrogen in favour of 
the simples it involves.) Even if we believe in (enough) simples, should we adopt a doctrine of universals 
that presupposes this, and leaves no room for even the possibility of infinite complexity? … I take this … 
reason [for believing in complex properties] to be weightiest” (1983: 30). 
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The point generalises to all properties: so, if the aforementioned simplified version of the 
subset view is true, every conjunctive property realizes each of its conjuncts. It will also be 
true that every property is realized by any conjunctive property which includes it as a 
conjunct. 
The observation that this version of the subset view entails that all conjunctive properties 
realize their every conjunct (and that all properties are realizable by arbitrarily chosen 
conjunctive properties that include them as conjuncts) is a problem for the subset view, and, 
as I shall show in this chapter, it is not a problem that can easily be fixed by merely 
stipulating that conjunctive properties do not realize their conjuncts. That stipulation, as we 
shall see, has its own problems. 
Let me explain why it might not be desirable that conjunctive properties count as realizers 
of their conjuncts. First, as Shoemaker (2007: 24) observes, allowing conjunctive 
properties to realize their conjuncts has the following consequence. For all properties F and 
G, if F and G can be instantiated together, there is a conjunctive property (F & G). Every 
property belongs to indefinitely many conjunctive properties as a conjunct. If we allow all 
properties to be realized by all conjunctions to which they belong, every property will have 
indefinitely many realizers. But more crucially, there will not be any property that is not 
realizable: you can take any property, F, and conjoin it with an arbitrarily chosen property 
G: insofar as F and G can be coinstantiated, (F & G) would be a conjunctive property 
which would realize F. Note that F can be any property; if this is the case, in Shoemaker‟s 
terminology, there would be “no self-constituted properties” (ibid). By “self-constituted” 
properties, Shoemaker means fundamental properties, namely the properties that need no 
other properties as dependence bases. If we want physicalism to be the view that mental 
properties are ultimately realized by fundamental physical properties, and if we (correctly) 
think that fundamental properties are not realized (but their instantiations are “self-
constituted” in Shoemaker‟s terms), then physicalism cannot be viably formulated in terms 
of realization. 
Second, consider the connection between realization and the determinate-determinable 
property relation. As I have argued in Chapter 3, if the subset view is true, then 
determinate properties are realizers of their determinables. The causal powers of being red 
are a proper subset of the causal powers of being scarlet, for example. The example 
generalises to all determinable properties and their determinates insofar as these are 
properties with causal profiles. In fact, I have argued that these observations show that the 
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determinate-determinable property relation is a special case of realization. (Every case of 
d-realization is a case of s-realization, but not every case of s-realization is a case of d-
realization; being red is s-realized by being scarlet, but having pain is not d-realized by 
having C-fibre stimulation.) Now, if we allow that all conjunctive properties are realizers 
of their conjuncts (and that every property is realized by a conjunctive property that 
includes it as a conjunct), then we would have to say the same for determinable properties: 
all determinable properties would be d-realized by properties that include them as 
conjuncts, in which case a determinate property would be a conjunctive property that 
includes the determinable property as a conjunct. But, as Shoemaker notes, it “is 
commonly said about the [determinable-determinate] … relationship that a determinate 
cannot be regarded as the conjunction of the determinable and some other property” 
(ibid).
57
 If this is true, then we should not think that conjunctive properties are realizers of 
their conjuncts (and that every property is realized by a conjunctive property that includes 
it as a conjunct).  
The view that determinate properties are not conjunctive properties that include their 
determinables as conjuncts is attributed to W. E. Johnson and A.N. Prior.
58
 A more 
contemporary list of people who endorse this view is as follows:  
 Yablo (1992) thinks that determinate properties do not have their determinables as their 
conjuncts. He thinks that the ban on conjunctive determinates is one of the reasons why 
the determinate-determinable property relation should not be identified with 
asymmetric property necessitation simpliciter (1992: 253, footnote 23). That is, there is 
more to determinable-determinate property relation than merely asymmetric 
necessitation. 
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 See also Shoemaker (2001: 443). 
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 See Johnson (1921) and Prior (1949), both cited in Sanford (2011). 
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 Funkhouser (2006) gives the following reason for such a ban on conjunctive 
determinates: a “determinable property X is determined only with respect to its X-ness 
(or X-ity, or similarly appropriate grammatical construction)” (ibid: 550). This is 
because a property Q counts as a determinable of a property P only if being P is a 
specific way of being Q. Funkhouser‟s example is that the conjunctive property (being 
red & being square) does not count as a determinate of being red, because being 
square does not specify how red something is. 
 Wilson (2009) does not seem to be thinking that this is controversial point. She implies 
that it is part of our understanding of the determinate-determinable property relation 
that “property P determines property Q only if ... the having of P does not consist in the 
having of a conjunctive property consisting of Q and some property P* wholly distinct 
from Q as conjuncts” (2009: 152).  
 Rosen (2010: 127-8) thinks that this ban on conjunctive determinates of determinables 
is what distinguishes determinate-determinable property relation from genus-species 
relation. Traditionally, it is thought that having a species property consists in having a 
genus property and a differentia property. The paradigm example is that being human 
(the species property) consists of being animal (the genus property) and being rational 
(the differentia property).
59
  
Third, one might think that there is something interesting about realization (and also about 
the determinate-determinable property relation) that cannot be captured if one allows for 
arbitrary conjunctions to be realizers (or determinates) of their conjuncts. This 
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 If both Rosen and Shoemaker are right, then we obtain an interesting result: species properties do not 
realize genus properties. Being human is not a realizer of being animal. Although this might be true, as I 
shall show in what follows, its truth does not consist in the claim that conjunctive properties are never 
realizers of their conjuncts. I will argue that some conjunctive properties are realizers of some of their 
conjuncts, and there might be independent reasons to think that being human is not a realizer of being 
animal.) 
139 
 
 
consideration will be relevant for my stance on the issue of conjunctive realizers, and I will 
discuss this in more detail in sections 6.4 and 6.5 below, where I introduce my own 
solution to this problem of conjunctive realizers. For the time being, let us grant that it is 
undesirable that all conjunctive properties are realizers of their conjuncts (and that every 
property is realizable by arbitrary conjunctions that include them as conjuncts), so 
something should be done to rule out undesirable cases. 
Something should be done to rule out undesirable, or “bad”, cases of realization, but what 
exactly? It might be thought, though mistakenly, that the obvious way of dealing with this 
problem is imposing a necessary condition for realization to the effect that the realizer 
property is never a conjunctive property that includes the realized property as one of its 
conjuncts. Shoemaker once thought that the solution would be exactly this. He suggested 
that “if we are to define realization in terms of the subset relation we need to impose some 
restriction that rules out conjunctive properties as realizers of their conjuncts” (2001: 442). 
With this restriction, realization would be defined as follows: a property P realizes a 
property Q if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of 
P and P is not a conjunctive property having Q as a conjunct (ibid: 432).
60
 However, as I 
will explain in what follows, this seemingly easy solution causes another problem for the 
subset view. 
I shall introduce this problem by means of a reductio: assume, for reductio, that no 
conjunctive property realizes its conjuncts. Take, as the classic example suggests, having 
C-fibre stimulation to be a realizer of having pain. (See Figure 1 below to follow the 
formalism.) The causal powers of the latter will be a proper subset of the causal powers the 
former. Take set A to be the set of the causal powers of having pain, and set B to be the set 
of the causal powers of having C-fibre stimulation. As a consequence of the subset view, A 
is a proper subset of B. Now think of the causal powers of having C-fibre stimulation that 
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 Compare this to s4-realization that I introduced in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.3.5. 
140 
 
do not belong to the set of causal powers of having pain. Let us call the set that includes 
these powers C. What follows from these is that the set B will be the union of sets A and C. 
Now, let us say that P is a property that corresponds to the causal powers in set C in the 
following way: P confers the causal powers in C.
61
 Now take the conjunctive property 
(having pain & P). The causal powers of this property will be the causal powers in the 
union of A and C (namely the set B). But the causal powers of having C-fibre stimulation 
are the causal powers in this set. As the causal thesis (that I have shown in Chapter 5 that 
the defender subset view should hold) suggests, properties are individuated by their causal 
profiles. Given the causal thesis, having C-fibre stimulation and the conjunctive property 
of (having pain & P) are the very same property because they have the same causal 
profiles. So, the conjunctive property of (having pain & P) is a realizer of having pain. 
Therefore, there is a conjunctive property that is a realizer of one of its conjuncts, which 
we assumed to be false. The reductio is complete: it cannot be the case that no conjunctive 
property realizes its conjuncts. 
 
Fig 1: C-fibre stimulation as a conjunctive property 
One might consider what would happen if properties were not to be individuated by their 
causal profiles. Quidditism would be true, and having C-fibre stimulation might fail to be 
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 Here, I am assuming that there is such a property P that is non-identical with having C-fibre stimulation, 
and I shall not let this assumption remain unacknowledged. Whether there is really such a property is an 
important question, and that there is such a property is challenged by Shoemaker, as I shall report below. 
For those who are not convinced that this property exists, the argument of this section will not be 
compelling.  
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identical with this conjunctive property: there could be two non-identical properties with 
the same causal powers. In that case, one way out of this argument would be to say that 
having C-fibre stimulation is not identical with the conjunctive property in question. 
Although the former is a realizer of having pain, the latter cannot be by stipulation. But 
this paints a very unattractive picture: nothing would guarantee that an individual with the 
causal powers of having C-fibre stimulation instantiates having pain. Worse: nothing 
would guarantee that an individual with the causal powers of having pain instantiates 
having pain. I examined the problems the subset view would face in the case of the falsity 
of the causal thesis in Chapter 5; I am not going to discuss this option further. 
Note that this also shows that the subset view with the restriction on conjunctive properties 
as realizers of their conjuncts entails that no property is a realizer of a property (and hence 
no property is a determinate of a determinable property too) because the point about having 
C-fibre stimulation and having pain generalises to all cases. For all properties F and G, if 
the causal powers of G are a proper subset of the causal powers of F, then there is a 
property F* such that F* confers the causal powers that are conferred by F but not by G. 
Then no two properties can satisfy both of the following necessary conditions on 
realization at once: (a) F realizes G only if the causal powers of G are a proper subset of 
the causal powers of F; (b) F realizes G only if F is not a conjunctive property that 
includes G as a conjunct.  
Before discussing (and rejecting) Shoemaker‟s response to this problem, let me introduce 
the problem in terms of a dilemma: (1) if the subset view is formulated without a 
restriction on conjunctive properties as realizers, then the view generalises too much; 
conjunctive properties such as (being red & being square) count as realizers of their 
conjuncts, and there are no properties that are not realized; (2) on the other hand, if the 
subset view is formulated with a restriction on conjunctive properties to the effect that 
conjunctive properties are never realizers of their conjuncts, then, as the reductio above 
shows, no property realizes any property. 
It goes without saying that both (1) and (2) are undesirable. But might this be a false 
dilemma? It would be if there is a way of formulating the subset view with a restriction on 
only some conjunctive properties as realizers of their conjuncts. Surely it is possible (in 
principle) to formulate the view with an exclusion clause that enumerates all the “bad” 
examples of conjunctive realizers. But what needs to be done is to find a principled way of 
excluding such bad cases, without thereby disallowing the acceptable, or “good” cases. 
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There are at least two ways of giving a criterion for demarcating between good and bad 
cases as such. One belongs to Shoemaker (2001: 441-445; 2007: 22-28), and the other to 
me (see sections 6.4 and 6.5 below). In the next two sections, I will introduce and reject 
Shoemaker‟s solution.   
6.2 The Unity Condition for Powers 
In the previous section, I introduced a problem for the subset view in terms of a dilemma: 
if conjunctive properties realize their conjuncts, then the subset view generalises too much; 
if conjunctive properties cannot realize their conjuncts, no property realizes any property. 
Here and in the next section, I will critically discuss Shoemaker‟s response to this problem. 
Shoemaker‟s (2007: 24-26) first response to (a differently articulated version of) this 
problem is that the second horn is not problematic.
62
 The second horn of the dilemma is 
that if conjunctive properties cannot realize their conjuncts, then no property can realize 
any other property. I explained this through the following example: having C-fibre 
stimulation is identical with the conjunctive property of (having pain & P) (where P is the 
property that corresponds to the causal powers of having C-fibre stimulation except the 
causal powers of having pain). If conjunctive properties do not realize their conjuncts, then 
having C-fibre stimulation does not realize having pain. The point generalises to all 
putative cases of realization. Shoemaker thinks that the second horn of the dilemma is not 
problematic, because he thinks that having C-fibre stimulation is not a conjunctive 
property in the aforementioned sense. In a nutshell, his response is that the property P that 
is supposed to be a conjunct of having C-fibre stimulation is not a property. If P is not a 
property, then (having pain & P) is not a conjunctive property. Therefore, the response 
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 The problem has not been formulated in terms of a dilemma before, so it might be misleading to present 
Shoemaker‟s response as a response to the second horn of the dilemma. 
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goes, there is no problem of conjunctive realizers. Of course, the crucial task is to show 
why P is not a property. 
It is clear that Shoemaker does not think that there is a property that corresponds to every 
cluster of causal powers. He says that “it will clearly not do to say that given a property 
and its set of ... [causal powers] there is a property corresponding to every subset of that set” 
(ibid: 23). This can be questioned, and I am sympathetic to the contrary view that any 
cluster of causal powers can be taken to correspond to a property. After all, this property P 
in question is the property of having a property that corresponds to a certain set of causal 
powers. Such correspondence can be spelt out in different ways. For example, it could be 
the property of conferring all (but not only) the causal powers in that set. This property 
does not have to be a sparse or a natural property. So, at best, we should take Shoemaker to 
be saying that property in question is not sparse or natural enough to count as a genuine 
property. If it is not a genuine property, the purported conjunctive property is not a genuine 
conjunctive property, because it includes a non-genuine property as a conjunct.  
But, why is this property not sparse or natural enough? In order to understand this, we will 
have to study Shoemaker‟s metaphysics in some detail. Here is a condition that Shoemaker 
stipulates about properties and causal powers: 
[causal] powers X and Y are bestowed by the same property if and only if it is 
a consequence of the causal laws that either (1) whatever has either of them has 
the other, or (2) there is some third ... [causal] power such that whatever has it 
has both X and Y (2007: 25). 
Let us call this condition the unity condition for powers. Now think of a property F with 
the set of causal powers A. F confers all and only causal powers in A just in case every pair 
of causal powers in A satisfies the unity condition for powers. This follows from how the 
unity condition for powers is formulated: take a set causal powers; if it is true that every 
pair in this set satisfies this condition, and then any bearer of any of these powers will also 
be the bearer of all and only powers in this set, which means that, if there is a property that 
corresponds to this set, then that property confers all and only powers in that set. The next 
step has to be the stipulation that a putative property with a given set of causal powers is 
genuinely a property only if every pair in that set satisfies the unity condition for powers. If 
every pair of causal powers in a set satisfies this condition, the set in question can be said 
to be “closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment” (ibid: 26). So, if a set of causal 
powers is not closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment, according to these 
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stipulations, there is no genuine (or sparse, or natural enough) property that corresponds to 
that set. 
Let me explain the idea in the previous paragraph through an illustration. Take a set of 
causal powers {cp1, cp2, cp3}. If it is possible, for example, that an entity has the causal 
powers cp1 and cp2 without thereby having cp3 (and there are no causal powers x and y 
such that having x entails having cp1 and cp3, and having y entails having cp2 and cp3), 
then {cp1, cp2, cp3} is not closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment. And by 
stipulation, there is no property that corresponds to the set {cp1, cp2, cp3} in a genuine-
property-making way. (Genuine-property-making is a relation between a set of causal 
powers and a genuine property such that the property has all and only causal powers in the 
given set.) Another example: take a set of causal powers {cp4, cp5, cp6}; if it is (either 
nomologically or metaphysically) necessary that whatever has the causal power cp4 has 
also the causal power cp7, which is a power that is not a member of the set in question, 
then {cp4, cp5, cp6} is not closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment. In that case, 
there is no property that corresponds to this set in a genuine-property-making way.  
A putative property F corresponds to a set of causal powers A in a genuine-property-
making sense only if F confers all and only causal powers in A as a matter of nomic or 
metaphysical necessity. Based on the illustrations in the previous two paragraphs, {cp1, 
cp2, cp3} and {cp4, cp5, cp6} are not genuine-property-making sets. The former is not, 
because cp3 is (nomically or metaphysically) independent from cp1 and cp2 so that the 
conferment of cp1 and cp2 does not necessitate (nomically or metaphysically) the 
conferment of cp3. The latter set is not a genuine-property-making set, because the 
conferment of some of the causal powers in that set necessitates (nomically or 
metaphysically) the conferment of cp7, which is not in that set. 
Obviously, these stipulations rule out conjunctive properties as real properties from the 
outset. Take a conjunctive property (F & F*). If F is a genuine property, it should conform 
to the aforementioned criterion. So should F*. But if both F and F* conform to this 
criterion, then the conjunctive property (F & F*) does not. Because if F can be instantiated 
without F*, then it is not true that the causal powers of (F & F*) are necessarily (in a 
nomic or metaphysical sense) conferred together. That no conjunctive property counts as a 
genuine property is not acceptable (unless one is a denier of conjunctive properties for 
other reasons). Shoemaker is aware of this problem and says that “we can give this as an 
145 
 
 
account of what it is for there to be a basic, nonconjunctive property that bestows all and 
only the ... [causal] powers in a set” (ibid: 25). 
What is important for Shoemaker‟s argument is that, if he is right (or rather, if we agree 
with his stipulations), then the putative conjunctive property (having pain & P) is not a 
conjunctive property, because P does not correspond to a set which is closed under nomic 
and metaphysical entailment. So, having C-fibre stimulation cannot be identified with a 
conjunctive property that includes having pain as a conjunct. But, why, according to 
Shoemaker, is P not a property in his restricted sense of the term “property”? 
The main reason that P fails to be a genuine property in the relevant sense is that the set 
that is supposed to be the genuine-property-making set of P has members whose 
conferment entails the conferment of causal powers that are not members of this set. Let us 
see why this is the case through an example. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that 
the causal powers of having pain are crying and wincing so that, necessarily, anything that 
has this property is disposed to cry and wince. Having C-fibre stimulation has these two 
causal powers as well, but it has additional causal powers that other realizers of having 
pain do not have. Some of these powers are related to the fact that the bearer of this 
property is a human being.
63
 Think of the causal power of crying like a human being. 
Necessarily, any individual that has C-fibre stimulation is disposed to cry like a human 
being, because any such individual will be a human being and will have pain. So, crying 
like a human being is a causal power of having C-fibre stimulation, and it is not a causal 
power of having pain. What follows from this is that this causal power is a member of the 
set that corresponds to the putative property P. Now consider that, necessarily, any 
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 I assume, for the sake of this argument, that having C-fibre stimulation can be instantiated only in human 
beings. If this is found problematic, as it should be, because it is too simplistic, then the example could be 
modified so as to change having C-fibre stimulation with a determinate of having C-fibre stimulation that 
can be instantiated only in human beings. 
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individual that is disposed to cry like a human being is disposed to cry simpliciter. But 
crying is not a causal power of P. It is a causal power of having pain. So, bearers of P have 
some causal powers that are not in the set that P is supposed to correspond to. If 
Shoemaker is right, then this disqualifies P as a genuine property. If P is not a property, 
then (having pain & P) is not a conjunctive property.  
Recall that the second horn of the dilemma says that if conjunctive properties cannot 
realize their conjuncts, then no property realizes any other property. The reason for this is 
that all realizers are conjunctive properties that include realized properties as conjuncts. 
Then, Shoemaker‟s response to this is that this conditional is not true, as the putative 
conjunctive properties in question include non-genuine properties as conjuncts, hence they 
are not genuine conjunctive properties. Therefore, the second horn of the dilemma fails to 
be problematic. 
 
Fig 2: Scarlet as a conjunctive property 
Another example (which is actually Shoemaker‟s working example throughout his 
discussion of this issue) is the realization of being red by being scarlet (ibid: 24-28). (See 
Figure 2 above to follow the formalism.) The same point can be illustrated by means of 
this example. Being scarlet is putatively identical with the conjunctive property (being red 
& Q) where Q is the property that confers the causal powers that being red does not. For 
the reasons given above, Shoemaker thinks that there is no such property as Q, because 
some of the causal powers that Q confers entail the conferment of the causal powers of 
being red. Think of a pigeon, Alice, who is trained to peck at all and only scarlet things. In 
this case, eliciting pecking behaviour in pigeons like Alice is a causal power that being 
scarlet has but being red does not have, because there could be other pigeons that peck at 
other shades of red but not at scarlet. So, eliciting pecking behaviour in pigeons like Alice 
is a causal power of Q. But this is not a causal power that can be exercised without the 
exercising of some causal powers that being red has. The conferment of these powers 
entails the conferment of some powers of being red. One such causal power is eliciting 
pecking behaviour at pigeons that are trained to peck at red things. 
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Do these illustrations really show that realizer properties are not identical with conjunctive 
properties that include the realized properties as conjuncts? It is true that (in the case of 
having C-fibre stimulation) there is no property that confers all and only the causal powers 
that are in the set of causal powers of having C-fibre stimulation but are not in the set of 
causal powers of having pain, because the set in question is not closed under nomic and 
metaphysical entailment. As Shoemaker maintains, there are some causal powers in that set 
whose conferment necessitates the conferment of causal powers that are not in that set. 
(And mutatis mutandis for all cases of realization.) But why should we stipulate that there 
is no property that corresponds to the set in question in a slightly different way? I suggest 
that one can reject Shoemaker‟s criterion for being a genuine property, and hold that some 
properties may correspond to some sets of causal powers which are not closed under nomic 
and metaphysical entailment. For example, a property can correspond to a set of causal 
powers in a way that it confers on its bearers all causal powers in that set, and powers 
beyond that set insofar as such powers are necessitated by the powers in the set. One might 
have worries about the sparseness (or the naturalness) of this property, but that is an 
independent issue. 
If I am right, then having C-fibre stimulation is identical with the conjunctive property of 
(having pain & P), where P is the property that corresponds to the set of causal powers in 
question in this specific way. This set consists of the causal powers that C-fibre stimulation 
confers but having pain does not confer; and the correspondence relation in question is not 
conferring all and only causal powers in that set. Instead, it is the relation of conferring all 
but not only causal powers in that set. 
In this section, I evaluated Shoemaker‟s first response to the dilemma that I have 
articulated in 6.1. Shoemaker‟s argument relies on his understanding of properties 
according to which a property corresponds to a set of causal powers only if that set is 
closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment. I suggested that we can work with a 
more liberal understanding of properties according to which some properties can 
correspond to sets of causal powers in a different way. That makes room for seeing realizer 
properties as conjunctive properties that include the realized properties as conjuncts. In the 
next section, I will explain how Shoemaker subsequently endorses this possibility and 
responds to this version of the problem. 
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6.3 Narrowing Powers 
In the previous section, I showed that Shoemaker‟s first attempt to rule out the possibility 
of realizers having realized properties as their conjuncts can be said to fail, given an 
understanding of properties according to which properties can correspond to sets of causal 
powers that are not closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment. According to this 
understanding, it is inevitable that being scarlet, for example, includes being red as a 
conjunct (alongside the other conjunct Q). Shoemaker (2007: 27-28) subsequently grants 
that this might be the case, and proposes a criterion according to which only some 
conjunctive properties count as realizers of only some of their conjuncts. In this section, I 
will introduce and reject Shoemaker‟s criterion. 
Take set A to be the set of causal powers of being scarlet. (See Figure 2 above.) Take set B 
to be the set of causal powers of being red. B is a proper subset of A. The discussion of the 
previous section mainly focused on the question whether there is any property that 
corresponds to the remainder set of A after B. Let us call this set C. As I have explained, 
Shoemaker argues that there is no property that confers all and only the causal powers in 
set C, because C is not closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment. The reason for 
this is that there are causal powers in C whose conferment entails the conferment of causal 
powers that are not in C. I have argued that this does not mean that there is no property that 
corresponds to C in a more specific way. If there is such a property, call it Q, then being 
scarlet can be identified with the conjunctive property of (being red & Q).  
Shoemaker (ibid: 27-29) considers a possibility along the lines of this. He thinks that if this 
specific way of corresponding to a set of causal powers can be articulated properly, we can 
make an exception for some conjunctive properties to realize some, but not all, of their 
conjuncts. Now, the task is to see how this specific way can be articulated. If we are 
successful in doing this, then we will have a response to the dilemma I introduced in 6.1. 
The dilemma that I considered showed that (1) if the subset view allows all conjunctive 
properties to realize all of their conjuncts, the view overgeneralises. On the other hand, (2) 
if conjunctive properties cannot realize their conjuncts, then no property realizes any 
property. If we can find a principled way of showing that there are exceptions to the rule 
that conjunctive properties cannot realize their conjuncts, then we can show that the 
dilemma that we considered is a false one. I think this is the right response to the dilemma. 
As I will argue in Section 6.4, according to one conception of properties, all realizer 
properties are conjunctive properties that include the realized properties as their conjuncts, 
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but not all conjunctive properties realize their conjuncts. But let me first introduce how 
Shoemaker follows a structurally similar line of reasoning. 
Shoemaker grants the possibility that being scarlet might be identified with the conjunctive 
property (being red & Q), and says that 
the subset view needs to be formulated in such a way that it is not true in 
general that conjunctive properties are realizers of, and determinates of, their 
conjuncts. But as we just saw, the formulation must not be such as to imply 
that no conjunctive property can be a realizer of one of its conjuncts … What 
we want to rule out is, for example, that the property of being red and square 
should count as a realizer of the property of being red, or of the property of 
being square (ibid: 27, formatting changed). 
So, we need a criterion that tells us which conjunctive realizers are good, and which ones 
are bad. To do this, we will have to pay attention to what kind of a property Q is, and in 
what way it is related to being red. It should be a different kind of property than being 
square, and its relation to being red should be different than the relation between being 
square and being red. 
Remember that Q is a property that corresponds to a set of causal powers which is not 
closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment. The set of causal powers that it 
corresponds to (in the way to be specified above) has some members, such as the power of 
eliciting pecking behaviour at pigeons like Alice and eliciting experience with the 
phenomenal character PC in human beings.
64
 What is interesting about these causal 
powers is that they cannot be conferred unless some of the causal powers of being red are 
conferred. Such powers are, respectively, eliciting pecking behaviour at pigeons and 
eliciting experience with a reddish phenomenal character in human beings.
65
 But note that 
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 These examples are from Shoemaker (ibid). 
65
 This phenomenal character would be the normal phenomenal character that an experience of a typical 
human being has when she looks at something red. 
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eliciting pecking behaviour at pigeons is a determinable power of eliciting pecking 
behaviour at pigeons like Alice, and that eliciting experience with a reddish phenomenal 
character in human beings is a determinable power of eliciting experience with the 
phenomenal character PC in human beings. So, the relationship between Q and being red 
is such that some powers that belong to the former are determinates of the powers that 
belong to the latter. In fact, the reason that C fails to be closed under nomic and 
metaphysical entailment is that there are determinate-determinable relationships between 
the causal powers in the set C and some powers of being red. 
Q is a property such that its instantiation determines (in the determinate-determinable 
relation‟s sense) the causal powers of being red. Q is a property that cannot be instantiated 
unless some of the powers of being red are conferred to its bearer. The relation that is 
specified here (namely the relation that obtains between Q and the powers of being red), 
according to Shoemaker, is asymmetric. Being red does not have causal powers that 
determine the causal powers of Q. This, of course, is a consequence of the fact that the set 
of causal powers of being red is closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment, because 
being red is a genuine property in Shoemaker‟s restricted sense: since the set in question is 
closed under nomic and metaphysical entailment, its powers will not entail the conferment 
of powers beyond this set, and hence, the said relationship that obtains between Q and 
being red will be asymmetric. 
Note that this specific relation does not obtain between being square and being red. The 
causal powers of being red do not determine the causal powers of being square and vice 
versa. This is because both properties have causal powers that form sets that are closed 
under nomic and metaphysical entailment. That is, being red confers all and only causal 
powers in its set, and being square confers all and only causal powers in its set. The 
conferment of the causal powers of one of these two properties does not entail the 
conferment of the causal powers of the other. Can we articulate what is important about 
this difference between the two cases so as to provide a principled way of demarcating 
between bad cases of conjunctive realizers and good cases of conjunctive realizers? 
Shoemaker thinks that we can; as I will explain shortly, I am sceptical that we can. 
Shoemaker tries to articulate a principled way as follows: 
I think, then, that a conjunctive property counts as a realizer of one of its 
conjuncts only when there is such an asymmetrical relation between the 
conjuncts, one of them being such that its instantiation narrows the way the 
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determinable powers bestowed by the other (the one that is realized) can be 
exercised (ibid: 28). 
Let us see how some of the cases are handled by this criterion:  
 The conjunctive property (being red & Q), which is identical with being scarlet, counts 
as a realizer of being red because Q’s instantiation narrows the ways the determinable 
powers of being red are exercised. When I see a scarlet tablecloth, the tablecloth does 
not only cause me to have an experience with a reddish phenomenal character, it causes 
me to have an experience with the phenomenal character PC. 
 The conjunctive property (being red & Q), which is identical with being scarlet, does 
not count as a realizer of Q, because being red does not narrow the ways the powers of 
Q are exercised. This is evident from the fact that the relation that is specified is 
asymmetric and that (being red & Q) counts as a realizer of being red. 
 The conjunctive property (having pain & P), which is identical with having C-fibre 
stimulation, counts as a realizer of having pain because P’s instantiation narrows the 
ways the determinable powers of having pain are exercised. 
 The conjunctive property (having pain & P), which is identical with having C-fibre 
stimulation, does not count as a realizer of P because having pain does not narrow the 
ways the powers of P are exercised. 
 The conjunctive property (being red & being square) does not count as a realizer of 
being red, or being square. Both conjuncts have sets of powers that are closed under 
nomic and metaphysical entailment, so the specified asymmetric determination relation 
between their powers does not obtain: the powers of being red do not entail the 
conferment of powers beyond being red‟s set of causal powers; and the powers of 
being square do not entail the conferment of powers beyond being square‟s set of 
causal powers. 
This might make it look as if we have a good principled way of demarcating between good 
and bad cases of conjunctive realization. However, the problem with this solution becomes 
evident if one adds this restriction to the definition of realization. With this restriction, this 
version of the subset view defines realization as follows: 
(Realization-Narrow) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal 
powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) if P is a conjunctive 
property that is constituted by Q and another property Q* as conjuncts, then there is a 
relation between Q and Q* such that (a) the bestowment of some of the causal 
152 
 
powers of Q* narrows the ways some determinable causal powers of Q can be 
exercised, and (b) it is not the case that the bestowment of some of the causal powers 
of Q narrows the ways some determinable causal powers of Q* can be exercised.
66
 
But, what is this relation of narrowing the ways the causal powers of a property can be 
exercised exactly? It seems to be the same relation as the determinate-determinable 
property relation. When we say that the bestowment of the causal powers of G* narrow the 
ways the causal powers of G can be exercised, in effect, we are saying that some causal 
powers of G are determinables of the causal powers of G*. 
Now, and this is the crux of my response to Shoemaker‟s solution, recall that the 
determinate-determinable property relation is a species of the realization relation, at least, 
according to the subset view. In fact, as I have argued in Chapter 3, if the subset view is 
true, all determinable properties are realized by their determinates in the same way that 
mental properties are realized by their physical bases. This means that the realization 
relation between properties is defined in Realization-Narrow partly in terms of a 
realization relation between causal powers. In order to see what is at stake, let us substitute 
the term “narrows the ways ...” with “realizes” (with appropriate grammatical alterations): 
(Realization-Narrow*) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal 
powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) if P is a conjunctive 
property that is constituted by Q and another property Q* as a conjunct, then there is 
a relation between Q and Q* such that (a) some causal powers of Q* realize some 
causal powers of Q and (b) it is not the case that some causal powers of Q realize 
some causal powers of Q*. 
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 The addition of (b) is required to specify that the emphasised relationship between the two conjuncts is 
asymmetric.  
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This formulation of realization is not very helpful: it explains the realization relation 
between properties in terms of a realization relation between the causal powers of these 
properties. As I shall show in the next section, I think we can do better than this and 
provide a better way of demarcating between the good cases and the bad cases of 
conjunctive realizers.  
6.4 Fundamentality  
I think that I showed in the previous section that Shoemaker‟s way of demarcating between 
bad and good cases of conjunctive realizers is not desirable because realization ends up 
being formulated in terms of another realization relation. It invokes the notion of 
“narrowing down”, which is supposed to correspond to the realization relation according to 
the subset view. In this section, I propose a way of solving the problem of conjunctive 
realizers without adding a constraint on conjunctive properties as realizers. I think we 
should stipulate that what counts as a realizer of a property must always be more 
fundamental than the realized property. I will elaborate on fundamentality below, but let 
me first introduce the new formulation of realization according to this proposal: 
(Realization-Prior) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal 
powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) P is a more 
fundamental property than Q. 
Let us, for the time being, assume that we have a working understanding of what it means 
to be a more fundamental property than another property, and see how this formulation can 
demarcate between good and bad cases of conjunctive realizers. It should be noted that I 
take fundamentality to come in degrees. This is an assumption that I will discuss in more 
detail shortly. I am not going to provide an analysis of relative fundamentality; that is, I am 
not going to attempt to explain what it is for one thing to be more, or less, fundamental 
than some other thing. As I will discuss in what follows, there are some particular cases 
where philosophers have some intuitions as to what things are more fundamental than 
other things. For example, according to physicalists, mental properties are not more 
fundamental than physical properties. 
Before showing how this formulation will be helpful in solving the problem, let me say 
something about the addition of (ii). I am not the first person to suggest that a necessary 
condition on realization is that the realized property is less fundamental than the realizer 
property. By and large, dependence relations are taken to be priority relations, whereby a 
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dependent entity is less fundamental than its dependence base. Bennett (2011; forthcoming) 
has recently argued that priority (or “directionality” according to her terminology), is a 
feature of all “building” relations. Bennett‟s building relations are: 
 composition (the mereological relation whereby parts compose wholes67);  
 truth-making (namely the relation by which a true proposition is made true by the 
obtaining of a state of affairs);  
 grounding (in the sense in which some facts are grounded in, or obtain in virtue of, 
other facts); 
 structure-making (in Armstrong‟s (1986) sense where a state of affairs is made of up of 
particulars and universals); 
 bundling (as in the relation whereby objects are thought to be made up of tropes68); 
 emergence69; 
 and realization. (According to Bennett‟s use of the term “realization” all types of 
realization that I discussed in Chapter 3 are species of realization.) 
The list that Bennett provides may or may not be accurate, but I follow the spirit of her 
proposal in the sense that I think that we should take realization as a priority relation.  
One might (mistakenly) think that the addition of (ii) is superfluous because it is covered 
by (i) already. But it would be wrong to think so, and the reason for this is the crux of the 
argument of this section. Any conjunctive property has a set of causal powers whose 
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 Though, see Schaffer‟s (2010) disagreement about the direction of priority in part-whole relations. 
68
 Though, if tropes are (mereological) parts of the particulars that they make up as in Paul‟s (2002) sense, 
bundling is a form of composition. 
69
 Bennett is wrong in putting emergence in this list of building relations for the simple reason that those who 
take emergence as the relation between mental properties and their bases, namely emergentists, take 
mental properties to be as fundamental as physical properties. See Barnes (2012) for a discussion. 
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proper subsets correspond to the causal powers of its conjuncts, but, not every conjunctive 
property is more fundamental than each of its conjuncts. 
Realization-Prior as formulated above does not have a condition which explicitly bans 
(some) conjunctive properties as realizers, but it will help us rule out some, namely the bad, 
cases of conjunctive properties as realizers of their conjuncts. Recall that I argued that 
being scarlet is the conjunctive property of (being red & Q). What is crucial for the 
illustration of how my proposal solves the problem of conjunctive realizers is that the three 
properties in question, namely being scarlet, being red, and Q, are not properties at the 
same level of fundamentality.
70
 It is not too controversial (insofar as we grant that 
fundamentality comes in degrees) that being scarlet is more fundamental than being red, at 
least for those who think that (i) grounding is a priority relation, and (ii) the fact that 
something is scarlet grounds the fact that it is red. A similar ranking can be made for the 
properties having C-fibre stimulation and having pain: having C-fibre stimulation is more 
fundamental than having pain.  
Having provided the ranking of fundamentality of these properties, now we can see what 
cases of conjunctive realizers are allowed and what cases are excluded by Realization-
Prior: 
 The conjunctive property (being red & Q), which is identical with being scarlet counts 
as a realizer of being red. The proper subset relation between two properties obtains, 
and the latter is a less fundamental property than the former. 
 If Q is as fundamental as, or more fundamental than, being scarlet, then Q will not be 
realized by being scarlet. If it is less fundamental than being scarlet, then being scarlet 
will count as a realizer of Q.  
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 Again, I am assuming that there is such a property Q that is non-identical with being scarlet. This is an 
assumption that should not go unacknowledged.  
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 The conjunctive property (having pain & P), which is identical with having C-fibre 
stimulation, counts as a realizer of having pain. The proper subset relation between two 
properties obtains, and the latter is a less fundamental property than the former. 
 If P is as fundamental as, or more fundamental than, having C-fibre stimulation, then P 
will not be realized by having C-fibre stimulation. If it is less fundamental than having 
C-fibre stimulation, then having C-fibre stimulation will count as a realizer of P. 
 The conjunctive property (being red & being square) does not count as a realizer of 
being red. The proper subset relation obtains but there is presumably no difference in 
the degrees of fundamentality of these properties.
71
 
Note that, on my view, anti-physicalists, at least the ones who think that mental properties 
are as fundamental as physical properties, cannot say that mental properties are realized by 
physical properties. I do not think that this is a disadvantage for my view. Different views 
regarding the mind-body problem are individuated by the relations they posit to obtain 
between mental properties and physical properties. As I suggested in Chapter 1, saying that 
this relation is realization is sufficient for being a physicalist. So, anti-physicalists should 
not say that mental properties are realized by physical properties. (Of course, they are free 
to say that determinable properties are realized by their determinates.)  
So far, I have not provided an account of what it is to be a (relatively) fundamental 
property. But I do not think that it is necessary to do so. There are some fairly agreed upon 
intuitions about fundamentality (at least among physicalists), and we can use these 
intuitions in these cases. In other cases where there are no agreements, then there will be 
less agreement on whether there is realization or not. But what I need for my solution is 
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 If I am wrong about this, according to Realization-Prior, then (being red & being square) would realize 
being red. If I am wrong about this, and if Realization-Prior is correct, then Shoemaker would be wrong in 
thinking that (being red & being square) does not realize being red. 
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that our intuitions about fundamentality should ideally coincide with our intuitions about 
whether there is realization or not.  
We have the intuition that macro entities, such as tables, chairs, cities, planets, galaxies and 
so on, are not as fundamental as micro entities that ultimately compose those macro 
entities. Speaking of composition, in fact, mereological relations are paradigm cases where 
questions about fundamentality are (almost) uncontroversial. It is natural to think that 
mereologically simple (or simpler) entities are more fundamental than the (complex) 
entities that they compose.
72
 There is an intuitive sense in which wholes are “nothing over 
and above” their parts. Unless one allows for the possibility of emergent properties (that I 
have discussed in Chapter 1), the properties of wholes are, again in this sense of the term, 
“nothing over and above” the properties of (and the relations between) their parts. A 
paradigmatic example of a claim about fundamentality is Lewis‟s (1986) thesis of Humean 
supervenience (see Chapter 4 above). According to this thesis, what ultimately exist are the 
bits of space-time, their properties and their arrangement; all else (including laws of nature) 
supervene on this array. On this view, then, the array of space-time would be (more) 
fundamental, and all else would be less fundamental. So, macro entities, properties of such 
entities, and the laws of nature, would be “nothing over and above” this fundamental 
structure of space-time. Although we do not have to agree with Lewis on the thesis of 
Humean supervenience, it is easy to understand this thesis in terms of fundamentality. So, I 
think that, in general, we can understand this “nothing over and above” locution in terms of 
a matter of fundamentality to the effect that if an entity (a property or an object) X is 
“nothing over and above” an entity (a property or an object) Y, X is not as fundamental as 
Y (unless X is identical with Y). 
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 Yet, it is only almost uncontroversial that this is so. Schaffer (2010) thinks that what he calls the „One‟, 
namely the whole universe, is ontologically prior to its parts. I will not be critically engaged with 
Schaffer‟s account. 
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So far I have been working with the assumption that fundamentality comes in degrees, and 
I have no intention to dispense with this assumption. However, it is worth noting that what 
might be called the graded model of fundamentality, or the “layered model of reality” as 
Kim (1998: 15) calls it, is not the only (meta-)ontological framework that talks about 
fundamentality. Just to mention a couple, Barnes (2012) and Cameron (2010) provide a 
meta-ontological framework according to which the talk of “fundamentality” should not be 
understood in terms of degrees. Let us call this model the non-graded model of 
fundamentality. According to this view, “things are either fundamental or they are not, in 
which case they are derivative. Fundamentality does not come in degrees” (Barnes 2012: 
876).  
On Cameron‟s (2010) version of the non-graded model, the task of ontology is to 
distinguish what “really” exists from what “merely” exists. He thinks that the English verb 
“exists” does not “carve the world at its quantificational joints” (ibid). This is because 
“exists” can be truly predicated of both fundamental entities and non-fundamental entities. 
(Similarly, “is instantiated” can be truly predicated of both fundamental properties and 
non-fundamental properties.)   On this view, what is not fundamental is simply derivative, 
and cannot be said to really exist, where “really exists” is a verb that is supposed to carve 
the world at its quantificational joints.  
It is not my task here to argue against the non-graded model, but it is important to note that, 
in order for my proposal for formulating realization to work and capture the cases where I 
think there is realization, the graded model has to be true. It is essential for my proposal 
that properties come in different degrees of fundamentality, so that a realizer property F is 
more fundamental than a property G that it realizes. Moreover, if F realizes G, and if G 
realizes H, then the difference between the fundamentality degrees of F and H is greater 
than the difference between the fundamentality degrees of F and G. 
Although I have not argued for the graded model of fundamentality, I should briefly note 
that it is not an ad hoc move to endorse it. The questions related to physicalism are usually 
framed in terms of an understanding of a world with different levels. Kim describes this 
“multi-layered” understanding of the world as follows:  
the world is stratified into different “levels,” “orders,” or “tiers” organized in a 
hierarchical structure. The bottom level is usually thought to consist of 
elementary particles, or whatever our best physics is going tell us are the basic 
bits of matter out of which all material things are composed. As we go up the 
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ladder, we successively encounter atoms, molecules, cells, larger living 
organisms, and so on (1998: 15).  
This multi-layered picture of the world is shared by most of the participants in the debate 
that I am engaged in. For example, think of Gillett‟s (2002: 2003) dimensioned view of 
realization, or Shoemaker‟s (2003; 2007) account of micro-realization, both discussed in 
Chapter 3. Such relations are all formulated against the background of a layered 
understanding of the world. It is one those theoretical commitments one has to make in 
order to proceed. So I do not feel the burden of demonstrating the accuracy of this model. 
What is true is that the priority feature of realization is compatible with this model, and is 
not compatible with the non-graded model. 
If my observations are correct and my proposal is to be taken seriously, it follows that, in 
my conception of properties, all cases of realization are such that the realizer property is 
identical with a conjunctive property that includes the realized property as a conjunct. But 
it is not the case that all conjunctive properties are realizers of all of their conjuncts. A 
conjunctive property counts as a realizer of a conjunct only if the former is a more 
fundamental property than the latter.  
Before moving to the next section, I want to briefly mention an interesting result of the 
considerations of this section. I have mentioned (in 6.1) above that it is customary to think 
that a species property is the conjunction of a genus property and a differentia property 
(Rosen 2010). Being human is the conjunctive property of (being animal & being rational), 
for example. Does being human realize being animal (or being rational)? The proper 
subset relation between the putative realizer and the putative realized properties obtains. 
The causal powers of being human include the causal powers of being animal as a proper 
subset (and the causal powers of being rational as another proper subset). But do we have 
difference in fundamentality in the relevant sense in any of these cases? That is, is any of 
these conjuncts (being animal or being rational) less fundamental than the conjunctive 
property (being animal & being rational)? It is very hard to answer this question, but what 
I can say is that even if there is priority in this specific sense, it is not obvious. If I am 
allowed to infer from not-obvious to presumably-false, and generalise this intuition to all 
cases of the genus-species relation, I would say that, as a rule of thumb, genus properties 
(and differentia properties) are not realized by species properties. If I am not allowed to 
make these inferences, then I am happy to suspend judgment on this matter. 
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Before closing this section, I shall briefly consider and respond to a possible objection. The 
objection goes as follows: (i) parts are more fundamental than the wholes they compose; (ii) 
on my version of the subset view, a realizer property includes the realized property as a 
conjunct; (iii) conjunctive properties include their conjuncts as their parts; (iv) so a 
conjunct is more fundamental than the conjunction it belongs to; (v) so, on my version of 
the subset view, a realized property is more fundamental than its realizers; (iv) but realized 
properties are not more fundamental than their realizers; (v) therefore, my version of the 
subset view is false. The short answer to this objection is that the premise (iii) can be 
resisted. Nothing that my version of the subset view says is committed to the claim that 
conjunctive properties are mereological wholes that are composed of their conjuncts as 
their parts.  
In this section, I argued that realization should be formulated as it is in Realization-Prior 
so that the realized property is always less fundamental than the realizing property. I 
argued that this helps us distinguish the bad cases of conjunctive realizers from the good 
cases.  
6.5 The Explanation Link  
I believe that I showed that my formulation of realization which imposes priority (of the 
more fundamental compared to the less fundamental) as a constraint is good enough to 
cover the good cases (namely the ones where we intuitively think that there is a realization 
relation) and to exclude the bad cases (namely the ones where we intuitively do not think 
that there is a realization relation) that we have covered so far. In this section, I want to 
consider some cases which are possibly problematic for my formulation. If these cases are 
not really problematic, my formulation that I gave in the previous section stands. But I will 
take this possibility seriously, and provide an alternative version of my formulation. 
Again, consider the conjunctive property of (having pain & P), which is identical with 
having C-fibre stimulation. According to Realization-Prior, since having C-fibre 
stimulation is more fundamental than having pain, and since the proper subset relation 
obtains between the causal powers of these properties, C-fibre stimulation  counts as a 
realizer of having pain. And I suggested that the conjunctive property of (being red & 
being square) presumably does not count as a realizer of any of its conjuncts, because there 
is no difference in fundamentality as required by Realization-Prior. 
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However, it seems possible to generate counterexamples to Realization-Prior in the 
following way. Take a non-fundamental property P and a fundamental property Q. (Or 
take P to be less fundamental than Q). The causal powers of P will automatically be a 
proper subset of the causal powers of the conjunctive property (P & Q). Does (P & Q) 
realize P regardless of what these properties are? An apparent example for this would be 
the one where we substitute P with believing that it is raining, and Q with a neural 
property which has nothing to do with beliefs, say having C-fibre stimulation. 
If it is the case that the conjunctive property of (believing that it is raining & having C-
fibre stimulation) is more fundamental than believing that it is raining, then it would also 
be the case that the conjunctive property in question is a realizer of believing that it is 
raining. Depending on the truth of the antecedent, this would be a fairly problematic 
objection to my proposal. The point could easily generalise, and my formulation might end 
up allowing a bunch of bad cases of realization. 
It is possible to respond to this objection by saying the antecedent is false. That is, it is not 
the case that the conjunctive property of (believing that it is raining & having C-fibre 
stimulation) is more fundamental than believing that it is raining. The fact that there is no 
interesting connection between the two conjuncts, namely believing that it is raining and 
having C-fibre stimulation, works in the favour of this response. After all, how can 
arbitrary conjunctions of unconnected properties be (relatively) fundamental properties? At 
any rate, the following principle strikes me as a wrong one:  
(The Wrong Principle) For all properties F and G, if F is more fundamental than G, 
the conjunctive property (F & G) is more fundamental than G.   
If the Wrong Principle were true, it would be very easy to generate new (relatively) 
fundamental properties. We could take a (relatively) fundamental property, conjoin it with 
a non-fundamental property, and if the principle that is considered were true, the 
conjunction would yield a (relatively) fundamental property. But this does not seem to be 
the case. 
To fix ideas, think of the disjunctive property of (having a mass of ~1.67 x 10
-27
 kg and 
being observed before 2050) or (not having a mass of ~1.67 x 10
-27
 kg and being observed 
after 2050). For convenience, let us call this property being hydrogrue. All hydrogen atoms 
that are observed before 2050 are hydrogrue; but no hydrogen atom that is observed after 
2050 is hydrogrue. So, like Goodman‟s (1955) “is grue”, “is hydrogrue” is an unprojectible 
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predicate. If that is the case, being hydrogrue is not a fundamental property which “carves 
nature at its joints”. However, being hydrogrue can be co-instantiated with relatively 
fundamental properties, such as being a hydrogen atom. (This conjunction is possible until 
2050.) But is the conjunctive property of (being hydrogrue & being a hydrogen atom) a 
relatively fundamental property? Or is it more fundamental than being hydrogrue? I think 
that both questions should be answered negatively. In this particular example, the 
conjunctive property in question seems to inherit its non-fundamentality from its non-
fundamental conjunct. If this observation is accurate, the Wrong Principle is false.  
If the Wrong Principle is false, then nothing (that I am aware of) guarantees that the 
conjunctive property (believing that it is raining & having C-fibre stimulation) is a more 
fundamental property than believing that it is raining. So, nothing (that I am aware of) 
guarantees that my proposal of realization in terms of priority is in trouble. 
However, I shall not be too confident, and grant the possibility of such problematic cases 
for my proposal. So let us take the possibility of such cases seriously, and make an 
amendment to Realization-Prior to the effect that it also rules out the considered bad case:  
(Realization-Prior-Connectional) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) 
the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) P is more 
fundamental than Q; (iii) P and Q are “interestingly connected”.  
The phrase “interestingly connected” in (iii) is deliberately left unclear; I shall pursue how 
we should understand this interesting connection shortly. What is problematic about the 
putative realization of believing that it is raining by the conjunctive property (believing 
that it is raining & having C-fibre stimulation) is that there is no connection between these 
two properties apart from the conjunct-conjunction relation (and the inevitable 
consequences of this relation). The gist of the objection against my proposal based on this 
putative case of realization is the intuitive unconnectedness of believing that it is raining 
and having C-fibre stimulation. And because of this unconnectedness, there is the absence 
of the “interesting connection” between believing that it is raining on the one hand, and 
(believing that it is raining & having C-fibre stimulation) on the other hand. A 
straightforward way of fixing this problem would be to add (iii) to the formulation of 
realization, and the problem is fixed.  
However, in what sense can the required “interesting connection” be explained? What is 
the “interesting connection” between having pain and having C-fibre stimulation which is 
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missing in the case that is in consideration here? What connection are we looking for? I 
can think of two options for cashing out the “interesting connection” in question. The first 
option will not be desirable for reasons to be explained. Hopefully, the second one will 
work. I shall discuss these in 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 respectively. 
6.5.1 Minimal Base  
Can the interesting connection in question be some sort of dependence? In other words, 
can we formulate realization along the lines of the following?  
(Realization-Prior-Minimal) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the 
causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) P is more 
fundamental than Q; (iii) P is a minimal base for Q.  
For all properties F and G, G is a minimal base for F just in case something‟s being G is 
sufficient for its being F, and “nothing less than” G would be sufficient for F‟s 
instantiation in this case. That is, G cannot be identified with a conjunctive property whose 
conjuncts include a property that does not make any difference with respect to whether F is 
instantiated or not. So, (believing that it is raining & having C-fibre stimulation) does not 
realize believing that it is raining because something less than (believing that it is raining 
& having C-fibre stimulation) would have realized believing that it is raining. 
Although it looks like we can use Realization-Prior-Minimal to rule out the bad case 
considered, there are some reasons to resist the addition of (iii). First, it makes the appeal 
to priority mentioned in (ii) redundant. We can use something along the lines of the 
following to rule out the bad cases that priority helped us to: 
(Realization-Minimal) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal 
powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) P is a minimal base 
for Q. 
The conjunctive property (being red & being square) does not count as a realizer of being 
red, because something “less than” this conjunctive property, such as being scarlet, would 
have realized being red. (Though, we could still impose priority for independent reasons 
that I have introduced in 6.4.) 
Second, and this is more important than the first reason, Realization-Prior-Minimal and 
Realization-Minimal jeopardise the inclusion of some good cases. Think of having pain. 
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Perhaps, in a possible world other than the actual world, where the laws of nature are only 
slightly different, something “less than” having C-fibre stimulation realizes pain. Or more 
interestingly, even some actual world realizers of having pain may be “less than” having 
C-fibre stimulation. Since the locution of “less than” in this specific sense is not perfectly 
clear yet, I am not going to investigate how serious this problem is. 
Third, introducing the notion of “base” as I articulate it should be found problematic for 
the sake of explaining realization. I have argued in Chapters 2, 3 and 5 that a theory of 
realization ought to explain in what way mental properties are metaphysically necessitated 
by their realizers. If we make it true by definition that the realizer property is a base for the 
realized property, there would not be anything to explain with respect to metaphysical 
necessitation. The necessitation of the mental by the physical should be the consequence of 
the formulation of realization, not part of the definition of it.  
6.5.2 Explanation 
A more promising way of cashing out what the “interesting connection” might be in the 
formulation of Realization-Prior-Connectional is by means of appealing to the notion of 
explanatory connection: 
(Realization-Prior-Explanatory) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) 
the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P; (ii) P is more 
fundamental than Q; (iii) Q and P are explanatorily connected.  
Saying that two things are explanatorily connected is not saying that one fully explains the 
other. So, demanding that P and Q are explanatorily connected is not demanding that 
something‟s being P explains that thing‟s being Q (or that something‟s being Q explains 
that thing‟s being P). A requirement of explanation in this sense, which might also be 
called metaphysical explanation, or grounding (Fine 1994; Correia 2008; Rosen 2010; 
Schaffer 2010), is stronger than what I am intending to impose as a constraint on 
realization.  
Explanation, in the full, metaphysical, sense is something that is linked to grounding in a 
particular way. In a nutshell, metaphysical explanation should be understood along the 
following lines:  
 x‟s being red is (metaphysically) explained by x‟s being scarlet; 
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 x is red because (not in the causal sense of the term “because”) x is scarlet; 
 x is red in virtue of x‟s being scarlet; 
 x‟s being red is grounded in x‟s being scarlet. 
The reason that Realization-Prior-Explanatory does not invoke the notion of a full, 
metaphysical, explanation is that explanation, understood along the lines of the locutions 
listed above, is connected to metaphysical necessitation. All of the claims listed above 
entail a metaphysical necessitation claim, namely that being scarlet metaphysically 
necessitates being red.
73
 And when I eliminated the option of adding a minimal base 
constraint on realization in 6.1 above, I explained why building the metaphysical 
necessitation feature of realization into the definition of realization is not desirable. As I 
suggested in Chapters 1, 2 and 5, metaphysical necessitation should be a consequence of 
our account of realization.  
What we need is not a condition about full explanation, but rather a requirement about 
some explanatory connection. I do not know how this explanatory connection can be 
spelled out, but what I know is that it does not exist in the bad putative cases of realization 
considered above. Normally, something‟s being red has no explanatory connection to its 
being square, so it also should not have any explanatory connection to its being red and 
square; someone‟s believing that it is raining has no explanatory connection with that her 
brain‟s C-fibres firing, so it should not have any explanatory connection to her believing 
that it is raining and her brain’s C-fibres firing; so on and so forth.74 
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 Though, that grounding entails metaphysical necessitation is challenged by some; see Leuenberger (2014).   
74
 In some cases, something‟s colour and shape might be interestingly connected. For example, think of a 
blue paper with a red square-shaped image printed on it. What marks the boundaries, and hence the shape, 
of the red image is its difference in colour from the rest of the paper. I am excluding such cases from my 
analysis. 
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A brief remark about the notions of explanation and explanatory connection are in order. 
The notion of explanation might raise the worry that I am suggesting some subjective, 
mind-dependent, constraints on realization, because explanation is usually understood as 
an epistemic, mind-dependent phenomenon. However, this would be a misguided worry. 
The notion of explanation, or explanatory connection, that is at work here has nothing to 
do with explanation in this subjective sense. An objective understanding of explanation is 
coherent, and the idea of such a kind of explanation is a traditional one. As Koslicki 
maintains, it is sometimes thought that an explanatory connection between two phenomena 
“can be traced back to there being a law connecting [them]” (2012: 213, footnote 27, 
emphasis deleted). And the existence of laws is not a subjective matter. Or, think of the 
Aristotelian understanding of explanation. On this understanding, things are to be 
explained according to four causes: material cause, formal cause, final cause, and efficient 
cause. As Koslicki notes, although these four causes are explanations, they “are real and 
privileged constituents of the world” (ibid). So, they are not subjective explanations.  
The next question that I will consider is whether, in Realization-Prior-Explanatory, (iii) 
makes (ii) redundant. It might be thought that it does, because metaphysical explanations 
are always directional in the sense that what is explained is less fundamental than what 
explains it. But that would be a mistake. In Realization-Prior-Explanatory, what we have 
is not full explanation, but an explanatory connection. Still, the same worry might be 
(mistakenly) thought to apply: if two things are explanatorily connected in a metaphysical 
sense, even if the connection is not full metaphysical explanation, these two things should 
differ from each other with respect to their fundamentality. What underlies these remarks is 
the assumption that metaphysical explanation is a priority relation. But this assumption is 
dubious.  
The problem with this assumption is that we can have metaphysical explanations regarding 
only non-fundamental entities. Arguably sets are non-fundamental entities, or at least, they 
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are not as fundamental as their members. Take three sets: {a, b, c, d}, {a, b}, and {c, d}. 
The existence of the first set can be metaphysically explained in terms of the existences of 
the latter two sets; that is, the existence of the former set can be inferred from the existence 
of the latter two sets by using the axiom of union. Is the set {a, b} more fundamental than 
the set {a, b, c, d}? If it is more fundamental, then this requires an argument.
75
 Here is 
another example: the genus-species relation is arguably not a priority relation, but having a 
species property metaphysically explains having the genus property.
76
 So, I do not think 
that the addition of an explanatory connection requirement makes the priority requirement 
redundant. 
To sum up, I believe that it is possible to respond to worries about the (problematic) 
realization of believing that it is raining by the conjunctive property of (believing that it is 
raining & having C-fibre stimulation). In order to do this, we can posit a further condition 
on realization so that the realized property and the realizer property must be explanatorily 
connected: since there is no explanatory connection between believing that it is raining and 
having C-fibre stimulation, this example fails to be a case of realization.  
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the problem of conjunctive realizers for the subset view. The 
problem can be explained in terms of a dilemma: if the subset view is formulated without a 
restriction on conjunctive properties as realizers of their conjuncts, then the view 
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 I can think of one way of arguing for this, though: Suppose that Lewis (1991) is right about the relationship 
between set theory and mereology, so sets have their subsets as their parts, in the mereological sense of the 
term “part”. Assume that wholes are less fundamental than their composing parts. So {a, b, c, d} is less 
fundamental than {a, b}. I can happily discard this argument, by resisting the Lewisian proposal that is 
mentioned. 
76
 This, again, is controversial. Rosen (2010) thinks that the species property is explained by the genus 
property and the differentia property. Socrates is a human being because he is an animal and he is rational. 
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overgeneralises and we end up with bad cases of realization; if the view is formulated with 
a ban on conjunctive properties as realizers of their conjuncts, it follows that no property 
realizes any property. The right response to this problem is that this is a false dilemma. 
Only some, namely the bad, cases of conjunctive realizers should be ruled out. However, it 
is not an easy task to provide a principled way of demarcating between bad cases and the 
good ones. Shoemaker provides such a principled way of doing so. But as I explained, his 
strategy is not very good, because he builds the notion of “narrowing down” into the 
definition of realization, and this notion, according to the subset view, refers to realization. 
So, if we take Shoemaker‟s solution, we end up with a formulation of realization partly in 
terms of realization. 
I maintained that realization should be seen as a priority relation in the sense that a realized 
property is always less fundamental than its realizer(s). I argued that once this point is 
accepted, we can rule out the bad cases of conjunctive realizers and allow all the good 
cases. I considered a possible objection to my proposal, and argued that, if this objection is 
taken seriously, it can also be stipulated that the properties that are connected through 
realization are always explanatorily connected. 
In the next chapter, I will go back to the simplified version of the subset view (because the 
problem of conjunctive realizers can be ignored for the sake of the issues that are discussed 
that chapter), and evaluate the subset view‟s solution to the exclusion problem.  
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CHAPTER 7: REALIZATION AND THE EXCLUSION PROBLEM 
7.0 Introduction 
According to the theoretical role of realization specified in Chapter 2, the postulation of a 
realization relation between mental properties and their physical bases should not imply 
that mental properties are causally excluded by their physical bases. This is an important 
constraint, because I take realization to be a relation in terms of which (non-reductive) 
physicalism can be formulated, and it is commonly thought that this variety of physicalism 
faces the exclusion problem, namely the problem that mental properties are causally 
excluded by their realizers. The subset view of realization that I have focused on in this 
thesis is commonly advertised as a distinctive solution to it. In this chapter, I will examine 
the exclusion problem and the subset view‟s solution to this problem. I will argue that the 
solutions that the defenders of the subset view provide are available to all varieties of non-
reductive physicalism. This should not be seen as an objection to the subset view, but 
should be seen as an objection to the way it has been advertised.  
In 7.1, I will re-introduce the exclusion problem premise by premise. In 7.2, I will re-
introduce the simplified version of the subset view and provide the two solutions that the 
defenders of the view appeal to in order to solve the exclusion problem. The first solution 
is that mental property instances are proper parts of their realizing instances, and wholes do 
not causally exclude their parts. In the second solution, a distinction between causal 
sufficiency and causal relevance is made, and it is argued that although both realized and 
realizer properties can be causally sufficient, only one of them can be causally relevant. In 
7.3, I will critically examine the first solution, and argue that we should not take the subset 
view‟s defenders‟ claims about parthood literally. Once this is acknowledged, it can also 
be seen that the solution that is given is available to other varieties of non-reductive 
physicalism too. In 7.4, I will evaluate the second solution. I will argue that all defenders 
of non-reductive physicalism can appeal to the distinction between causal sufficiency and 
causal relevance.  
7.1 The Exclusion Problem 
In this section, I will introduce the exclusion argument, which purports to show that non-
reductive physicalism is false. Those who think that the exclusion problem is a problem 
suggest that if non-reductive physicalism is true, then mental properties are causally 
excluded by their realizers. They claim that any event that appears to be caused by a 
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mental property instance is already causally necessitated by the instantiation of the realizer 
of that mental property. Assuming that there is no systematic causal overdetermination, 
there is no room for mental causes, if mental properties are realized by physical properties. 
Jaegwon Kim (1989; 1998; 2005) is probably the most-cited source of the arguments that 
are purported to demonstrate this alleged problem for non-reductive physicalism.
77
 
The demonstration of the exclusion problem starts with the platitude that mental properties 
can be, and sometimes are, causes of physical events. For instance, my belief that it is 
raining can cause me to open my umbrella. Call the event of opening my umbrella E. It is 
natural to assign a causal role in this case to the property of believing that it is raining. Call 
this property M. But if non-reductive physicalism is true, then M, like every instantiated 
mental property, is physically realized. Let us call the realizer of this mental property P. 
Recall that realization is an asymmetric, and hence an irreflexive, relation, so P is not 
identical with M. Now consider the physicalistically acceptable principle that if a physical 
event has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. This principle has come to be known 
as the principle of causal closure, and is suggested to be a significant component of 
physicalism.
78
 The importance of it for physicalism comes from the contention that if 
physicalism is true then anything that is explainable can be fully explained by physics. 
Kim argues that if this principle were not true for what appear to be the effects of mental 
causes, then “to explain some physical events you must go outside the physical realm and 
appeal to nonphysical causal agents and laws governing behaviour!” (1996: 147). 
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 There is a debate as to whether the same can be said for chemical properties, biological properties and so 
on. Noordhof (1999) argues that Kim‟s argument, if it is sound, also shows that those properties are 
inefficacious too, insofar as they are multiply realized. Kim (1997; 1998; 1999) takes those properties to 
be micro-based and argues that the exclusion problem does not arise for micro-based properties. Micro-
based properties are properties like COMBO that I discussed in Chapter 3. However, it can be disputed 
that they are micro-based properties and that micro-based properties are not causally excluded. 
78
   See Montero (2003) for a critical survey of versions of this thesis. 
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So far, the picture we have is the following: M (believing that it is raining) causes E (my 
opening the umbrella). But as the principle of causal closure suggests, E has a sufficient 
physical cause too. Given that M is realized by P, we can unproblematically suppose that P 
is the sufficient physical cause of E in question. Given that M and P are not identical, it 
follows that E has two non-identical sufficient causes. Let us call this case UMBRELLA. 
Now, consider the exclusion principle: no event has multiple sufficient causes (that are 
instantiated simultaneously) unless it is genuinely causally overdetermined.
79
 So, 
according to this principle, unless we have a case of genuine causal overdetermination, the 
existence of one cause for a subsequent event rules out other possible simultaneous causes 
for the very same event. The exclusion principle is controversial, as I shall highlight in 7.3. 
So, let us not focus on how to motivate it. What is important for our purposes here is its 
consequences regarding UMBRELLA. Since E has two non-identical sufficient causes 
instantiated simultaneously, it follows from the exclusion principle that UMBRELLA is a 
case of genuine causal overdetermination: P and M causally overdetermine E.  
Before proceeding to the next steps of the demonstration of the problem, a short note on 
causal overdetermination is in order: a paradigm example of genuine causal 
overdetermination is the case where two snipers simultaneously shoot a victim and each 
shot is sufficient for the death of the victim. Let us call this case SNIPERS. It is clear that 
genuine causal overdetermination is possible, because SNIPERS is possible. It is not 
relevant whether there are actual cases of genuine causal overdetermination of this sort. 
If we were to stop the demonstration of the exclusion problem at this stage, generalising 
from UMBRELLA to all mental-to-physical-causation cases, we would conclude that non-
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 The addition of the simultaneity constraint is required so as not to rule out cases of causal chains. Take 
event E1 as a cause of event E2, and E2 as a cause of event E3. Assuming that causal sufficiency is transitive, 
both E1 and E2 are causally sufficient for E3, but this is obviously not a case of causal overdetermination. If 
it were, then almost every event would have been genuinely causally overdetermined. 
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reductive physicalism implies that mental properties and their physical realizers genuinely 
causally overdetermine their effects. However, the next step in the argument rejects this 
consequence. It says that mental properties and their realizers do not causally 
overdetermine their effects. The motivation for this comes from the contention that if such 
causal overdetermiantion is to be permitted, then systematic causal overdetermiantion has 
to be permitted, because whenever there is a mental property instance, there is also its 
realizer instance which is causally sufficient for the event that the mental property instance 
claims to cause. And, a prominent metaphor suggests that systematic causal 
overdetermination entails “bad engineering” on God‟s part, so we should not believe in 
such overdetermination.
80
 
Let us recap what we have seen so far: 
(1) Some mental properties are causes of physical events. (Mental Causation) 
(2) Mental properties are realized by physical properties. (Realization) 
(3) If a physical event has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. (Closure) 
(4) No event has multiple (simultaneous) sufficient causes unless it is genuinely 
causally overdetermined. (Exclusion) 
(5) Mental properties and their realizers do not causally overdetermine their effects. 
(No Overdetermination) 
And the argument for (5) goes as follows: 
(5a) If mental properties and their realizers causally overdetermine their effects, they 
do this systematically.  
(5b) There is no systematic causal overdetermination. 
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 See for example Schiffer‟s comments that “causal superfluousness is hard to believe in; it is hard to believe 
that God is such a bad engineer” (Schiffer 1987, quoted in Garett 1998: 355) 
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(5) Mental properties and their realizers do not causally overdetermine their effects. 
(No Overdetermination) 
Now, let us see what is at stake through UMBRELLA. (1)-(4) imply that UMBRELLA is a 
genuine case of causal overdetermination because M and P are non-identical sufficient 
causes of E. However, (5) says that this is not the case. Therefore, (1)-(5) are mutually 
inconsistent. At least one of (1)-(5) must be false. Depending on the dialectic, the target of 
the argument changes, but a dilemma along the following lines follows: either non-
reductive physicalism entails epiphenomalism (the view that mental properties are causally 
inert), or non-reductive physicalism is false. Accepting the first horn of the dilemma is not 
desirable, because it is given as a platitude that mental properties can be causes. So, non-
reductive physicalism is false. Or so would say an opponent of non-reductive physicalism. 
If the opponent in question is a reductive physicalist, she would target (2), because (2) 
postulates the non-identity of mental and physical properties. If the opponent is opposing 
the physicalist component, she could oppose either (2) or (3).
81
  
In the next section, I will introduce the subset view‟s response to the exclusion argument. 
7.2 The Subset View as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem 
If we take the exclusion argument that is introduced in the previous section seriously, then 
non-reductive physicalism seems to be in trouble. However, I believe that non-reductive 
physicalists have the resources to solve this problem. Here, I will introduce the subset 
view‟s solution to this problem.  
The subset view is sometimes advertised as a solution to the exclusion problem. 
Shoemaker says that his view “is designed to avoid this consequence [that mental 
properties are causally excluded]” (2007: 11). Similarly, Clapp maintains that, on his view, 
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 Emergentists can and do take these option. See O‟Connor & Churchill (2010). 
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“the problems forcefully presented by Kim concerning causal and explanatory exclusion of 
mental properties by physical properties do not arise” (2001: 133). Wilson also presents 
her version of the subset as a solution to the exclusion problem (1999: 47-48). 
According to the simplified version of the subset view, a property P realizes a property Q 
if and only if the causal powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P. (Recall 
that, in Chapter 6, I found this simplified formulation problematic because it entails that all 
properties are realizable and all conjunctive properties realize their conjuncts. I argued that, 
in addition to the subset relation between their causal powers, realizer and realized 
properties should also have a priority relation in the sense that realized properties are 
always less fundamental than their realizers. Since nothing in this chapter hinges on this 
problem, and since this problem can be solved, I will sidestep it and work with the 
simplified version of the subset view.)  
There are two strategies that are appealed to by the defenders of the subset view to solve 
the exclusion problem. The first strategy is to show that mental properties and their 
realizers do not (genuinely or problematically) causally overdetermine their effects because 
mental property instances are parts of their realizers. The second strategy appeals to a 
distinction between causal sufficiency and causal relevance and an arguement that 
although both a realized property and its realizer can be causally sufficient for a subsequent 
event, only one can be causally relevant. I shall discuss these two strategies in 7.2.1 and 
7.2.2 respectively.  
7.2.1 The Parthood Strategy  
The first strategy is to show that the proper subset relationship between the causal powers 
of a realized property and its realizer explains why mental properties are not causally 
excluded by their realizers. The idea is as follows: because of the proper subset relation 
between the causal powers of these properties, there is a part-whole relation between the 
instances of these properties. According to Shoemaker, the “instantiation of a realizer 
property … might naturally be said to include as a part, the instantiation of the … property 
that is realized” (2007: 11). And this is supposed to be the key to the solution of the 
exclusion problem. As Clapp writes, “just as there is no causal and/or explanatory 
competition between a whole and its parts, so there is no causal and/or explanatory 
competition between instances of mental properties and instances of their physical 
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[realizers]” (2001: 133). This point about the instances applies to the properties: there is no 
causal competition between mental properties and their realizers.
82
 
I set aside until the next section the discussion of how to establish the aforementioned part-
whole relation. Now, let us see how the alleged part-whole relation between mental 
properties and their realizers solves the exclusion problem. Here is an analogy that 
Shoemaker uses. Suppose that Smith is killed by a salvo of shots. But suppose also that, 
among the salvo, there is only one shot, namely Jones‟ shot, which hits the target. Let us 
call this case SALVO. It would be right to say that the “salvo killed Smith, but it did so 
because it included a particular shot, Jones‟, that killed Smith” (Shoemaker 2007: 13). 
With respect to killing Smith, there is no causal competition between the salvo as a whole 
and Jones‟ shot. By analogy, regarding UMBRELLA, we can say that there is no causal 
competition between the P instance and the M instance, because the latter is a part of the 
former. Here, the disanalogy between these two cases on the one hand and SNIPERS on 
the other hand should be noted: in the latter case, the two causes (two shots) are not related 
to each other by a part-whole relation, and if it were the case that any event could have at 
most one cause, we would have to say that one of these causes is excluded.  
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 This solution to the exclusion problem is inspired by Yablo‟s (1992) solution. Yablo thinks that mental 
properties are determinable properties whose determinate properties are their physical realizers, and that 
determinable properties and their determinates are not in causal competition for their effects. (See Chapter 
3 for my discussion of Yablo‟s view.) Determinables and their determinates are not in causal competition, 
because they are in the “same team” (ibid: 259). Yablo explains the “same team” metaphor in the 
following way. “Take for example the claim that a space completely filled by one object can contain no 
other. Then are even the object's parts crowded out? No. In this competition wholes and parts are not on 
opposing teams” (ibid: emphasis deleted). Yablo‟s explanation is that just as physical objects and their 
parts do not compete for the occupation of space, determinables and their determinates do not compete for 
causing subsequent events. Based on this analogy of parthood, Yablo then says that determinable 
properties and their determinates are in a part-whole relation. (See also Yablo 2001: 4-5). 
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It is worth asking why, in SALVO (and by analogy, in UMBRELLA too) there is no causal 
competition. Regarding SALVO, Shoemaker appears to have two conflicting intuitions. In 
one place, he says that SALVO “is obviously not a case of overdetermination” (ibid). On 
this reading, Shoemaker is resisting the exclusion argument, because he is rejecting 
premise (4), namely the exclusion principle. The salvo as a whole and Jones‟ shot are non-
identical events, and they are both causally sufficient for the subsequent event. Although 
we have non-identical events that cause the very same event, we do not have a case of 
causal overdetermination. By analogy, UMBRELLA is not a case of causal 
overdetermination either. 
Elsewhere, regarding the very same case, namely SALVO, Shoemaker says that this is “not 
overdetermination of an objectionable sort” (2007: 53).83 This appears to conflict with 
what he says above. There, he says that SALVO is not a case of causal overdetermination. 
Now, it seems that Shoemaker grants that it is a case of overdetermination, but it is not a 
problematic one.
84
 Putting aside this apparent conflict momentarily, it is clear that we can 
resist the exclusion argument anyway. On this reading, premise (5b) turns out to be false: 
SALVO could be a case of causal overdetermination because systematic causal 
overdetermination is not ruled out. Every case in which both a whole and a part of that 
whole are causally sufficient for a subsequent event would be a case of causal 
overdetermination. The bus runs over and kills Frank, but the half of the bus is sufficiently 
big and heavy to be lethal. Neil has food poisoning from a portion of chicken pakora, but 
only one piece of chicken in the whole portion is bad. Examples can be multiplied. But 
since such cases are common and undeniable, it is wrong to think that accepting them 
would be problematic. 
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 See also Shoemaker (2001: 436) for similar remarks in an earlier text without reference to SALVO. 
84
 Morris (2011) observes this apparent conflict too. As I shall illustrate below, I think this conflict is 
resolved with a charitable reading of Shoemaker. 
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Although Shoemaker‟s two interpretations of SALVO seem to conflict, I think there is a 
way of reconciling them: we can take genuine overdetermination as the type of 
overdetermination which is problematic when it is systematic. So, when we say that 
SALVO is not a case of problematic overdetermination even though it is a case of 
systematic overdetermination, we say that it is not genuine overdetermination. By analogy, 
UMBRELLA is not a case of genuine overdetermination, because even though it is an 
instance of systematic causal overdetermination, it is not problematic to grant its existence.  
7.2.2 The Relevance Strategy 
Now, let us move to the second strategy of the defenders of the subset view: the appeal to 
the notion of causal relevance. On his other comments on the exclusion problem, 
Shoemaker suggests that the subset view not only vindicates the causal efficacy of mental 
properties, but it also gives reasons to think that, in some cases, realizer properties could be 
causally excluded by realized properties (2007:14). 
Recall that, when considering the first strategy, we saw that the P instance in UMBRELLA 
is a cause of E in virtue of including the M instance as a part. Although this seems to 
suggest a compatibilist reading where both P and M are causes, we see Shoemaker 
suggesting that, because of the in-virtue-of relation, M has priority over P with respect to 
causing E. This priority claim will become more evident in the subsequent discussion. 
In order to see how the second strategy works, let us consider the case SOPHIE, which is 
originally introduced by Yablo (1992). Sophie is a pigeon that is trained to peck at all and 
only red things she sees. Suppose that Sophie is shown a scarlet patch. Since scarlet 
patches are red, she pecks at this patch. Inspired by Yablo, the defenders of the subset view 
all think that determinable properties are realized by their determinates. So take the 
determinable property being red to be realized by its determinate being scarlet in this 
example. Regarding SOPHIE, Shoemaker says that  
[t]his instantiation of red was realized in an instantiation of scarlet, and the 
instantiation of scarlet was of course causally sufficient (in the circumstances) 
for the occurrence of Sophie's pecking. But it seems right to say that it was the 
instantiation of red, not the instantiation of scarlet, that caused Sophie's 
pecking” (2007: 14, emphasis added). 
Now, recall UMBRELLA. By analogy, it might be said that although both M and P are 
causally sufficient for E, it is right to think that M, rather than P, is the cause of E. So, 
Shoemaker‟s intuitions seem to have transformed from a compatibilist account to an 
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exclusion account. In SOPHIE, being red excludes being scarlet. In UMBRELLA, M 
excludes P. And by analogy, in SALVO, Jones‟ shot would exclude the whole salvo.  
If we are to agree with this new exclusion account, we have to endorse a distinction 
between a sufficient cause and a relevant cause. In SOPHIE, while both being red and 
being scarlet are sufficient for the pecking behaviour, only being red qualifies as a relevant 
cause. Being scarlet is causally sufficient, but it is not causally relevant. One of the 
sufficient causes excludes the other as a relevant cause. I will discuss the understanding of 
causation that underlies this reasoning in 7.4 below. 
In the last two subsections, I introduced the subset view‟s two strategies to solve the 
exclusion problem. In the next two sections, I will examine these two strategies 
respectively.  
7.3 Examining the Parthood Strategy 
Now, I will critically examine the first strategy that the defenders of the subset view appeal 
to in their response to the exclusion problem. The solution goes as follows: mental 
property instances are parts of their realizer instances, and parts and wholes do not causally 
compete. Since their instances do not causally compete, the properties are not causal 
competitors either. 
The idea that mental property instances are parts of their realizer instances seems to have a 
significant role in this solution. However, it is not established how this parthood relation 
can obtain. From the fact that the causal powers of a property Q are a proper subset of the 
causal powers of a property P, it does not straightforwardly follow that any P instance 
includes a Q instance as a part. Melnyk (2006) observes this gap between the subset claim 
and the parthood claim, and offers the defenders of the subset view a solution to close this 
gap. According to this solution, properties are identified with the sets of causal powers they 
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confer.
85
 And corresponding to this identification of properties and sets of causal powers, 
the instances of these properties can be identified with sets of the tokens of these causal 
powers.
86
 If property instances are identified with sets of token causal powers that are 
associated with these properties, any property instance, which is identical with a set of such 
powers, would include the instances of the properties it realizes.  
To illustrate, suppose that property P has causal powers cp1, cp2 and cp3, and that 
property Q has causal powers cp1 and cp2. Suppose that an individual S instantiates P. 
This instantiation of P would be identical with the set {cp1S, cp2S, cp3S} (where cpnx 
should be read as the tokening of cpn in individual x). This set includes the set {cp1S, 
cp2S}, which would be identical with the instantiation of Q in S. So the instantiation of P 
in S includes the instantiation of Q in S. 
The first problem with this solution is that it commits the subset view to more than it is 
originally committed to. In fact, Melnyk presents this “solution” as some sort of a reductio 
against the subset view. Naturally, the defenders of the subset view would have the burden 
of proof to justify the identification of property instances with sets of token causal powers, 
and the identification of properties with sets of causal power types. I should note that it is 
possible to defend this view, but the problem is that this is an additional task, and the 
subset view, as it is advertised by Shoemaker, is independent of this view (2007: 142).
87
 
The second problem with this solution is that even if the defenders of the subset view can 
justify the aforementioned identification claim, it still does not follow that a P instance 
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 The identity of properties with sets of causal powers is something that Shoemaker (1980) has argued for 
independently of the issues related to the subset view. However, he wants to keep the subset view 
independent from this view (2007: 142). See Chapter 5 above for my examination of this dissociation.  
86
 I called the thesis that Melnyk commits the subset view Power-Instance-Identity in Chapter 5. 
87
 However, see Chapter 5 above. In Chapter 5, I argued that keeping the subset view independent of similar 
metaphysical commitments is not possible. 
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includes a Q instance as a part. What follows is that Q instance is a subset of the P instance. 
In order for the intended conclusion to follow, we need to endorse the view that sets have 
their subsets as parts. Again, it is possible to defend this view. It might be argued that there 
is a mereological relation between two entities although it prima facie does not seem to be 
so.
88
 The problem is that this is still an additional commitment for the subset view, which 
requires an argument. And, regardless of the possibility of the success of the required 
argument, it would reduce the logical space for the subset view even further.  
Based on these observations, it would be fair to say that the defenders of the subset view 
have not made a persuasive case for the claim that realized property instances are parts of 
their realizer instances. (Perhaps, they will in the future.) But does this mean that the subset 
view cannot solve the exclusion problem? 
It is true, or at least very plausible, that parts and wholes do not genuinely (or 
problematically) causally overdetermine their effects. There is something intuitive to the 
idea that SALVO is not a case of genuine (or problematic) overdetermination. So, 
Shoemaker‟s intuitions about SALVO seem right. Given this, the following two are true: 
(a) Jones‟ shot is not causally excluded by the whole salvo;  
(b) Jones‟ shot is a part of the salvo.  
Moreover, it is true that (b) entails (a), because of the general rule that parts and wholes are 
not causal competitors. What is disputable is whether the part-whole relation is required to 
explain away the causal competition.  
Consider a relation R which is logically weaker than proper parthood. That is, for all x and 
y, that y is a proper part of x entails xRy, but xRy does not entail that y is a proper part of x. 
And suppose further that R is a relation such that if xRy, then x and y do not causally 
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  Lewis (1991) thinks that classes have their subclasses as mereological parts. 
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compete. If we can show that there is some relation that occupies the role R as specified, 
and if it can be demonstrated that, in SALVO, Jones‟ shot and the salvo are related with 
this relation, then we can have an explanation for (a) that would be less committal than (b). 
What could occupy the role of R as specified above? I suggest that a good candidate is 
asymmetric necessitation. Asymmetric necessitation is weaker than proper parthood in the 
sense specified above. If something is a proper part of another thing, the presence of the 
latter asymmetrically necessitates the presence of the former.
89
 But the presence of 
something could asymmetrically necessitate the presence of another thing without the latter 
being a proper part of the former. That is, proper parthood is only a species of asymmetric 
necessitation. (For example, the existence of a statue is asymmetrically necessitated by the 
existence of the lump of clay that constitutes the statue. But on a standard understanding of 
material constitution, the statue is not a proper part of the lump of clay.) And things that 
are related through asymmetric necessitation are not causal competitors. This latter claim is 
less obvious than the former, but it is defensible, as I will argue below. 
The idea that there is no “genuine” causal overdetermination when there is a necessitation 
relation between two causes has been around for a while (Block 1990; Yablo 1992; Garrett 
1998; Funkhouser 2002; Bennett 2003; Sider 2003; Kallestrup 2006). Variants of the case 
of SNIPERS can be seen as examples of genuine, or “standard”, causal overdetermination. 
The disanalogy between SNIPERS and SALVO is clear. None of the shots necessitates the 
other in SNIPERS. But in SALVO, the presence of the whole salvo necessitates the 
presence of Jones‟ shot. (Here, I am assuming mereological essentialism, namely the view 
that wholes have their parts essentially. If this is found problematic, the same point could 
be made by granting that most salvos have proper parts which are lethal collections of 
shots. So, such lethal salvos necessarily include lethal proper parts.) 
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  I am assuming mereological essentialism here. I shall comment on this assumption below. 
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Now, the question is why there is no genuine causal overdetermination when causes are 
related by a necessitation relation. Bennett (2003, 2008) provides an account of causal 
overdetermination thanks to which we can have an answer to this question. While it is 
difficult to provide a full account of genuine causal overdetermination, we can give an 
account of some of its necessary conditions. In order for an event E to be causally 
overdetermined by two non-identical events A and B, A must be causally sufficient for E 
when B is absent, and B must be causally sufficient for E when A is absent. Although it is 
not required to invoke a counterfactual theory of causation in order to explain causal 
overdetermination, we can appeal to subjunctive conditionals to formulate it. The 
overdetermination test that Bennett gives goes as follows: 
(OD) (For non-identical events X, Y and Z) X and Y causally overdetermine Z only if 
(i) if X had happened without Y, Z would have happened; (ii) if Y had happened 
without X, Z would have happened; (iii) the conditions (i) and (ii) are not vacuously 
true.
90
 
Now, let us consider SNIPERS. Let us say that event A is sniper A‟s shooting the victim, 
event B is the sniper B‟s shooting the victim, and event C is the death of the victim. First, if 
A had happened but B had not happened, C would still have happened. Second, if B had 
happened but A had not happened, C would still have happened. Third, the two conditions 
are not vacuously true: A without B (and likewise, B without A) is not impossible. So, the 
case is not disqualified as causal overdetermination by (OD).  
However, SALVO fails the test. The reason is that the whole salvo necessitates Jones‟ shot: 
it would not have been the same salvo without thereby including Jones‟ shot, if 
mereological essentialism is true. Even if mereological essentialism is false, it would not 
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 The subjunctive conditional “if P were the case, Q would have been the case” is vacuously true when P is 
necessarily false. 
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have been a lethal SALVO without including a lethal part. This means that it is only 
vacuously true that if the salvo were present and Jones‟ shot were absent, then Smith 
would have died. Similarly, in UMBRELLA, it is only vacuously true that if I had 
instantiated P without instantiating M, I would have opened my umbrella, because it is not 
possible to instantiate P without thereby instantiating M. It is stipulated from the outset that 
P metaphysically necessitates M. That mental properties are metaphysically necessitated 
by their realizers (in the worlds where physicalism is true) is already a part of physicalism. 
Strictly speaking, it is not required by physicalism that a given realizer property, on its own, 
is metaphysically sufficient for a property it realizes. What is metaphysically sufficient is 
usually the total realizer, and this includes the core realizer (which is the property that is 
readily thought to be the realizer property), the appropriate background conditions.
91
 But 
then, what I said in the previous paragraph might be resisted. After all, having P without M 
is possible when the appropriate background conditions do not obtain (or the laws of nature 
are different). In that case, the conditional in question would not be vacuously true. 
However, there is an available response to this objection: although this conditional would 
not be vacuously true in this case, it would not be true anyway. If the appropriate 
background conditions do not obtain, nothing guarantees that E happens when P is 
instantiated (Bennett 2008: 288-289). 
If these observations are correct, then UMBRELLA is not case of genuine causal 
overdetermination regardless of whether the M instance is a part of the P instance or not. 
What is important is that M is necessitated by P. Considerations like these provide reasons 
to reject the premise (4) or (5b) in the exclusion argument. There could be non-identical 
causes for a subsequent event without genuine (or problematic) causal overdetermination. 
Both the salvo and Jones‟ shot are causally sufficient for Smith‟s death. Both M and P are 
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 See Chapter 2 above for a more detailed discussion of total and core realization distinction. 
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causally sufficient for E. Neither case is a case of genuine (or problematic) causal 
overdetermination.
92
   
So, when Shoemaker says that SALVO is not a case of causal overdetermination, he 
actually echoes the aforementioned contention that there is a significant difference between 
cases like SALVO and cases like SNIPERS. Since asymmetric necessitation is weaker than 
parthood and sufficient to explain away the causal competition, the positing of the 
parthood relation between the realized properties and their realizers is a step that 
Shoemaker and other defenders of the subset view do not need to take. And, considering 
the problems associated with the demonstration of the part-whole relation between mental 
property instances and their realizers, perhaps it is a step that they should avoid. 
Others who take the subset view‟s parthood claims literally include Audi (2011) and 
Morris (2011). They both raise objections against the subset view based on this. Morris 
(2011) poses the following problem. Taking realized property instances as parts of their 
realizers leads us to a conclusion which is at odds with physicalism. According to 
physicalism, a mental property instance depends on the physical property instance that 
realizes it. However, when part-whole relations are considered, standardly, it is thought 
that wholes depend on parts, not vice versa. So, by analogy, the subset view takes physical 
properties (as wholes) to depend on mental properties (their parts). Audi makes a similar 
point when he says that realizer properties, “on the … [subset] view, are the wholes, and 
hence not ontically prior to what they realize. So this view fails to accommodate a basic 
feature of realization” (2011: 16). Once the parthood relation that is stipulated by 
Shoemaker is not taken literally as a mereological realization, Morris‟s and Audi‟s 
objections can easily be rejected. 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
92
 See Arnadottir & Crane (2013) for a recent article against the exclusion principle. They argue that the 
exclusion principle “is contrary to our ordinary judgments about causation, has no strong independent 
defence, and ought to be rejected” (ibid: 253). 
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My claims in this section lead to a dilemma for the subset view: either the subset view‟s 
solution to the exclusion problem requires the parthood claim, or it requires less than this. 
If the parthood claim is required, then the defenders of the subset view should explain how 
the subset condition on the causal powers of properties entails the part-whole relation 
between the instances of these properties. The commitments that are required for this 
explanation reduce the plausibility of the view. On the other hand, if a weaker relation than 
parthood is sufficient for this solution, the most plausible candidate is asymmetric 
necessitation. However, if this sort of necessitation is what is required to solve the 
exclusion problem, then the subset view becomes superfluous with respect to the solution 
to the exclusion problem, because any form of non-reductive physicalism can use this 
strategy. Realization is stipulated by all non-reductive physicalists as an asymmetric 
necessitation relation. Of course, merely saying that the mental is metaphysically 
necessitated by the physical is one thing, explaining how that is so is another thing. And, I 
believe that the subset view has the resources to explain how that is so. But with respect to 
responding to the exclusion argument, this is a step that is not required. 
So, this is not an argument against the subset view, a version of which I proposed. Instead, 
I intend to show that it is misleading to advertise the subset view as if it is a distinctive 
solution to the exclusion problem. In the next section, I will critically examine the second 
strategy that the defenders of the subset view appeal to. 
7.4 Examining the Relevance Strategy 
In the previous section, I argued that the first strategy that the defenders of the subset view 
ultimately appeal to in their response to the exclusion problem can be used by all forms of 
non-reductive physicalism. In this section, I will discuss their second strategy, and argue 
for a similar conclusion. 
Suppose that the exclusion principle as it is given in premise (4) is false. Can there be a 
plausible version of the exclusion principle other than the one given in (4)?  As I 
mentioned in 7.2 above, Shoemaker seems to provide an exclusion account although he 
rejects (4), which seems to suggest that he appeals to a different exclusion principle. This 
is clearer in his discussion of SOPHIE, where he thinks that being scarlet does not seem to 
be the right cause of the pecking behaviour. In a way, being red excludes being scarlet, 
although both are casually sufficient for the pecking behaviour. This different exclusion 
principle could be formulated along the following lines: 
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(NewEx) If there are simultaneous multiple sufficient causes for an event E, only one 
of these is an appropriate cause of E, unless E is genuinely causally overdetermined. 
According to this new exclusion principle, unless we have a case of genuine causal 
overdetermination, we can choose at most one of the causally sufficient conditions as an 
appropriate cause of E. In SOPHIE, being red is the appropriate cause. In UMBRELLA, M 
is such a cause. In SALVO, Jones‟s shot is the appropriate cause. And finally, in SNIPERS, 
both shots are causes, and because of this, SNIPERS is a case of genuine causal 
overdetermination. 
The idea that is expressed by NewEx should not be uniquely associated with the subset 
view: Yablo (1992) and Menzies (2008; 2013)
93
 have argued for the plausibility of a 
principle like this. The plausibility of NewEx hinges on the plausibility of the distinction 
between sufficient causes and relevant causes. As Menzies notes, 
the fact that causal sufficiency doesn‟t amount to causation has been known for 
some time ... A man‟s taking a contraceptive pill is causally sufficient for his 
not getting pregnant, [but] there is no causal relevance here, as the man‟s 
taking a contraceptive pill makes no difference to his not getting pregnant 
(2013: 71-2). 
What we need to pay attention to is the notion of causal relevance. There are different 
ways of cashing out what causal relevance is. Here, I will sketch two ways of doing so.  
First, it is possible to explain causal relevance in terms of proportionality. Yablo (1992) 
thinks that causes should be proportional to their effects as much as possible. And 
proportionality is understood as follows: a cause should be required by the effect in the 
sense that nothing less than it would have caused the event, and a cause should be enough 
for the effect in the sense that nothing more is needed to cause the event. When Yablo 
originally introduced the case of SOPHIE, he suggested that being red is a better candidate 
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than being scarlet for causing the pecking behaviour because, in this case, being red is a 
better candidate for proportionality. Being red is both required and enough for the pecking 
behaviour; although being scarlet is enough for the same behaviour, it is not required by 
the effect; if the patch were crimson, Sophie would still have pecked.  
NewEx can be formulated in terms of this proportionality account of causation in the 
following way: 
(NewEx-Proportionality) If there are simultaneous multiple sufficient causes for an 
event E, only one of these is a proportional cause of E, unless E is genuinely causally 
overdetermined. 
In SOPHIE, NewEx-Proportionality excludes being scarlet in favour of being red. In 
SALVO, it excludes the salvo in favour of Jones‟ shot. But we can consider another case 
(another recurring example in this debate) where Sophie‟s sister Alice is trained to peck at 
all and only scarlet things. She is given a scarlet patch, and she pecks. Let us call this case 
ALICE. In ALICE, being scarlet excludes being red, because being red (although 
required), is not enough for the pecking behaviour; Alice would not have pecked at a 
crimson patch. 
Second, we can explain causal relevance by means of appealing to the notion of difference-
making. Considering SOPHIE, Menzies says the following: 
the target‟s being red makes a difference to the pigeon‟s pecking because in 
any relevantly similar situation in which the pigeon is presented with a red 
target it pecks, and in any relevantly similar situation in which it is not 
presented with a red target it does not  ... [These] observations confirm the 
conjecture that the requirement that causes make a difference to their effects 
captures the crucial notion of causal relevance (2013: 73). 
With this account of causation as difference-making, we can reformulate NewEx as follows: 
(NewEx-Difference) If there are simultaneous multiple sufficient causes for an event 
E, only one of these is a difference-making cause of E, unless E is genuinely causally 
overdetermined. 
Similar results will be obtained when NewEx-Difference is applied to the cases that we 
have been considering.  
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The proportionality and the difference-making accounts are not the only two accounts of 
causation by which we can highlight the distinction between a sufficient cause and a 
relevant cause. But the discussion of these two accounts suffices to show that what is at 
work in the subset view‟s second strategy is this distinction. The subset view does not 
provide an additional account of why there is such a distinction. If this is correct, then, 
regarding this second strategy, we can conclude that any non-reductive physicalist is free 
to appeal to it. This strategy‟s tenability does not provide any extra support for the subset 
view. Again, this is not an objection against the subset view. Rather, it intends to show that 
if the subset view can solve the exclusion problem, so can other variants of non-reductive 
physicalism.  
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I evaluated the subset view‟s response to the exclusion problem. I discussed 
the two strategies that the defenders of the subset view use in order to solve this problem. I 
maintained that if these solutions work, they work independently of the truth of the subset 
view. The first strategy boils down to the observation that mental properties and their 
realizers do not causally overdetermine their effects because they are connected through an 
asymmetric necessitation relation. But any non-reductive physicalist can appeal to this 
strategy, because, realization is, by stipulation, an asymmetric necessitation relation. On 
the other hand, if the second strategy works, it works in virtue of the distinction between 
causal sufficiency and causal relevance. Any non-reductive physicalist can appeal to this 
distinction. These considerations support the conclusion that the subset view should not be 
advertised as a distinctive solution to the exclusion problem, because the strategies that its 
defenders use are open to all non-reductive physicalists.  
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have argued that physicalism should be formulated as a realization thesis: 
mental properties are realized by physical properties. I have argued that the core idea of the 
subset view provides a helpful formulation of realization. So, if physicalism is true: the 
causal powers of a given mental property are a proper subset of the causal powers of its 
realizer. Although the core idea of the subset view is presumably true, there is more to 
realization than the proper subset relationship between causal powers of properties. In 
particular, if realization were simply the said proper subset relationship between causal 
powers of properties, it would also be true that, first, all properties (including the 
fundamental ones) are realizable by other properties, and second, every conjunctive 
property is a realizer of its conjuncts. I suggested that we should take realization to be a 
priority relation to solve this problem: a realizer property is always more fundamental than 
the properties it realizes. From these observations, I proposed that the following 
formulation of realization is plausible: 
(Realization-Prior) A property P realizes a property Q if and only if (i) the causal 
powers of Q are a proper subset of the causal powers of P, and (ii) P is more 
fundamental than Q.
94
 
I maintained that physicalists‟ intuitions as to which properties are more fundamental than 
others match their intuitions as to when there is a case of realization. 
Given that it is one of the core ideas of physicalism that mental properties are 
metaphysically necessitated by physical properties, and that physicalism in my 
understanding is the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties, a 
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 Although I am not entirely convinced about this, in case some counterexamples to this formulation might 
be generated, a third condition on realization can be added so that P is explanatorily connected to Q. I 
discuss this in detail in Chapter 6, Section 6.5.2. 
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theory of realization should provide the resources to explain how it is the case that if a 
property P realizes a property Q, then, necessarily, if something has P, it also has Q. If 
realization is the relation that is specified in Realization-Prior, then the metaphysical 
necessitation feature of realization should ideally be explainable in terms of a relationship 
between properties and their causal powers. I argued that if the causal thesis is true then 
the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can easily be explained. The causal 
thesis is the conjunction of the following two theses: 
(C1) Properties are individuated by their causal profiles. 
(C2) Properties have their causal profiles essentially.  
Although the causal thesis might be required for a theory of realization that endorses 
Realization-Prior, it should be noted that both (C1) and (C2) are very controversial theses. 
Those who find these two theses implausible will have indirect reasons to find the theory 
of realization I have defended implausible too.  
By and large, theories of realization have focused on issues about mental causation; many 
theories of realization have been motivated by the solutions they give to the exclusion 
problem. The exclusion problem is the alleged problem that mental properties are causally 
excluded by their realizers because all the causal work that appears to be done by a given 
mental property is already carried out by its realizer. I argued that a theory of realization 
should provide the resources to explain how mental causation is possible, so show how the 
exclusion problem is not a real problem. I concluded that the real solution to the exclusion 
problem boils down to the claim that mental properties are not metaphysically distinct 
from their realizers. Since Realization-Prior, coupled with the causal thesis, can easily 
explain how a mental property is metaphysically necessitated by its realizer, the exclusion 
problem can be easily responded to under the version of physicalism that I formulated in 
this thesis. 
I have clarified the notion of realization by mapping out its connections to the formulation 
of physicalism, a general metaphysics of properties, causal powers and laws of nature, 
causation in general, and mental causation in particular. I hope that the future research on 
these and related issues will benefit from the discussions and the arguments I have given 
and the strategy I have endorsed. I expect that similar strategies can be used for studying 
and formulating other views regarding the mind-body problem and the relations those 
views postulate.  
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